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The Army, in a period of constrained resources and
increasing demands on its leaders, can ill afford to pursue
leadership training which is ineffective. The evaluation plan
developed in this study seeks to provide the decision maker with
information necessary to guide the training development
towards its desireed outcome: producing better leaders.
A review of the leadership theories contributing to the
Army's organizational leadership model, their training programs,
and the leadership training of the other services is presented.
Their methods of program evaluation are studied.
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change, behavioral change, and the change in organizational
performance. Each is discussed in terms of its source of data,
experimental design, and contribution to the overall under-
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scheme is presented in an action plan format to coincide with
other ongoing initiatives in the leadership and educational fields
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A. INTRODUCTION
The military forces of this nation, as a microcosm of
society, can look to a future of rapid change along all
fronts. In order to develop plans and programs which will
be carried into the new century these environmental trends
must be plotted and dealt with new. Within the next twenty
years the 13 to 24 year old population will decline by 217,.
This will require that almost 50% of all male high school
graduates be recruited by 1995 to meet authorized strength
levels as compared to 40% in 1930 QJS Army Strategic Studies
Institute, 1978, p. 62]. The soldier of the 30 ' s and 90 '
s
will serve in a technology and system intensive organization
whose objective will turn from equipping the man to manning
the equipment. Demands for technicians will outnumber the
supply as new equipment is placed into the field. Into this
environment he/she will bring an increased demand for indi-
vidual rights and independence, and will be mere vocal about
perceived abuses of his/her time and talents.
Officers will receive mere specialized assignments, be




Leadership and mission accomplishment will be functions
of technical expertise, qualification in multiple skill
areas, and cognitive ability to analyze, sort, and se-
lect alternative courses of action from wide varieties
of digital output. At the same time, leaders and per-
sonnel managers will not be able to exert control or
influence activities simply through the use of directive
authority. A leader's success in motivating and directing
subordinates will be based on the ability to use a varying
combination of leadership skills and approaches effec-
tively in a variety of management situations.
(US Army Strategic Studies
Institute, 1978, p. 6|
To prepare our leaders to meet the challenge is the task
of the various military training systems. This training will
be plagued with budgetary restrictions as funds go into more
sophisticated hardware. The result will be fewer courses
offering long term resident instruction, greater reliance on
exportable training packages, and short-term (temporary duty)
courses stressing technical skills. This course of action
began several years ago in the Army following a study of the
1973 Mid-East war.
The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command began revising
school curricula to emphasize technical competence in the
operation and employment of our weapons systems. Funds,
however, were not available to lengthen the courses. The
result -- some of the more traditional subjects relating
to officer development were dropped out.
Review of Education and
Training for Officers, 1978,
p. v]
This philosophy towards training will fail to prepare
the leader (commander, leader, manager) to deal with the
greatest resource available, people. Leadership training
12

in the Army has not been 'dropped out 1 or cut back due to
a lack of importance, but because a baseline for leadership
doctrine development activities has not been formally estab-
lished and a failure to establish a correlation between what
was being taught and the resulting tangible benefits in the
operational units.
Leadership, more than any one factor, must serve as the
cornerstone for shaping the Army environment of the 1980' s.
It will be leadership which provides us with the vision
and inspiration to deal with some of the most complex
problems to confront a peacetime Army in our country's
history and simultaneously prepare our soldiers for war.
Leadership makes things happen. It is leadership which
creates and shapes unit environments which inspire soldier
motivation and commitment; it is leadership which shapes
unit cohesion; and it is leadership which must work col-
lectively to shield soldiers and units from the dysfunc-
tional forces and tendencies which are natural spinoffs
of centralization and technical innovation. Thus, we
must consciously direct our attention and commitment to
leadership training and development if it is to be the
force which creates an environment conducive to training
and molds our soldiers into units prepared to go to war.
[Rojas, 1980, p. 3]
As the 1980 's begin there exists an opportunity to
rectify this problem. A doctrine for leader development
has been promulgated and a Department of the Army level
conference convened to plan for its implementation. The
subject of program evaluation remains to be addressed in
order to complete the transition to a more effective Army.
B. THE NEED FOR EVALUATING LEADERSHIP TRAINING
All programs eventually reach a point in their implementa-
tion where the designer or manager evaluates its relative
13

effectiveness against some established criterion. Just as
the project manager would be remiss in failing to analyze a
project not yielding its expected rate of return, why then
doesn't this realization of importance of evaluation extend
to training? McGehee and Thayer [1961] drew an analogy
between training evaluation and Mark Twain's comment about
the weather, i.e. "everybody talks about it, but nobody does
anything about it." [Blumenfeld and Crane, 1973, p. 42]
A quick review of the training literature however, reveals
the practice of evaluation has not kept pace with the
prescription. Evaluation research is conspicuous by its
absence and when present is frequently remiss in applying
appropriate controls to draw reasonably valid conclusions.
(TBunker and Cohen, 1978, p. 4]
Organizations, reluctant to assess training programs,
frequently cite one or more of the following reasons for
not evaluating:
1. Lack of funds, evaluation is too expensive.
2. An unshakeable belief that their training works.
3. It is impossible to get accurate results, so that
What is really being said is: "We are afraid that the eval-
uation will show we are doing something wrong or have made
the wrong decisions and we would rather not know about it."
The hazard of this 'head in the sand' attitude is similar
to a type I or type II error in statistics: type I, accepting
the program when it is bad and suffering the consequence of
continuing to spend considerable sums of money and time on a
program which is not contributing to the effectiveness of the
14

organization; or, type II, rejecting the training program
when it in fact is benefiting the attendees and the organ-
ization.
When an organization does realize the potential benefits
of a comprehensive evaluation plan and includes it as a
significant phase in the training system, it can profit in
many ways. Some of the reasons for evaluating training
include:
1. Assess achievement of training objectives.
2. Assess effectiveness of the trainer.
3. Justify the expense of training through cost-benefit
analyses
.
4. Improve the content/ structure of the training.
5. Decide whether other trainees should receive the
training
6. Identify which trainees benefited the most/least.
7. Reinforce major points for the trainees.
8. Create advance expectations in the minds of the
trainees through utilization of pretraining tests.
Evaluation answers the question what is it worth, not how
it works. The purpose of evaluation should be to support
decisions to initiate, modify, maintain, or terminate
various courses of action.
[Eoyang, 1977, p. 3]
The fundamental application of evaluative techniques is
twofold: to aid the decision maker by clarifying the some-
times ambiguous results of a training program, and secondly,
15

to provide feedback to the individual on how well he/she has
succeeded in meeting the objectives of the instruction.
General Douglas MacArthur wrote, "In no other profession
are the penalties for employing untrained personnel so
appalling and so irrevocable as in the military." [Pitts,
1976, p. 19]. This is particularly true in the area of leader-
ship training. In determining the need therefore for the
evaluation of leadership training the question must not be:
"Can we afford to assess our training efforts?" but rather;
"Can we afford not to?"
Assuming the importance of conducting an evaluation the
next issue becomes one of where the assessment fits into the
overall training scheme. Obviously the evaluation plan must
be supportive of the objectives promulgated in the training
program. To assist in this step a systems approach should
be taken to integrate the evaluation. It must be realized
that not only is evaluation a subsystem of training but that
training is a subsystem of the organization and the environ-
ment in which it functions . As such any evaluation design
must reflect the interrelationships of the process with other
components of the system, e.g. the personnel management
system, service school system, and even the customs and
traditions of the organization as a system. Failure to con-
sider the ramifications of this will lead to a disjointed
scheme of evaluation, lack of commitment to the plan, and
16

the eventual disregard of the findings of the evaluation.
System integration is the key to evaluation design.
Isolating for the moment the training process, evaluation
is typically the final step. The US Army, for example, has










In order to support the first six stages evaluation must
focus on four factors in order to provide meaningful feedback
to the decision maker. Alden £1978} describes these factors
as
:
1. Willingness to Change*
If no decision concerning a change in policy,
research, etc. will be made as a result of the evaluation
then the design and implementation of an assessment plan is
a moot point. The Army recognizes the importance of a
thorough evaluation as evidenced by the inclusion of this
process in the Army Leader Development Plan. The plan, an
output of the 1980 Action Planning Conference, is currently
in the draft stage. Commitment to evaluation remains
17

contingent upon the viability of the assessment design.
2. The Type of Information Needed*
The type of information can best be determined by
returning to the importance of systems to training and eval-
uation. Viewing it as a system comprised of inputs, process,
and outputs, the research questions center around the relation-
ship of these variables. For example, if the decision
involves the presentation of material then an examination of
the process is appropriate. If the decision maker needs to
know whether or not the program should be continued then a
complex evaluation answering questions about the change in
both trainee attitude and behavior and change in the organ-
ization in which the trainee functions (or leads) is called
for. The time frame available to the decision maker in which
to reach a conclusion is critical to this question.
3. The Source of the Information.
Campbell, Dunnette, Lawler, and Weick [1970] discuss
two sources of data, internal and external. Kirkpatrick
£19793 offers four sources; reaction, learning, behavior, and
results. Implied by these levels is a requirement to address
such specifics as experimental design and constraints on the
data gathering. The relationship between these two thoughts
and their implications for evaluation comprises a major





What information will signal the decision maker that
a change should be made? This can be written in terms of some
absolute standard such as a paper and pencil test on material
taught, or a statistical comparison between control and exper-
imental groups. Whichever standard is used, the decision
maker should be prepared with some course of action before
the results of an evaluation are known.
Recognizing the importance of conducting an evaluation
and the focus or direction such a plan must take, it remains
to be emphasized that the development of an assessment plan
needs to coincide with the preparation of the training pro-
gram itself. This requires that the fear of the evaluation
yielding negative results be overcome by the trainer and the
decision maker. This thesis is directed towards preparing a
viable evaluation model at a time when the Army is embarking
on a new course in its leader development.
C. THESIS VALUES
The U.S. Army, like all organizations, is a values based
institution. Values lay the foundation upon which goals and
behaviors are specified and the future state of the organ-
ization is built. As James MacGregor Burns states, "Mobilized
and shaped by gifted leadership, sharpened and strengthened
be conflict, values can be the source of vital change." [1978,
p. 4l] Accordingly, in order to reach its future state, this
19

evaluation plan is built around the following values
:
1. Goal-Directed
The evaluation plan will clearly specify tasks
necessary for implementation, detail the rationale behind the




The plan will take a systematic approach. The train-
ing development system, Army school system, the personnel
management system, and a recognized system of evaluation must
be systematically associated. There must also be consist-
ency with, and reflection of, the objectives and goals of the
leadership training program. As mentioned previously, system





The plan should not be constrained by the phobias
which have frequently affected many evaluation attempts in
both the military and civilian training programs, nor will
it be constrained by the argument "That isn't done in the
military, no one will buy it." It will question the value
of tradition where it is seen as an abstacle to progress.
4. Pragmatic
While many programs can be creative, their "pie in
the sky" approach can doom them to oblivion. A program must
be practical as opposed to idealistic. The decision maker
20

must be presented with a step by step outline to guide him
or her through the evaluative process. This value is closely
related to that of Goal-Directed.
5. Flexible
Recognizing the climate in which the military operates
as being moderately dynamic, subject to budgetary uncertainties,
the plan must provide for contingencies.
The principle benefit in establishing the above values
and norms is that, if a proposal seems unclear or difficult
to specify, its appropriateness for inclusion can be judged
by the stated objectives and values.
The objective of this thesis is to develop a viable
evaluation plan for Army leadership training which will
provide feedback to training developers and decision makers
on the effectiveness of the program and to leaders on their
style of leadership.
The plan is not devised to evaluate leaders, that
remains the job of the superior. Nor will the thesis
question the appropriateness of the current leadership train-
ing programs. The purpose of the plan is to provide a
strategy by which the program's effectiveness can be reviewed
To reach this objective the following organization will
be used in developing the plan.
21

D. DESIGN AND ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS
This introductory chapter has focused the reader's atten-
tion on the environment within which the military must operate
throughout the remainder of this century, its particular
implications on leader development, and the need to monitor
those training programs designed to reach effective leader-
ship.
Chapter II sets the stage for exploring the current state
of leadership research through a presentation of those theo-
ries of leadership which have had the greatest impact on the
military's approach to leadership training. Those theories
which offer a training program will be examined particularly
closely to ascertain what method of evaluation, if any, was
used.
The 'art' of leadership in the armed forces, being rather
unique from that in the civilian sector, requires that a
unique approach be used in the development of its leaders.
Accordingly, the approach taken by each service is reviewed
in Chapter III. Particular emphasis is placed on the US Army
and those systems with which the evaluation plan must inter-
face.
Kirkpatrick' s criteria for the evaluation of training
will serve as a base for the various methods of assessment
available to determine a program's effectiveness. The advan-
tages, disadvantages, and utilization of these techniques
22

are presented in Chapter IV.
Chapter V organizes the material presented in the fourth
chapter into an action plan format. This standardized form
clearly specifies the action needed to be taken, the agency-
responsible for the action, and, in accordance with the Army




II. REVIEW OF LEADERSHIP LITERATURE
A. INTRODUCTION
The subject of evaluating leadership training must, by-
necessity, commence with an overview of the theories of
leadership. Once the subject is placed in perspective an
examination of contemporary approaches to leadership training
programs, and their method of evaluation, will serve as a
foundation and basis of comparison for the programs of the
military services. This review is not intended to be all
encompassing, but rather to single out individuals whose
work addresses the major theme of this plan or has contributed
significantly to the development of the military leadership
programs. For a detailed discussion of the historical aspects
of leadership research the reader is refered to Ralph M.
Stogdill's Handbook of Leadership .
B. GREAT MAN AND TRAIT THEORIES
It was not very long ago that the subject of leadership
training was considered an area not worth pursuing. The
widely held belief was that the qualities of leadership were
a function of heredity, if one was not fortunate enough to
be related to royalty there could be no expectation of holding
a leadership position. This concept was formalized by Carlyle
[1846] in his essay on heroes in which he proposed the 'Great
24

Man' theory of leadership. In 1960 Eugene E. Jennings pub-
lished An Anatomy of Leadership: Princes, Heroes, and
Supermen which reviewed and analyzed the research on this
theory.
With leaders so easily identifiable it was believed
possible to determine what made the man/woman so great.
This idea gave rise to the next major classification of
leadership theory, the trait approach. Begining in the late
1920' s studies were conducted to measure the personality and
character of individuals who had reached positions of leader-
ship. The focus of academic research remained fixed,
throughout World War II, on defining those traits which sep-
arated leaders from non- leaders.
The implication of this theory would have been to screen
leaders from non- leaders based on some identified leadership
traits, and to provide training only to those individuals
displaying those qualities. In actuality the war require-
ment to increase manpower from "two hundred thousand in 1939
to almost six million three years later" [Review of Education
and Training for Officer, 1978, p. v.] resulted in a training
program which presented the traits to all potential leaders.
The research on trait theory revealed an interesting
phenomenon, some of the studies Stogdill cites in his 1948
survey contradict each other with respect to the traits
associated with effective leadership. Accounting for these
25

discrepancies he adds situation to the general headings of
capacity, achievement, responsibility, participation, and
status as factors associated with leadership. In discussing
the addition he writes:
A person does not become a leader by virtue of the
possession of some combination of traits, but the pattern
of personal characteristics of the leader must bear some
relevant relationship to the characteristics, activities,
and goals of the followers. Thus leadership must be
conceived in terms of the interaction of variables which
are in constant flux and change. The factor of change
is especially characteristic of the situation. .. It
becomes clear that an adequate analysis of leadership
involves not only a study of leaders, but also of
situations
.
[Stogdill, 1974, p. 63]
This urging of a situational view was far different
from the pure situational theories of the time. The pure
situationalist, e.g. Murphy [1941] , thought that leadership
does not "reside in a person but is a function of the occa-
sion. The situation calls for certain types of action; the
leader does not inject leadership, but is the instrumental
factor through which a solution is achieved." [Stogdill, 1974,
p. 18]
What was suggested was a need to look at the interactive
effects of both situational and personal factors. Researchers
such as Westburgh [1931] , Gibb [1954] , Stogdill and Shartle
[1955] , Bennis [1961] , and Hollander [1964] have elaborated
on this interaction by proposing various sets of factors. In
a 1974 survey of 163 additional studies, Stogdill pointed
26

out this need to consider both factors by listing some
leadership characteristics in order to modify the pure sit-
uational theorist's point of view.
It is this combination of factors which today is commonly
called the situational or interaction approach. Hersey and
Blanchard summarize the approach with:
The focus in the situational approach to leadership is
on observed behavior, not on any hypothetical inborn or
acquired ability or potential for leadership. The
emphasis is on the behavior of leaders and their group
members (followers) and various situations.
[Hersey and Blanchard, 1977,
p. 89]
Within this major catagory are found many of the current
theories or models of leadership that have either dealt with
the issue of training or were influential in the design of
the military's programs. A second group of theories which
has had a like effect are those Stogdill [1974] calls
"Humanistic" theories, those that are "concerned with the
development of effective and cohesive organizations ." [Stogdill,
1974, p. 21.] The work of McGregor, Blake and Mouton, and
Likert fall within this catagory, and it is by this title that
their works will be reviewed. Also reviewed are the studies





1 . Contingency Theory
Since 1951 Fred E. Fiedler and his associates have
been studying, testing, and modifying the Contingency Model
of leadership. To date it stands as the most researched of
all models. While it is their training program, Leader Match,
which is significant to this thesis, a background on the
model is necessary in order to understand the training
concept.
The Contingency Model is based on two factors: (1)
the motivational style of the leader; and, (2) the degree
of situational control.
The leader's motivational style is determined
through the administration of an eighteen item bipolar ad-
jective scale. This scale, the Least Preferred Co-worker
Scale, is central to the model. Fiedler describes its oper-
ation as:
An individual who describes his or her least preferred
coworker in very negative and rejecting terms (a low
LPC) [task motivated] in effect shows a strong emotional
reaction to people with whom he or she cannot work --
in effect, "if I can't work with you, you are no damn
good!" This is the typical pattern of a person who,
when forced to make the choice, opts first for getting
on with the task and worries about his interpersonal
relations later. Someone who describes even the least
preferred coworker in relatively more positive terms in
effect looks at the individual not only as a co-worker
but also as a person who might otherwise have some
acceptable traits. The high LPC leader [relationship
motivated] sees close interpersonal relations as a re-
quirement for task accomplishment.
[Fiedler, 1977b, p. 199]
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The situation is defined as "the degree to which
the situation provides the leader with power and influence."
[Csoka and Bons , 1978, p. 295] It is measured on three
scales: (1) Leader -- Member Relations, either good or poor
it is the degree to which the leader is supported by the
group; (2) Task Structure, how clearly the task is defined
with respect to goals and procedures, this dimension being
structured or unstructured; and (3) Position Power, strong
or weak, it measures the degree to which the leader can
reward and punish group members (subordinates) . When
arranged on a continuum the situational control (originally
called situational favorableness) forms eight octants as
shown in figure 1. Also depicted in figure 1 is a plot of
the results of Fiedler's studies. The horizontal axis rep-
resents situational control while the vertical is a corre-
lation between group performance and LPC score.
Experiments conducted by Fiedler and others on groups
ranging from field artillery NCO's to high school principles
tended to show that "task motivated leaders perform generally
best in favorable situations, i.e. under conditions in
which their power, control, and influence are very high (or
conversely, where uncertainty is very low) or where the
situation is unfavorable, where they have low power, control,
and influence. Relationship motivated leaders tend to per-
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control, and influence." [Fiedler, 1976a, p. 354]
There are two additional assumptions which are
critical to the reported experiments with the model: (1) that
leader attributes are stable over time; and, (2) that all of
the possible factors which determine the situation can be
summed into the favorableness , or unfavorableness , dimension.
The number of variables being almost limitless in this latter
factor.
The contingency model has met with a great deal of
criticism despite (or because of) the many experiments con-
ducted to prove its validity. Hersey and Blanchard disagree
with Fiedler's either/or position on the leader's motivation
saying it is not sufficient that the situation vary from
favorable to unfavorable, the orientation of the leader also
may vary from task motivated at one extreme to relationship
motivation on the other. They state that "Most evidence
["e.g. the Ohio State Leadership Studies] indicates that
leader behavior must be plotted on two separate axes rather
than on a single continuum." [Hersey and Blanchard, 1977,
p. 102]
Stinson and Tracy [1974] raise three points based on
experiments they conducted to verify the model. Briefly,
they question: (1) the interpretation of the LPC scores,
"By its structure the LPC is an attitudinal scale, but
Fiedler has attempted to make inferences from it regarding
the behavior or style of leaders." [Stinson and Tracy, 1974,
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p. 477]; (2) stablity of the LPC score, "Fiedler's inter-
pretation of the LPC score as an indicator of a stable
personality trait is based on post hoc analysis and he has
presented no independent evidence of the existence of this
trait." [p. 478]; and (3) the post hoc measurement of situ-
ational favorableness control.
Ashour [1973] has criticized Fiedler's procedure for
combining results of different octants together which "con-
founds any predictive differences that might exist between
octants .. .After applying Fisher's [1946] technique of combin-
ing correlations and then analyzing the data, Ashour found
that Fiedler's model failed the validity tests (i.e. non-
significant correlations) in six of the eight situational
octants'.' [Hendrix, 1976, p. 27] Ashour concluded therefore
that the model contained serious theoretical and methodological
flaws
.
The studies by Graen [1970, 1971] and comments by
Holland [1974] can be summed up with a Stinson and Tracy
quote: "if the validity and reliability of the LPC score
cannot be established with greater certainty, its use to
provide data supporting a major leadership theory is inap-
propriate." [Stinson and Tracy, 1974, p. 485]
Countering these criticisms Fiedler maintains that
"these studies have methodological weaknesses which make them
inadequate tests of the model." [Fiedler, 1971, p. 202]
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Specifically the Graen et al [19713 study was cited as
having poor manipulation of the power variable in its
laboratory situation, a problem Fiedler believes he over-
comes in his studies outside of the laboratory, e.g. ROTC,
West Point, Belgian Navy, etc. The task structure manip-
ulation and the distribution of the LPC scores among the
octants Fiedler found as contributing to that study's
weaknesses
.
Leaving the basic model and turning towards its
implications for training recall the second assumption that
any number of variables can go into determining situational
control, training is such a variable. Fiedler maintains that
a "leader's motivational orientation or personal style is
likely to be relatively impervious to modification through
short term training. On the other hand, training might
improve the leader's potential influence and control (i.e.
the situational control of the job)." [Chemers and Rice, 1974,
p. 1123 Training, in other words, is a modifier of the sit-
uation. This, however, is not always good.
Given a moderately favorable situation and a low
LPC type leader, training in this situation can be predicted
to improve the situation, thereby putting the low LPC leader
in a favorable situation, which the model predicts as being
the most advantageous for the leader and group performance.
The same logic also applies to the high LPC leader found in
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an unfavorable situation where training will hopefully raise
the situation to one of moderate favorableness . The negative
aspect comes when the low LPC leader in an unfavorable sit-
uation moves into a moderately favorable situation where he
loses the advantage. This Fiedler points out is why training
does not always result in improved group performance. The
implied course of action is for the leader to receive addi-
tional training in order to move the situation to one of
favorableness. When movement through training is not feasible
Fiedler sugggests that assignment to leadership positions be
based on the individual's motivation and the situation. A
practice which, for all practical purposes, is impossible
at lower command levels within the military, but, one which
is being used for senior grade (general officer) assignments.
This ability to change the situation through training
was used by Fiedler, Chemers, and Mahr [1975]] to develop the
Leader Match Training Program. The program involves a self-
paced book entitled, Improving Leadership Effectiveness
,
which is designed to teach individuals how to apply the
principles of the contingency model.
In Part 1 of the manual, the individual completes the
LPC scale, which indicates whether he or she is prima-
rily concerned with interpersonal relations (high LPC)
or with task accomplishment (low LPC). In Part 2, the
individual learns how to measure situational control
using scales designed for each of the three variables.
Part 3, suggests methods for changing situational
control and Part 4 provides guidance on how to help
subordinate leaders improve their performance.
[Fiedler and Mahr, 1979, p. 248]
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It is the method of evaluation used for this program,
advertised as a "fully validated training program," which
is of most interest to this thesis.
To examine the methods employed, four experiments will
be reviewed in which the presentation of the Leader Match
program reportedly led to significantly higher measures of
leader effectiveness. These experiments, all involving
military subjects, were conducted between 1977 and 1979.
In the first experiment Navy officers and petty
officers were randomly assigned to either a control or
treatment group. Performance ratings were completed prior
to training for both groups with no significant difference
between groups reported. The treatment group then was given
two, four-hour, training sessions in which they viewed a
film on the theory, read the Leader Match manual, and part-
icipated in a group discussion. Six months afterwards
performance ratings were again gathered from at least two
of the three original raters for each subject. The result,
measured by mean performance change in rating score, showed
"the difference between the trained and control groups'
change scores .. .were highly significant." [[Leister et al.
,
1977, p. 468].
Using the notation from Campbell and Stanley's Exper-
imental and Quasi-Experimental Designs for Research on Teaching




Treatment Group: R 0^ X 2
Control Group : R 0^ 2
The symbols represent: R = Random Assignment; = Observation;
X = Treatment. The ordering from left to right signifies the
passing of time, the last observation being 0^. Thus, in




The second experiment, involving West Point cadets,
follows the same design as the first but the treatment group
was required to submit a written evaluation of the manual and
a follow-up report three months later describing attempts to
use the principles of Leader Match (Contingency Theory) and
their relative success or failure.
Each subjects' assignment to either the top, middle,
or bottom third category (of all cadets at the school) based
on leader effectiveness was the performance criterion selected
The result: "subjects in the experimental group were signif-
icantly more in the top third and less in the bottom third
catagories than subjects in the control group." QCsoka and
Bons, 1978, p. 297]
Experiment three differed in that a third control
group was randomly selected and the treatment group was not
required to provide feedback. This third group was told
they were to be observed and evaluated during the time the
experiment was being conducted. The purpose of this will
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be discussed later. Battalion commanders were used to rank-
order the subjects, again West Point cadets, based on dis-
played ability to lead. These rankings were converted to
decimal scores for comparison purposes (e.g. the first out
of four was converted to .75; third out of eight was .62).
An analysis of variance indicated that "student military
leaders who were given the Leader Match training manual
ranked significantly higher in comparative performance
than those who did not use the manual.
"
[Csoka and Bons , 1978,
p. 298] The informed control group performance ranking was
below that of the control group which was not informed. The
short-hand depiction of this experiment is
:
Treatment Group: R X
Control Group 1: R
Control Group 2: R (X)
The (X) indicates a placebo treatment, in this case informing
the group they were being observed.
The final experiment, Army ROTC cadets at Advanced
camp, involved a stratified random sample of schools grouped
into upper, middle, and lower categories based on student
performance at the previous year's camp. Three schools from
each catagory were designated as treatment or control, a
total of eighteen schools. The 190 cadets from the nine
treatment schools were issued the manual and given a closed-
book exam to insure that the training was completed. The
subjects' performance at camp was based on two peer ratings,
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advisor ratings, an orienteering exercise, and a tactical
exercise. The latter two criteria did not show a significant
difference between control and treatment groups while the
"mean cadet performance of ROTC programs in which Leader
Match was administered was significantly higher than that of
control schools on measures directly related to leadership
skills. "[Fiedler and Mahr, 1979, p. 251].
The purpose behind detailing these experiments is
to call attention to the possible alternative hypotheses
(explanation of group differences apart from those created
by Leader Match) despite the popularity of the experimental
design. In each experiment the possibility of sampling bias
and rater bias are adequately addressed. The likelihood
however, that the Hawthorne effect accounted for some of
the difference is not so easily dismissed as Fiedler et al.
would indicate.
This major contaminant of evaluative methodology
results from the subject having been singled out for special
attention (e.g. training). In the first experiment the
effect is rejected on the naive assumption that "training is
a way of life in the military services .. .participation in a
12-hour training program is thus nothing out of the ordinary
for most military personnel." [Leister et al., 1977, p. 469]
The fact is that 12-hours of concentrated leadership training
is something special outside of a service school environment.
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An item which is not reported in the case but one which would
be significant to the impact the study would have on the in-
dividual was whether or not the trainers were military or
not.
Further supporting their contention that the Hawthorne
effect was negligable they argue that other training program
experiments should also have reported positive results. This
argument would be valid only after an analysis of the admin-
istration of the experiments, other research efforts perhaps
imposing other forms of control.
In the last experiment the importance of motivation
to the performance at ROTC advanced camp is minimized. They
(Fiedler and Mahr) point out that there should have been a
difference in the orienteering and tactical exercises if
the training was responsible for no more than raising moti-
vation. This justification is in error due to the relatively
minor role motivation plays in successful performance on
these exercises, knowledge of land navigation and tactics
being the principal components of success, whereas the other
performance measures are highly influenced by motivation as
opposed to skill.
Recognizing that the "method of choice for eliminating
the Hawthorne effect is . . . the use of an alternative training
program " [Fiedler and Mahr, 1979, p. 252] the researchers
claim that the leadership instruction received by cadets
during their previous year(s) of ROTC training constitutes
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this alternative. Their claim fails to address a salient
feature of the Hawthorne effect, that of being singled
out for training. Across the board training does not meet
this criteria.
Csoka and Bons [1978] report that in their experi-
ments (the second and third) the Hawthorne effect (as a
confidence builder) is not easily dismissed.
Having elaborated on the Contingency Model, Leader
Match, and the validation studies of this training program,
the point is all too clear. Even a leadership program
as thoroughly researched as Fiedler's is subject to
invalidities in the evaluation methodology. These difficul-
ties lie at the heart of all assessment attempts and will
serve as a useful comparison to the model proposed in this
thesis
.
Prior to moving on to the other situational
theorists, the following is offered as testimony to Fiedler's
work:
Fiedler's model might best be characterized as a model
of controversy, and perhaps the birth of this contro-
versy is Fiedler's greatest contribution to the under-
standing of leadership. The introduction of his model
has resulted in many researchers attempting to test the
model, and each test has perhaps added a little to the
knowledge of leadership.
[Hendrix, 1976, p. 27]
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2 . Situational Leadership
Hersey and Blanchard, like Fiedler, maintain that
there is no one best style of leadership. They differ in
their contention that the needs of the group and the envir-
onment make the successful leaders adapt their behavior to
the situation.
The Situational Leadership theory (previously called
Life Cycle Theory of Leadership) starts with a two dimensional
grid, the vertical axis representing relationship behavior
while the horizontal axis signifies task behavior. They
define these variables as:
Task Behavior - The extent to which leaders are likely
to organize and define the roles of the members of their
group (followers) ; to explain what activities each is to
do and when, where, and how tasks are to be accomplished;
characterized by endeavoring to establish well-defined
patterns of organization, channels of communication, and
ways of getting jobs accomplished.
Relationship Behavior - The extent to which leaders are
likely to maintain personal relationships between them-
selves and members of their group (followers) by opening
up channels of communication, providing socio-emotional
support, "psychological strokes," and facilitating
behaviors
.
(^Hersey and Blanchard, 1977,
p. 104]
It is based on a curvilinear relationship between
task and relationship behaviors and maturity of their
followers for a specific task. Figure 2 depicts this relation-
ship.













































to set high but attainable goals (achievement - motiva-
tion)
,
willingness and ability to take responsibility, and
education and/or experience of an individual or a group."
Qiersey and Blanchard, 1969, p. 28] This concept of the
follower being a vital part of a leadership theory is signif-
icant in considering an evaluation of any training program.
Stogdill writes, "Change in the leader is significant only
if it produces an impact on the follower group." Q974, p. 422]
According to the theory, as the maturity level of the
individual /group rises (moves from right to left) the approp-
riate behavior or leadership style should change from high
task and low relationship to one of high task/high relation-
ship. At the midpoint in the maturity continuum the curve
slopes downward to the left as maturity continues to increase,
this results in a decrease in the relationship behavior as
the group passes into what Maslow termed the esteem and self-
actualization needs, they provide their own relationship
needs or "strokes." Throughout this change in relationship,
task behavior has continued to decline.
In effect this theory says that given a certain task
for which the followers display high maturity a low relation-
ship/low task behavior style is appropriate. This point, as
will be seen, corresponds to Blake and Mouton's Impoverished
leadership style which the Grid model would never consider
appropriate. It should be noted that this point corresponds
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with Maslow's self-actualization need which he maintains is
reached by only a very few individuals. So while the leader's
behavior at this point may be correct, so few of the fol-
lowers will ever reach this maturity level that the behavior
will usually never be seen. The theory is consistent with
McGregor's Theory Y which allows for a wide range of style,
depending on the work group and the situation.
Hersey and Blanchard have sectionalized the curve
according to the quadrant it falls in and have termed the
leadership styles as: Telling (high task/low relationship);
Selling (high task/high relationship) ; Participating (low
task/high relationship) ; and Delegating (low task/low rela-
tionship) . These terms describe the style appropriate to
the level of maturity.
While noting that "changing the style of leaders is
a difficult process, and one that takes considerable time to
accomplish" Hersey and Blanchard, [1977, p. 150] have devel-
oped a test to measure the leader's self perception of his/
her style, style range, and style adaptability (resulting
profiles from the instrument) . This instrument is the Leader
Effectiveness and Adaptability Description (LEAD) -- Self.
It consists of twelve situations of varying follower maturity,
three from each quadrant. Each situation is followed with
four possible responses from the leader. Based on the re-
sponse given, the leader is classified into a certain style.
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The consequence of this classification is an ability to
recognize which level of management the leader's style is
most appropriate for and structure future training and
development courses to expand the leader's adaptability.
Hersey and Blanchard report that most leaders are able to
modify their style after some training in Situational
Leadership theory.
To assist the leader in determining what training
may be needed there is also a LEAD -- Other instrument
which the leader's peers, superiors, and subordinates
complete on the leader. The test is identical to the LEAD --
Self in the situations but is written in the third person.
Despite the current popularity of the Situational
Leadership model within the military and civilian communi-
ties (e.g. Xerox Corporation) it is not without its critics.
Barrow £1976] criticized both the theory and instrument as
not having been empirically tested, a comment which is still
voiced. Information concerning the testing of the model is
very limited. Due to its commercial orientation little has
been published in academic journals concerning measures of
its validity, thereby restricting the type of criticism
found in the Contingency Model.
Given the overall influence of Hersey and Blanchard 's
model it is appropriate to consider the model's implication
with respect to a major leadership function, decision making.
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The '/room and Yetton model considers the situational aspects
of the problem at hand in prescribing the suitable leader-
ship style.
3 . Sorr^ative .oodel of Leadership Styles
The objective of the Proem and Yetton model is to
prescribe an appropriate leadership style in making decisions
It is formulated on a set of five assumptions: (1; That the
model be operational (leader required behaviors are unambig-
uous; ; (2) That the degree of subordinate participation in
problem solving can vary, '3) That no one leadership method
is applicable to all situations; (4) That the issues of a
ecific problem contains the key to its solution; anc ''l,
at the leadership lethod used in response to one situation
should not constrain the method or style used in other
situations
.
rased on these assumptions two model', were developed,
one for group, the other for ::.-;. rldual problem (i -•-
number of subordinates affeoteo by the decision, one or
i^'//
. Eaci model is comprleed or three ariables t'r.e
attributes of the Fpecific problem, a pet of rules to .-.
: quel. and -.-.. mee of the decision, and a List of
possible leadership ttyles
Ihers arc Fever .-...-. -. - . . s - . , . e -. , or -. . i i -
tions, which require a fee or so answer. . -: or: gi-a! -.ooel
calleo for :.
;
, ... wo nspplesjental quai Lone
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As a by-product of their research Vroom and Yetton
have developed a program of leadership development. The
purpose of course to "encourage people to examine critically y<^
the leadership methods they use in concrete situations in
order to better fit their 'style' to the situational demands."
[Vroom and Yetton, 1973, p. 208] Their program, taking from
15 to 22 hours for the first six phases, consists of seven
phases in total: (1) Training in recognizing the differ-
ences in own and other's decision process; (2) Diagnosis
of one's own leadership style; (3) Practice in using deci-
sion processes; (4) Understanding the consequences of
different decision processes; (5) Training in the Normative
Model; (6) Feedback based on behavior on the standardized
problems; and (7) Follow-up. The feedback package in
phase six comes in the form of a computer printout showing
the leader's responses in comparison to the other leaders in
the group and agreement with the model's predicted solutions.
In attempting to validate the theory, managers who
were unaware of the Normative model were asked to describe
a problem, its attributes, and the relative effectiveness
of the solution. The correlation between what the model would
predict to be the most effective course of action and what
course the manager reportedly took to arrive at the decision
was sought to verify its overall validity. The results were
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"all in a direction consistent with the hypothesis that the
model has a higher 'probability' of generating decisions of
high quality and acceptance, but none reach conventional
levels of statistical significance." [Vroom and Yetton, 1973,
p. 183] The most recent work on the model by Jago and Vroom
[1978] centers on validating the problem sets developed for
the training and testing their predictive ability.
In a recent article on the Vroom and Yetton model
Field [1979] critiques several features of the theory. First
is the possiblity of error due to the method of obtaining
self-reports from the managers on decisions they have made
in the past, "the manager will likely report high decision
effectiveness, quality, and acceptance and may have cogni-
tively distorted the actual levels of these variables"
[p. 252]. He concludes his remarks with "The utility of the
Vroom - Yetton model is questionable for two reasons. First.
it is not as parsimonious as other models of leader decision
process choice [it is overly complex]. Second, it deals with
only one aspect of leader behavior, that of selecting dif-
ferent decision processes for different problem situations"
Cp. 256].
This completes the review of the situational models
of leadership. While not exhaustive of the field, it dees
provide insight into the major theories. In the next section






Hersey and Blanchard's comment on the contingency
model's failure to recognize that leadership must be measured
on two axes stems from the results of the Ohio State Leader-
ship studies. These studies, begun in 1945, sought to iden-
tify various dimensions of leader behavior, that is, the
behavior of an individual when directing the activities of
a group toward some final goal. Initially arriving at four
dimensions, these were later reduced to two, Consideration
and Initiating Structure. Consideration is the "behavior
indicative of friendship, mutual trust, respect, and warmth
in the relationship between leader and members of his staff"
[Hersey and Blanchard, 1977, p. 94]. Initiating Structure
refers to "the leader's behavior in delineating the relation-
ship between himself and members of the work group and in
endeavoring to establish well-defined patterns of organi-
zation, channels of communication, and methods of procedure"
[Hersey and Blanchard, 1977, p. 94]. Both dimensions being
expressed in behavioral terms, i.e. how the leader acts.
Following in this view, Robert R. Blake and Jane
S. Mouton constructed a similar framework using concern for
people and concern for production. Analogous to Consider-
ation and Initiating Structure respectively, the major
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difference is that the use of the term concern makes the
dimension attitudinal vice behavioral. This model, the
Managerial Grid, has been widely used as a leadership
training tool in both the civilian and military programs to
get the leader to recognize the interdependence of the two
dimensions
.
The grid itself is constructed with concern for
people along a nine-point vertical axis and production con-
cern along the nine point horizontal axis. Of the 81 possible
points of interaction, five have been identified as being
primary styles, they are depicted on figure 4 and defined
as:
Impoverished (1,1). Exertion of minimum effort to get
required work done is appropriate to sustain organiza-
tional membership.
Country Club (1,9). Thoughtful attention to needs of
people for satisfying relationships leads to a comfort-
able friendly organization atmosphere and work tempo.
Task (9,1). Efficiency in operations results from
arranging conditions of work in such a way that
human elements interfere to a minimum degree.
Middle-of-the-Road (5,5). Adequate organization per-
formance is possible through balancing the necessity to
get the work out while maintaining morale of people
at a satisfactory level.
Team (9,9). Work accomplishment is from committed
people, interdependence through a "common stake" in
organization purpose leads to relationships of trust
and respect.




































































In designing leadership training around Managerial
Grid (also applicable to organizational development, inter-
group relations, etc.) Blake and Mouton have constructed a
six phase program.
Starting with the leader recognizing his/her own
style of leadership and culminating with the attainment of
some organizational goals, it covers both individual and
organizational leadership. An unique aspect of the Grid
is that it is taught to the leaders /managers of an organ-
ization by personnel from its own ranks. These instructors
or facilitators having been trained and certified in the
conduct of the program. While the length of the phases may
run from one week to several years, the major objectives of
each phase are:
Phase I. Management Development. To increase the leader's
awareness of own attitudes, and to familiarize him/her with
the Grid system so that it may be applied in analyzing
own and organizational leadership.
Phase II. Team Development. Analysis of own work group
environment is conducted to determine what, if any,
barriers to effective leadership exist. Team provides
feedback to leader on his/her style so that the leader may
analyze the gap between the 9,9 style leader (where the
theory says he should be) and where he and others
perceive him to be. A "standard of excellence" is estab-
lished for individuals and groups' performance.
Phase III. Intergroup Development. Similar to the
second phase, the emphasis is on organizational leader-
ship at the interface of various work groups. Barriers
in planning and communicating between the groups are
identified and resolved.
Phase IV. Organizational Goal Setting. Leaders use
skills obtained in previous phases to objectively,
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logically, and explicitly define the organizations goals.
Phase V. Implementation. Implement Phase IV plans. May
take several years
.
Phase VI. Stabilization. Measurement and evaluation of
success in reaching organizational goals.
Throughout the program, and in the final analysis,
questionnaires, forms, etc., are provided to the organization
to determine its (the Grid's) effectiveness.
Again, it is the final phase, evaluation, which this
thesis is primarily concerned with. Despite its popularity
"surprisingly few areas of the Grid have been subjected to
rigorous research" £Huse, 1975, p. 160]. Holding much the
same opinion as Odiorne [1964] that training must result in
an increase in tangible economic indicators to determine its
effectiveness, Blake and Mouton hold that within a profit
making organization the ultimate measure is financial.
In one widely publicized evaluation of a 4,000 member
division of a petroleum corporation, an increase in profits
and productivity and a decrease in controlable costs were
pointed to as evidence of the success of the Grid training.
The problem with the evaluation was that many of the indi-
cators, or criterion, changed as a result of: (1) organiza-
tional impact from the parent headquarters in the form of
forced reduction in the size of the work force; (2) failure
to establish a control group, and (3) no measure of the
possible Hawthorne effect. The design of the program (in
retrospect) is most like that of Campbell and Stanley's
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one-shot case study and one-group pretest -- posttest designs
(the two most susceptible to sources of invalidity) . These
problems are frequent in the studies of the Grid; Blake and
Mouton [1966], Beer and Kleisath [1967] , Beckhard [1965] , and
Kuriloff and Atkins [L967] . Stogdill, citing the same petro-
leum study stated "The control in these studies are less than
adequate. The research was conducted during a long economic
upswing when, in general, businesses were increasing their
profits'* [1974, p. 189] .
It is unfortunate that a program for leadership
training as developed and as widely used as the Grid should
suffer from such poor evaluative techniques. As discussed
in the introduction, the military services, which have
taught Managerial Grid extensively (e.g. US Army Management
School, 1964), can no longer afford to adopt a program which
has nothing more to offer than intuitive appeal. Furthermore,
the commitment called for on the part of the subordinate
cannot be developed in a combat environment through "delib-
eration and debate around major organization issues and
by the mutual identification of sound objectives" [Pitts, 1976,
P. 57].
Blake and Mouton are not alone in arguing for a one
best style of leadership. Another theory which has become a





2. Theory X and Theory Y
A classic theory both in terms of its use in military
instruction and impact on behavioral research is McGregor's
concept of Theory X and Theory Y. These two theories dichot-
omize the beliefs or assumptions one may have about human
nature and behavior which formulate an individuals leadership
style.
The assumptions of Theory X include: (1) the average
human being has an inherent dislike of work and will avoid
it if possible; (2) most people must be coerced, controlled,
directed, or otherwise threatened with punishment to get
them to put forth adequate effort toward the achievement of
organizational objectives; (3) The average human being prefers
to be directed, wishes to avoid responsibility, has relatively
little ambition, and wants security above all else.
A leader ascribing to these beliefs would tend to
rationalize poor organizational performance by blaming the
people with which he/she must operate. The leader is more
likely to control or supervise his subordinates much more
closely through the use of his/her authority.
On the other hand, Theory Y assumes: (1) the expend-
iture of physical and mental effort in work is as natural as
play or rest; (2) external control, and the threat of punish-
ment are not the only means for bringing about effort toward
organizational objectives; (3) commitment to objectives is a
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function of the rewards associated with their achievement;
(4) the average human being learns, under proper conditions,
not only to accept but to seek responsibility, and (5) the
capacity to exercise a relatively high degree of imagination,
ingenuity, and creativity in the solution of organizational
problems is widely, not narrowly, distributed in the popula-
tion. It is this assumption which gives credibility to the *
7Vroom and Yetton Normative model for the high acceptance
problem requirements.
The supervisor whose assumptions about human nature
are similar to the Theory Y principles has greater flexi-
bility to operate over a range of leadership styles. He or she is
able to determine the appropriateness of exercising his/her
authority to control the subordinates when a lack of commit-
ment to the organizations goals fails to stimulate the
necessary self-control and self-direction to insure efficiency.
This principle of integration, creating a condition in which
subordinates can realize their own goals by working towards
the organizations, is central to Theory Y.
j'
Above all else, it must be remembered that Theory Y
does not imply permissive leadership, a common misunderstanding
of McGregor's work. It allows for growth of the organization,
unencumbered by the resource requirements devoted to the
control of employees otherwise willing to support the organi-





To aid the leader in moving toward a Theory Y
belief it was proposed that training in the principles of
both X and Y would make it possible for leaders to "evaluate
their own actual situation to determine the extent to which
it approximates the assumptions contained in Theory X, as
contrasted with those in Theory Y. Once the theory-versus-
practice analysis has been completed, causes for the differ-
ences are identified" [Blake and Mouton, 1978, p. IS"].
McGregor's theories have had substantial impact on
the works of other behavioral scientists and their contribution
to the study of leadership in general and military leadership
specifically. Renis Likert is one such researcher.
3. Management Systems *S
Perhaps best known in the military community for
his influence on the Navy's Human Resource Management Support
System, Renis Likert ' s work at the Institute for Social
Research, University of Michigan, has emphasized the leaders'
need to consider the human contributions to an organization's
output. His efforts over the last four decades have centered
on identifying the leaders role in the organization, his/her
influence as a leader, the organizational characteristics
associated with various leadership styles, and the assignment
of costs to the human asset.
The first effort, the linking-pin concept, identifies
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the leader as a member of two groups, subordinate in one,
superior in another. Within both he or she must be perceived
by the other members as a part of their group in order to
exert any influence and be effective. This second concept
has been termed the interaction -- influence principle.
Stouffer et al., wrote of this principle in The American
Soldier [1949]
:
If an intermediate- level officer is to be a real leader,
he has a dual role to play. He must accept the norms
and values of superior authority, thus serving as an
agent of the impersonal and coercive organization of which
he is part. To the extent that he does this effectively,
his superiors regard him highly. At the same time, he
must win the willing followership of the men under him,
so that he welds over them authority which they themselves
have given him.
[Gibb, 1969, p. 236]
Two variables are at work in this principle. First,
the more influence a leader has on his superiors the greater
will be his influence with the subordinates. Second, "the
more that managers allow themselves to be influenced by their
subordinates, the more influence they, in turn, exert on
subordinates" [Rush, 1976, p. 8-8]. Combined, these variables
spell out a leadership style resembling Theory Y or partic-
ipative which has been termed a supportive relationship.
In many studies of organizations Likert found that
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the participative style was only one of four types, or
systems, possible. Arranged in order from that most commonly
associated with a Theory X assumption, these systems are:
System 1 (Exploitive -- Authoritative). No confidence
or trust in subordinates. Top down orientation of decision
making, highly centralized management. Fear and punish-
ment are typically employed to force greater production.
System 2 (Benevolent -- Authoritative) . Condescending
attitude of managers towards subordinates . Some dele-
gation of decision making from top of organization.
System 3 (Consultative). Substantial, but not complete,
trust in subordinates. Strategic decisions remain at
top, day-to-day decisions made at lower levels. Rewards
primarily used to motivate workers.
System 4 (Participative -- Group) . Complete trust and
confidence in subordinates. Good communications in
both directions allows for decentralized approach to
decision making. Intrinsic rewards motivate employees.
[Hersey and Blanchard, 1977,
p. m
It is towards this fourth system that Likert says
all organizations should strive. To help the company or
command to move in this direction an instrument was developed
which monitors the climate of the organization on eight char-
acteristics; leadership, motivation, communication, decision
making, interaction and influence, goal setting, and control
Drocess
.
The Navy has been influenced by Likert' s (as well as
Bowers and Seashore's) work in designing its 88-item Human
Resource Management Survey. The dimensions measured include;
command climate, supervisory leadership, peer leadership, and
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work group processes. Seventeen separate indexes comprise
these four dimensions with an additional eight for emphasis
and end result measures.
The results of the survey administration can aid the
leader in monitoring his/her own style and the degree to
which subordinates perceive him/her as a member of the group
(ability to influence).
Likert's later work in human resource accounting has
evoked considerable interest, but limited acceptance and is
not within the scope of this study.
As in the case of the situational leadership
theorists, the scope of literature reviewed in this section
is not all inclusive. The models selected for inclusion have
provided the reader with a sufficient background on the body
of research which espouses a one best style of leadership.
In the following section the interaction of leader and fol-
lower will be reviewed from a slightly different perspective.
E. TRANSACTIONAL AND TRANSACTIONAL ANALYSIS THEORIES
1. Transactional
Transactional leadership, similar to the concept of
the exchange between organizations and members (March and
Simon, 1958), refers to the transaction between leader and
follower. T.O. Jacobs [1971] provides this explanation:
Leaders act as organization representative by providing
earned benefits to their followers, while at the same
time guiding them toward satisfaction of organizational
goal attainment needs. There is substantial evidence
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supporting the view that such transactions do underlie
organizational membership, and that both the organiza-
tion and the members have expectations that must be met
in order for the exchange to be considered fair.
[Jacobs, 1971, p. 96]
As a consequence of failing to meet their expec-
tations either side will become dissatisfied and seek to
terminate the relationship or modify it so that an equitable
exchange is achieved. One of the critical expectations on
the part of both groups is reward for benefits provided, the
group expects certain behavior from its leader which it rewards
with esteem, influence, etc. The leader, on the other hand,
expects productivity from the group which he/she rewards
through contributions to the group ' s/ individual ' s needs
(physiological through self-actualization) . Jacobs discusses
in detail the implications surrounding expectations, percep-
tion of rewards, success or failure of the group, and other
aspects of this social exchange view of transactional leader-
ship.
Hollander [1978] provides this view of transactional
leadership:
It is necessary to look at the leader - follower relation-
ship, and not only at the leader. A fuller view of
leadership needs to include followers and their responses
to the leader. This process forms the basis for the
transactional perspective, or approach to leadership.
[Hollander, 1978, p. 1]
In outlining the features of this perspective,
Hollander, emphasizes a "fair exchange" of benefits and rewards
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between follower and leader. His description of the exchange
theory is very similar to Jacobs' and need not be detailed
here.
James MacGregor Burns, in contrasting transactional
and transforming leadership, speaks of transactional leader-
ship as
:
Occur £ring} when one person takes the initiative in making
contact with others for the purpose of an exchange of
valued things ... Each party to the bargain is conscious of
the power resources and attitudes of the other. Each
person recognizes the other as a person. The bargainers
have no enduring purpose that holds them together; hence
they go their separate ways. A leadership act took place,
but it was not one that binds leader and follower together
in mutual and continuing pursuit of a higher purpose.
[Burns, 1978, p. 19]
He further contends that it is the nature of trans-
actional relationships to be short-lived, both leader and
led having to move on as needs are fulfilled. "Most important,
the transactional gratification itself may be a superficial
and trivial one" [Burns, 1978, p. 258].
2. Transactional Analysis
Developed by Eric Berne [1964] and popularized in
works by Thomas Harris [1969], Transactional Analysis (TA)
is a method for analyzing the behavior exhibited in an exchange
between people.
At the center of the model lies three ego states;
Parent, the evaluative, rule enforcing state; Adult, the
rational, decision making state; and, Child, the emotional
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state. In the healthy individual a balance of all three
states exists while in the unhealthy person any one state
may dominate.
The transaction between two people is analyzed as a
function of which state they are "dealing" from and to
(stimulus/response)
.
The key to continued communication is parallel trans-
actions. This implies, for example, a Parent addressing
Child as stimulus would receive Child addressing Parent
response. If the transaction is crossed, e.g. Adult to
Adult stimulus receives a Child to Parent response, commun-
ications breaks down between the individuals
.
TA analyzes both one-time and continuing transactions
with a view toward identifying roles, working toward estab-
lishing parallel transactions, and reducing the games people
play in their interrelationships. A game is a transaction
in which the person is not being honest, some ulterior motive
is driving the transaction.
Criticized as being too simplistic, the support and
attention given TA in the last few years stems from this sim-
plicity.
In 1973 the US Army Chaplain Corps, in response to
a request from the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, devel-
oped the Personal Effectiveness Training course (PET) . PET
used the principles of transactional analysis as developed by
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Berne and Harris. Its primary focus was to provide training
in communication and personal counseling. While the course
no longer exists in its entirety, the concept is frequently
discussed in unit and service school training.
Transactional and transactional analysis theories
deal with the relationship between follower and leader as
the result of some exchange. In the next section this
exchange or expectation will be contrasted to the view
expressed by Burns.
F. TRANSFORMATIONAL LEADERSHIP ^
Transformational leadership, as defined by James
MacGregor Burns in his book Leadership
,
is:
Transforming leadership, while more complex [than trans-
actional]
,
is more potent. The transforming leader recog-
nizes and exploits an existing need or demand of a potential
follower. But, beyond that, the transforming leader looks
for potential motives in followers, seeks to satisfy higher
needs, and engages the full person of the follower. The
result of transforming leadership is a relationship of
mutual stimulation and evaluation that converts followers
into leaders and may convert leaders into moral giants.
[Burns, 1978, p. 4]
The key to Burns' theory is moral leadership which
"emerges from, and always returns to the fundamental wants
and needs, aspirations, and values of the followers" [p. 4].
A political scientist, he draws from the experiences of





A function of complex biological, social, cognitive, and
affective processes, that is closely influenced by the
structures of opportunity and closure around it, that may
emerge at different stages in different peoples' lives,
that manifests itself in a variety of processes and
arenas - in short, we have seen that the usual general-
izations [traits, leaders being born and not made and
vice versa] are without foundation.
[Burns, 1978, p. 427]
Philosophical in nature, his arguments are not readily
molded into the experimental design features for validity
and reliability testing which seem the prerequisite for
military training. What then is the value in including his
theory? Simply put, it provides the stimulus needed to
look at leadership from other than the behavioral scientists
point of view. This refreshing insight will undoubtedly
leave its impact on the armed services in the near future.
G. SUMMARY
The preceding literature review has provided the reader
with a general orientation of those theories which have
contributed significantly to the understanding of leadership.
Despite the differences in perspective with regard to leader-
ship theory and the characteristics of an effective leader
development program, certain commonalities are found. Foremost
is the role of the followers, their influence on the leader
and reaction to his/her attempts to influence are paramount
in determining the effectiveness of the leader and subsequently
the success or failure of the organization.
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The second major point of agreement, with the single
exception of Fiedler, is that the leader is capable of
modifying his/her style, behavior, attitude towards the
follower. This change is contingent upon the effectiveness
of the change agent, in this case training. Again Fiedler
is heard as the one dissenting voice vis-a-vis other theorists
on the efficacy of leadership training.
It is postulated that the ability of any training program
to produce better leaders can only be assessed in light of
its relative merits and demonstrated effect on the organ-
ization and individual leader. Broad generalizations about
the capabilities of training to bring about change are inap-
propriate in this context.
In the following chapter the leadership training programs
developed by each service are examined in light of the
theoretical concepts reviewed here. Particular attention
is focused on the environment in which the US Army's
program, and consequently its evaluation, must operate.
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III. LEADER DEVELOPMENT IN THE MILITARY
As stated in the introduction, the study of leader
development is most appropriately considered in the context
of systems presently in place. The systems applicable to
this thesis, apart from the leadership training program
itself, include the service's organization for training and
the personnel management system. In this chapter these
systems are reviewed for each service as a prelude to
detailing their approach to leadership training.
In order to make the task of defining and comparing
the various personnel systems manageable, only that portion
of the system applicable to officers is studied.
A. UNITED STATES ARMY
1 . Organization for Training
During the 1970' s considerable change was seen in the
organization and operation of the US Army. Significant among
those areas affected was military training. This section
details the current organizational structure as it pertains
to the areas of policy, doctrine, research, and implementation
of leadership training.
In 1973 a major Army-wide reorganization resulted in
the creation of the Leadership Branch, Human Resources Devel-
opment Directorate, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for
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Personnel (ODCSPER) . The function of this office is primarily-
one of monitoring the leadership issues in the Army and form-
ulating policy.
Another organization created in 1973 is the US Army
Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) . As the name implies
TRADOC is the proponent agency for developing, managing, and
supervising the training of individual officers and enlisted
personnel throughout the Army. It commands all Army service
schools with the exception of the Army War College and the
Military Academy.
As discussed in the introduction, the initial emphasis
in TRADOC centered on the technical competence required for
combat. This orientation first focused on the institutional
training, i.e. service schools. Gradually, as it was realized
that the majority of learning took place at the unit level, a
decentralized approach was adopted. At this stage exportable
training packages were developed for both the individual
soldiers and units.
Under this decentralization the various service schools
became the primary source of Army doctrine and training devel-
opment. Each school evaluates proposed doctrinal changes
within their area of expertise and forwards their recommen-
dations to TRADOC for approval and implementation. In de-
signing specific courses (such as the initial entry Officer
Basic Course) the school incorporates its specialty training
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with materials from other areas, proponency for which has
been given to another school. A great deal of latitude is
given each school in designing its courses. This has led to
a wide variation in the approach taken toward the common
military subjects, i.e. leadership. The result is that no two
service schools approach the subject of leadership training
with the same material or in the same manner.
Compounding this problem is a lack of a clear under-
standing concerning the proponency of leadership research,
training development, and doctrine. Within the area of
leadership training there are a number of agencies reporting
to TRADOC. The US Army Infantry School (USAIS) is designated
as proponent for the development of concepts and doctrine for
military leadership. The Commander, US Army Administration
Center (ADMIiNICEN) is tasked as "the proponent for the devel-
opment of concepts and doctrine related to personnel manage-
ment to include human resources development" fTRADOC Regulation
600-3]]. Army Regulation 310-25, the dictionary of Army terms,
includes leadership within the definition of "human resources
development ."
Other TRADOC agencies involved in leadership develop-
ment include the Command and General Staff College which is
primarily concerned with leadership battle roles and the
Organizational Effectiveness Center and School which has re-
cently received proponency for common tasks in the areas of;
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communications, human relations, counseling, supervision,
decision making, management sciences, planning, and ethics.
These are also the areas identified in the organizational
leadership model which will be discussed later.
Efforts within TRADOC to clarify proponency have
centered on differentiating organizational leadership
(ADMINCEN) from individual leadership (USAIS) , though this
distinction was never clearly specified.
Outside of the TRADOC chain of command the US Army
War College and the Military Academy are both involved in
leadership research and training development as it pertains
to their particular curricula.
Within the area of leadership research the Army
established a contract in 1951 with George Washington Univer-
sity for the establishment of a Human Resources Research
Office. This office served as the Army's "principal re-
search and development agency in the field of training methods
training content, and training evaluation" ^Lavisky, 1977,
p. 107], This contract was terminated in 1969 and the agency
was separately incorporated as the Human Resources Research
Organization (HumRRO) . This new organization, comprised of
many of the people who had previously worked for the univer-
sity, provided the Army with a resource for "conducting
studies and research and development on training, needs for




During the 1973 reorganization of the Army the
special contract with HumRRO was terminated and the training
research integrated into an in-house organization. This in-
house agency eventually came to be called the Army Research
Institute for the Behavioral Sciences (ARI) and was assigned
the mission of "conducting the Army's research and develop-
ment program in human performance, military selection, behav-
ioral evaluation, motivation, race relations, behavioral and
social aspects of drug abuse, social change, soldier-community
relations, career incentives, and training" [Lavisky, 1977,
p. 152J. HumRRO still exists as a private corporation and
does the bulk of the research work contracted out by ARI.
Because so many agencies were involved in some phase
of leader development, the situation the Army found itself
in as it entered the 1980 ' s was one where:
Leader research, concept development, and training devel-
opment activities have been carried on unsystematically
and with less than resource/cost effectiveness. As such
there are undesignated proponencies; fragmented propon-
encies; multiple and shared proponencies for the same
area; developmental efforts being conducted in semi-
isolation; and disconnects between researchers, combat
developers, and training developers.
[DA, ADMINCEN, 1979, p. 26]
To address this problem an Army Leadership Action
Planning Conference was convened in February 1980. Made up
of representatives from all the agencies described above,
the purpose of the conference was to draft a comprehensive
plan to guide the Army's leadership training and development
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activities. The attendees identified the following objective
in the areas of policy, coordination, and integration of
effort:
Develop and implement policies and procedures that empha-
size centralized planning and coordination and promote
decentralized execution to support leader development.
[Leader Development Plan,
April 1980, p. 6]
Tasks and responsibilities designed to achieve this
objective were also spelled out. The Deputy Chief of Staff
for Personnel office is to prepare and coordinate an Army
regulation on leader development that prescribes objectives,
responsibilities, and administrative procedures by September
1981. TRADOC, by October 1980, is to designate a single
integrating agency for leader development.
While it is far too early to judge the effectiveness
of the conference, indications that the recommendations will
be adopted are positive.
In the next section the second major system impacting
on leader development, the personnel management system, is
examined
.
2 . Personnel Management System
The Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS) is a
comprehensive plan encompassing the assignment, promotion,
evaluation, etc. of Army officers. Career progression, and in
particular education and training, is the aspect of OPMS which
is of greatest concern.
74

With the cost of equipping the military rising at a
dramatic rate, the pressure has been building to cut back in
other areas of the budget. In 1976 the Senate Armed Services
Committee recommended reductions in the Army training organ-
ization. This was followed early the following year by the
Office of Management and Budget's proposed minimums for
education and training resource levels. These levels were
far below what was then considered acceptable by the Army
trainers. Since no major changes had been made in the
system for many years (pre-Vietnam) the Chief of Staff of the
Army directed in August 1977 that a Review of Education and
Training of Officers (RETO) be conducted in order to:
Determine officer training and education requirements
based on Army missions and individual career development
needs. Based on those requirements, develop training
and education policies and programs which combine self-
development, unit development, and institutional develop-
ment in a phased schedule from precommissioning or
preappointment training through career completion.
[Review of Education and
Training for Officers, 1978,
P- I - 3]
The recommendations of that study called for a
complete revision in the manner in which the Army trains its
officers. At present many of these recommendations have been
approved for implementation while others have been deferred
pending further review. Figure 5 depicts the difference
between the current and proposed systems.


























































































the Leadership Action Planning Conference stressed the need
to integrate plans for leader development with those RETO
actions approved for execution. Accordingly, the plan for
assessing the effectiveness of leadership training must be
written in terms of the future state of training within the
Army.
The elements of the proposed system include:
a. Accession Assessment Center
Potential Army officers will be tested using
assessment center technology on motivation and leadership
potential, as well as the traditional medical and physical
fitness exams, prior to acceptance into ROTC training.
Military Academy candidates are currently exposed to this
selection process.
b. Basic Course
All newly commissioned officers will attend an
expanded basic course. Upon arrival at the school they will
be required to pass a diagnostic test. This first step in a
series of Military Qualification Standards (MQS) will insure
a common body of knowledge and skills regardless of the
commissioning source.
Previously twelve weeks in length, the new
courses will average nineteen weeks. The officer will be
taught those skills required in the first three years of
service. He/she will validate these skills through on-the-job
77

performance in order to become MQS II qualified.
c. Temporary Duty Schooling
Some of those skills which were previously
taught in the Advanced Course may be covered in the expanded
Basic Course or delayed until staff schooling. The majority,
however, will be covered in temporary duty schools such as a
Pre-Company Command Course of approximately five weeks dura-
tion. . Throughout this stage of an individuals career func-
tional (technically oriented) schooling in a TDY status will
be offered. Self-development by means of non-resident instruc-
tion, college courses, and a professional readings require-
ment will be strongly encouraged. Before the tenth year of
service all officers must have completed MQS III to be
eligible for staff schooling.
3
d. Combined Arms and Services Staff School (CAS )
3All new majors will attend CAS to provide them
with some training in staff procedures. Approximately seven
weeks in length, the proposed course of instruction calls for
24 hours of leadership instruction (ethics, group dynamics,
and organizational effectiveness)
.
e. Command and General Staff College (C&GSC)
3Approximately 40% of those majors completing CAS
will be given advanced training in general staff skills at
C&GSC (or the equivalent sister service school) . Initially
RETO recommended 20?o attend this ten month school. In April
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1980, however, the Commanding General, TRADOC, approved the
elimination of the Advanced Courses providing the present
407o attendance rate be retained.
f. Precommand Course
Lieutenant Colonel's and Colonel's selected for
command now attend five seperate TDY courses (legal, mainten-
ance, training, tactical, and command development). It is
proposed that these courses be tailored to the position.
This tailoring would require a detailed front-end analysis of
each command billet.
g. Senior Service College
Little change from the present system is called
for in the new system. The conduct of joint and combined land
warfare, as taught at the Army War College, remains a current
training requirement.
h. General Officer Development
To provide a system to meet the continuing
education and development needs of General Officers a three
phase training program was proposed. It consists of trans-
itional, orientational, and developmental training. Specif-
ically called for are a two to six week interassignment
course, periodic mandatory executive update seminars, and
major command sponsored periodic Senior Commander/Manager
workshops
.
The salient points of the new education and training
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system, with regard to leadership training, are: (1) the
use of assessment center technology/methodology is actively
being pursued; (2) primary emphasis on leader development
will take place in the units, schools being reserved for
technical (hard skill) subjects, and; (3) with the expansion of
the basic course fewer classes per year will be held at each
school. With fewer classes the class size will have to
increase to maintain the same throughput. This, in turn,
will limit alternative methods of instruction necessitating
increased use of the lecture. Redirection of assets from
the Advanced Courses may obviate this problem.
3 . US Army Leadership Training
In 1971 the US Army War College was directed by the
Chief of Staff, General William C. Westmoreland, to study
Army leadership. Their findings, along with those of the
Continental Army Command's Leadership Board, pointed out
the wide disparity in satisfaction with Army leadership
across ranks. This despite a common understanding of its
importance. The recommendations made in this study, Leader-
ship for the 1970 's
,
ushered in a decade of considerable
research.
It is from this study that the Army War College's
Leadership Monograph Series began. The series is "dedicated
to keeping Army leaders informed on a broad range of perti-
nent techniques of leadership and management" [["Consolidated
Army War College Leadership Monograph," 1975, p. lii]. On
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1 September 1974 ADMINCEN assumed responsibility for the
continuation of the series from the War College.
In 1975 the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel
tasked ADMINCEN to develop a single leadership model to
provide for progressive leadership instruction, identify
leader skills required at each level of experience, and iden-
tify leadership training requirements from precommissioning
to senior service college levels. Monograph # 7 of the
series, "A Progressive Model for Leader Development," rep-
resented the first step toward that goal.
The model developed by Clement and Zierdt L~19753 is
depicted in figure 6. It proposes that leader development
is contingent upon the interaction of three variables:
motivation (attitudes); skills and knowledge, and opportunity.
Assuming that soldiers generally enter the military system
with a "positive attitude, and. .. reasonably well motivated"
^Clement and Zierdt, 1975, p. 16]], development is primarily
dependent on: (1) The skills and knowledge acquired in the
service school system, and; (2) The opportunities in the unit
which the personnel management system makes available. This
second factor addresses the unit commander's responsibilities
in developing his/her subordinates by providing the supportive
climate necessary for the application of skills and knowledge.
The development of a base line doctrine followed in


























































arrive at a "taxonomy" of managerial and leadership dimensions
by position level. A taxonomy (a classification scheme that
clarifies terms and concepts which would otherwise remain
vague) was desired in order to permit the evaluation of the
effectiveness of training programs by specifying, in explicit
behavioral terms, what constitutes effective organizational
leadership. Clement and Ayres [1976] define organizational
leadership as reflecting "two primary characteristics: on
the one hand, leadership effects are oriented toward organ-
izational objectives; on the other, leadership roles are
established by the organizational structure so that positions
of leadership are imposed on the group" [Clement and Ayres,
1976, p. 3].
The initial development of these dimensions was
based on a review of the literature which included; Ohio
State studies; University of Michigan studies; and other
behavioral, communication, military, and management literature
From this review, nine dimensions of organizational
leadership and five organizational levels were identified,
[see figure 7]. Appendix A defines each dimension and sub-
dimension.
In May 1977 Monograph # 9, "Organizational Leadership
Tasks for Army Leadership Training," applied the first phase
of TRADOC's instructional systems design (ISD) model to
those dimensions previously identified. The first step was























FIGURE 7. A MODEL FOR ANALYZING
ORGANIZATIONAL LEADERSHIP
SOURCE^ LEADERSHIP MONOGRAPH NO. 8
"A MATRIX OF ORGANIZATIONAL LEADERSHIP
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"Intrapersonal" was added to the "Communication" dimension.
A number of products have been designed to support
the development of leadership training at the service schools
based on the matrix. USAIS has published a leadership task
list, more comprehensive than Monograph # 9, which was the
result of the second leadership seminar held in March 1979.
This list is intended to provide a common base for course
development. It was, however, acknowledged that how and
when the material is integrated into the present courses
(if at all) is still the prerogative of the individual schools
USAIS has also developed lesson plans, complete with tasks,
conditions, and standards, for each dimension and level up
through company grade officer. These are available to the
schools to assist them in their leadership training program.
Despite these efforts to standardize leadership
training, the schools have been slow to adopt the material.
Some training developers feel resistance from the ISD managers
over the difficulty of expressing the dimensions in the
proper format. Clement and Ayres £1977^ addressed this
problem in Monograph # 9:
Up to now, most of our training focus has been grounded
in the "transfer of identical elements" in which learning
is presumed to occur only if the identical elements
present in the old situation are present in the new sit-
uation. This learning theory is fine if we can success-
fully identify all of the elements to be learned.
Unfortuantely, "soft skills" such as leadership skills
are not amenable to a comprehensive delineation of dis-
crete elements. For this reason, a shift to the trans-
fer-of-principles theory allows us to assume that the
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leader can generalize his learning: the learner need
not be aware of the presence of identical elements in
a stimulus situation because transfer will occur when
he applies those principles having sufficient generality
to cover a class of stimuli which are learned in past
specific situations.
[Clement and Ayres, 1977, p. 3]
Field Manual 22-100 has been rewritten to support
leader development at the individual and unit level through
the adoption of the organizational leadership matrix. This
manual, the first of three, is designed for the lower and
first-line levels of the matrix. Plans currently call for
two additional manuals, one for middle and top (field grade)
officers, and eventually a senior (executive) level manual.
In a separate effort to support the units, a training
package, called Leadership and Management Development Course,
(L&MDC) , has been implemented. Initially fielded in 1975 at
three installations, its success warranted expansion to all
installations and division level units.
An experience based workshop, it is conducted by
instructors certified by the Organizational Effectiveness
Center and School. The purpose of the course is to: (1)
Develop an understanding of one theory of work-team develop-
ment; (2) Develop an understanding of the situational
appropriateness of various managerial styles, and; (3) Intro-
duce communication skills essential to effective mission
accomplishment through people, which will make participants
more effective as group managers and members.
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The course is a one week workshop presented to small
groups (10 - 12) composed of peers (equivalent rank) who do
not have a work relationship. A one day follow-up is con-
ducted approximately six weeks after the course completion.
It was originally designed for E-5 through 0-3 and equivalent
civilian grades but since then a modified version for 0-4
through 0-8 has been designed.
Appendix B lists the key learning objectives of
the L&MDC in order of presentation. This list should provide
sufficient insight into the course curriculum. The conduct
of the course utilizes the methods of adult or experiential
education. "They will find themselves actually involved in
problem solving situations which provide real feelings of
satisfaction or frustration. They will be providing and
receiving information about their leadership behavior in the
course and that of their co-participants" [DA, OEC&S, 1979,
P- 2J
A major reason for the program's success is that
it is unit-based training, that is, personnel discuss real-
life problems and situations during the workshop and return
to their units immediately after training. However, it has
been realized that because the participants do not have a
work relationship, there is no opportunity for mutual rein-
forcement of learning upon return to the unit.
Evaluation of L&MDC currently consists of administering
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a survey at the end of the course and six weeks later at the
follow-up session. The participant survey is designed to
solicit feedback from the students on both the presentation
and the perceived relevancy of the course.
In a 1975 study, A Comparison of Three Experimental
Learning Programs: SKIM, PET, L&MD
,
the advantages and dis-
advantages of L&MDC were discussed. These remain applicable
today and are presented in Appendix C.
4. Summary
In this section the three major subsystems of leader
development within the US Army have been examined, the organ-
ization for training development, the officer personnel man-
agement system (training and education subsystem) , and the
leadership training model. Throughout, it has been demon-
strated that this is a system subject to many changes, yet
one which has recently been given new guidance and direction.
Much of this direction, in the form of influencing the RETO
study, came from the other military services. In the following
sections the leader development of these services are
presented.
B. UNITED STATES NAVY
1. Organization for Training
Unlike the Army, the Navy operates a far more cen-
tralized education and training system with respect to leader-
ship training. At the top of this system is the Deputy Chief
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of Naval Operations for Manpower, Personnel and Training
(OP-01) . Directly subordinate is the Human Resources Manage-
ment Division (OP-15) whose mission is to:
Develop plans and policies and establish programs, pro-
cedures, and improved practices in the Naval organization
which support increased unit and personnel effectiveness,
improved leadership and management, enhanced career sat-
isfaction and increased personnel motivation.
USN, Officer Personnel Newsletter
Fall 1979, p. 3
To fulfill this mission a Human Resource Management
Support System (HRMSS) has been planned to coordinate the
Navy's programs in the following five areas: (1) Organiza-
tional Development; (2) Leadership and Management Education
and Training; (3) Equal Opportunity; (4) Overseas Duty
Support, and; (5) Drug and Alcohol Abuse. This section will
concern itself solely with the leadership program.
As training policy coordinator, the Director, HRM
Division (OP-15) , works closely with the Chief of Naval
Education and Training (CNET) on the development, management,
implementation, and evaluation of leadership training,
specifically the Leadership and Management Education and
Training (LMET) courses. Currently this relationship between
OP-15 (program sponsor) and CNET is modified so that OP-15
retains curriculum control over the LMET program, typically
a CNET responsibility.
In the area of research there are two organizations
which work on issues related to leadership training. The
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Office of Naval Research has primary responsibility for the
theoretical or basic research which is conducted. This
research- in- science phase is commonly referred to as 6.1
funds and involves the awarding of contracts to scholars in
the behavioral science field (among others).
Progressing along the continuum of research develop-
ment to the 6.2 funds the major effort in this research- in-
technology phase is aimed at solving military problems, short
of major program development. That is, how can the efforts
in the first phase now be applied to problems in the military
This job of applied research is undertaken by the Naval Per-
sonnel Research and Development Center, (NPRDC) , San Diego,
whose mission is to:
Conduct human resources RDT&E in the areas of manpower,
personnel, education, and training, and serve as the
coordinating agency for all human resources RDT&E for
the Navy.
[DN, NPRDC, 1978, p. iii]
2 . Personnel Management System
A Naval officer's transition through the training
and education system depends to a great extent on his or
her warfare specialty. There are three major divisions of
officers within the Navy: Unrestricted Line, Restricted
Line, and Staff Corps. This discussion will focus on the
largest division, the Unrestricted Line, and specifically
on its major specialty, Surface Warfare. Other warfare





Officers entering the Surface Warfare Community
are sent to a 16-week Surface Warfare Officers School (SWOS)
where emphasis is placed on those functional areas necessary
to prepare the individual for watch and division officer
duties. Prior to the introduction of LMET at all initial
training sites the Surface Community was the only specialty
offering its newly commissioned officers leadership and manage-
ment training. (JSpencer, 1978, p. 121]
After SWOS the initial sea tour will usually be as a
division officer in either the Engineering, Weapons, or
Operations Department. Within this tour he/she is expected
to qualify as a Surface Warfare Officer. Qualification is
guided by the Personnel Qualification Standards (PQS) program.
PQS is an outline of the various items an individual must
accomplish to be certified (certification being made by the
ship's Captain). It consists of: (1) Fundamentals, knowledge
necessary to do the job; (2) Systems, man/equipment inter-
face; and, (3) Watch Stations, procedures. Qualification is
a prerequisite for attendance at the next level of formal
training, Surface Warfare Officer Department Head Course.
Attendance at this course during the first shore tour
qualifies the officer to serve in any one of the principal
department head positions. During the next sea tour the
officer is encouraged to prepare himself/herself for the
command qualification examination which is required for
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command of a surface ship. After three years (18 months each
on two classes of ships) the officer usually commences the
second shore assignment.
During this assignment attendance at the Postgraduate
School or staff college can be anticipated (if qualified)
.
The one-year College of Naval Command and Staff (equivalent
to the Army's Command and General Staff College) is collocated
with the Navy's College of Naval Warfare. Officers do not
attend both schools. "The Navy places little emphasis on
attendance at a staff or war college -- just over 10 percent
of the eligible Naval officers attend at [either] of these
levels. Command, not formal education is a pathway to stars"
fReview of Education and Training for Officers, 1978, p. G-2-
11]. Training at both colleges is divided into: (1) Maritime
strategy and policy and their interrelationship with foreign
policy; (2) Defense economics and decision making to allocate
national resources in accordance with national goals and
strategy, and; (3) The employment of naval forces to accomplish
the four-fold mission of strategic deterence, naval presence,
sea control, and projection of power overseas.
Previous specialized training (e.g. Postgraduate
School during the first shore tour) will be utilized the
first two years of the second shore assignment with the
possibility of staff college during the last year.
After selection for lieutenant commander (04) and
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recommendation for assignment as an executive officer (or
command in a very few cases) the officer attends the Pro-
spective Executive Officer (PXO) Course. This five-week
course (two weeks of leadership training) had previously been
the first formal leadership and management training received
regardless of specialty.
During the third and subsequent shore assignments the
officer can expect to fill any of the following five catagories
of billets: (1) Operational assignment requiring utilization
of Surface Warfare Officer qualifications; (2) Billets in the
area of his/her subspecialty; (3) General unrestricted line
billets appropriate to the grade; (4) Senior service college
attendance, or; (5) Washington duty.
The majority of the Surface Warfare Officer commander
(05) sea assignments are as Commanding Officers of ships.
Initially screened for command the year in which they are
selected for promotion, the individual's record is considered
each year until selected for command or until he/she enters
the secondary promotion zone to captain (06) . Those selected
are ordered to command via the six-week Prospective Commanding
Officer (PCO) Course which include two weeks of LMET.
In summarizing the Navy's training and education
system, it is apparent that it has had a significant impact
on the remodeled Army system. The attainment of Military
Qualification Standards during the Army Officer's first ten
years is very similar to the Navy's Personnel Qualification
Standards. Both programs being designed to insure that
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officers obtain the fundamental skills essential to their
specialty. The assignments and schools addressed in this
section are summarized on figure 9.
3. US Navy Leadership Training
The 1975 BUPER's study refered to in the previous
section was a turning point in the Navy's approach to leader-
ship training. The program which has evolved from that study
is clearly the most integrated and systematic program of any
service. Its development warrants a detailed examination.
Lyle M. Spencer [1978] , in summarizing the results of
that study, noted the following:
a. A majority of naval commissioned and non-commis-
sioned officers did not receive any leadership and management
training at key ascension points in their careers (e.g. Div-
ision Officer, Department Head, Executive Officer, etc.).
b. 157 different leadership courses existed at that
time £1975} in the various commands.
c. An examination of the content of the existing
courses found: (1) There was no standard curricula or A
consensus about what knowledge or skills were needed to
perform effectively as a Navy leader. Courses consisted of a
combination of Navy tradition, rules, regulations, civilian
academic management theories , and a few offerings from the
behavioral sciences; (2) Courses lacked any foundation in
empirical research; (3) Courses were 90 percent cognitive and
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at people about leadership and management in formal classroom
lecture formats rather than teaching them actual leadership
and management skills, and; (4) While the courses were well
received, the participants had difficulty in relating what
they had learned to their jobs.
To correct these problems BUPER's (now OP-01) sought
to develop an empirically based training program, that is,
based on the actual skills used by superior performers.
Confronted with the task of identifying those competencies
(skills, knowledge, and motivation) which determine or pre-
dict effectiveness in a leader a research method developed by
VDavid McClelland [1976] was used.
Realizing that it is much easier to reach consensus
on who is an effective leader vice what makes an effective
leader, the first step was to identify a group of superior and
a group of average leaders for each ascension point. These
ratings were made by the commanding officers and, where pos-
sible, verified by examination of retention rates, "E" awards,
and inspection scores. This was first undertaken in San
Diego during the September -- October 1976 time frame. A sample
of eighty-two officers and enlisted personnel were obtained,
however, only 51 ratings were received on the 82 people inter-
viewed. Of these 51, 30 were rated superior and 21 average.
The next step involved interviews utilizing a tech-
nique termed Behavioral Event Interviewing (BEI) . In it,
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the leader is asked to relate some critical incidents, that
is, important success and failure experiences they have had
in their present jobs. Specifically requested was information
concerning: (1) What led up to the experience; (2) Who was
involved; (3) What they (the leader) felt, wanted, or intended
in responding to the situation; (4) What they actually did,
and; (5) The outcome or results of the action taken. After
several incidents from each person were gathered, a comparison
of those factors which distinguished between the superior and
average leaders was made.
Two or more researchers independently examined the interview
transcripts ... to identify distinguishabe individual char-
acteristics which appeared to differentiate superior from
average performers and those which were expressed with equal
frequency by all performers were identified.
[Klemp, et al., 1977, p. 12]
From the initial interviews of the rated personnel in
the Pacific Fleet twenty-seven competencies, grouped into
five clusters, were identified as distinguishing leaders.
These competencies are listed in the left hand column of
figure 10 as "LMET Competencies."
In order to validate these competencies the same
procedures were applied to a similar cross-section of person-
nel from the Atlantic Fleet in February 1977. This time,
however, the leaders were interviewed prior to being rated
by their superior. Based on a factor analysis of the Pacific
Fleet results (the fifth factor, Coercion was not used) a
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for the Atlantic Fleet. A discriminant function showed that
in 67.9% of the cases the leader was correctly identified as
superior or average (p < .001). For this analysis only 78 of
the 100 leaders interviewed were rated (38 superior and 40
average)
.
[Klemp, et al., 1977]
In May 1977 a committee comprised of the representa-
tives of the program sponsor (OP-15), CNET, and the Chief of
Naval Technical Training met to design the first four of
fourteen ascension level specific courses. To the right of
the initial competencies in figure 10 is a list depicting
how the competencies were formed into curriculum clusters.
During the initial stage of Curriculum development,
"management control" .. .was divided into two areas
"problem solving" and "process management." The reason
for doing this was that students could first look at
problem solving through planning, processes, concept-
ualizing, and forming an action plan. Process Manage-
ment then deals with optimizing people and resources.
Coercion, being a type of influence, was established
that even though it separated superior and average
performance, superiors used it less and as a last
resort. Therefore, for instructional purposes, it was
included under the dimension of "skillful use of
influence." Finally, the cluster title "task achieve-
ment" was changed to "concern for efficiency and
effectiveness ."
[Mangus, 1980, p. 28]
A trial course was conducted in June 1977 with
favorable results. During this period of curriculum devel-
opment and pilot testing a second validation effort was
undertaken
.
This second effort (August through October 1977)
sought to gather data from a sufficiently large enough sample
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to verify competencies across all levels and warfare com-
munities. To do this a battery of nine paper and pencil
tests were developed covering fifty separate scales or
variables. This test was administered to 1,200 officers and
enlisted personnel.
A competency was regarded as validated if one or
2
more of its indicator variables was significantly correlated
with the superior's rating of performance. This in one or
more of the following billet groups: (1) Commanding Officer
and Executive Officer; (2) Department Head and Division
Officer; (3) Master and Leading Chief Petty Officer, and;
(4) Leading Petty Officer and Petty Officer.
Sixteen of the original twenty- seven competencies
from the Pacific and Atlantic Fleet interviews were validated
in this manner. These competencies, grouped by curriculum
cluster, are presented in figure 12 and defined in Appendix D.
These sixteen competencies form the core of the two-
week LMET course with variations on course content being made
for each ascension level school. LMET schools have been
established for the following levels; PCO/PXO, Department
Head, Division Officer, Chief Petty Officer, and Leading
Petty Officer. Recruits will not receive LMET training but
will be exposed to the concepts as modeled by their instructors
and company officers. The instructors at these LMET schools
are all trained and certified at the Human Resources Management
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School, Naval Air Station Memphis, in the twelve-week LMET
Instructor Course.
During each course the student progresses through a
five-step process:
a. Recognition. Each competency is explained in
terms of desired knowledge, skills, attitudes, etc. and
how this contributes to the performance of the superior Navy-
leader.
b. Understanding. The participant translates the
competency by means of his/her own experiences into language
with which they are comfortable.
c. Self-Assessment in relation to the competency.
Each student is able to identify areas in which he/she is
strong or need's new skills.
d. Skill acquisition and practice. All skills are
practiced with emphasis on those the individual has identified
as needing improvement in.
e. Job application. Participants develop individual
action plans for application on their job. This step rein-
forces learning and gains commitment to the competencies
desired by the Navy.
At the unit level, the teaching of formal LMET courses
by uncertified instructors is prohibited, as is the modifica-
tion of LMT courses (those addressed in the 1975 study) to
include LMET precepts and procedures. It is envisioned
that LMET team building workshops can be designed which will
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be administered through the Human Resources Management Support
System. These workshops will bring to the unit level the
latest refinements of the LMET program and reinforce individual
skills.
It is important to note that the changes in course
content were based on validation and not evaluation studies.
Presently a funding shortage is prohibiting a comprehensive
external evaluation (measures designed to assess actual
changes in job behavior or organizational performance) as
designed by NPRDC. On the other hand, CNET is progressing
toward an internal evaluation plan to determine whether the
course is actually teaching what it was designed to teach.
This effort centers on:
a. The development of a standardized student critique
form for all LMET sites.
b. Posttraining tests to assess student performance.
McBer and Company is still involved in this aspect of the
evaluation.
c. Assessment of the student by the instructor.
It is estimated that one year will be required for
funding and program writing. All inputs to the evaluation
will be computer scored and analyzed for possible course
revisions
.
One matter which complicates the evaluation process
is the Navy policy that personnel will not be denied LMET
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training for the purpose of establishing a control group.
In a proposed Human Resources Management Support
System (HRMSS) Navy Training Plan the establishment of an
Evaluation and Information office is called for. The
purpose of this office will be to formulate a summative
evaluation design and collect data on all aspects of the
HRMSS. This will be an ongoing effort and include LMET as an
element of that system.
The principal benefit in reviewing the Navy's
approach to education and training has been in contrasting
the highly centralized approach towards leadership training
with the Army's decentralized system. The result being a
fairly rapid implementation of a major program (LMET) as
compared to the many years spent in developing a base line
doctrine for leadership training in the Army. In the next
section another centralized approach. is reviewed, the
US Air Force.
C. UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
1. Organization for Training
Like the Navy, the Air Force operates a very cen-
tralized training system with regard to its Professional
Military Education (PME) . The Commander, Air Training
Command, has proponency for each level of education in an
officers career from precommissioning through senior service
college. Under his operational control fall the following
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PME schools Squadron Officer School (SOS) , Air Command and
Staff College (ACSC) , and the Air War College (AWC) . All
of these schools are located at Maxwell Air Force Base,
Alabama.
These schools differ from the purely technically
oriented schools in that PME encompasses the knowledge
unique to the profession of arms in general and the employ-
ment of aerospace power in particular. Within the schools'
curricula are; national security affairs, military history,
leadership, management, professional ethics, and standards
of behavior.
Through this organizational differentiation between
PME schools and the functional or technical schooling the
Air Force, more than any other service has developed the
distinction between education and training. Education being
the more general and abstract while training more specific
and concerned with the development of job specific skills.
Each of the PME schools listed above has its own
leadership curriculum development branch. The doctrine
and policy which guides the programs is formulated at the
Air Force Chief of Staff level by the Director of Personnel
Plans
.
Research in leadership related areas is conducted
by the Occupational Measurement Center at Lackland AFB.
This organization performs a task analysis for officer
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positions and recommends the type of training or education
needed to perform that task. Their work has been used to
identify the eight dimensions of leadership which are
detailed in the third section.
The Air Force Human Resources Laboratory, Brooks AFB,
has provided limited research in the leadership area, most of
which has been confined to literature reviews. Both the
laboratory and the center are under the operational control
of the Air Force Systems Command.
A third agency which has indirectly aided the
research effort is the Leadership and Management Develop-
ment Center (LMDC) , Maxwell AFB. This agency is tasked with
identifying systematic issues in leadership and management
for Air Force commands. Their mission is similar. to the
Navy's Human Resource Management Center ' s /Detachment ' s and
the Army's Organizational Effectiveness Staff Officers.
LMDC teams administer surveys designed to measure
such variables as satisfaction, productivity, attitude, and
leadership traits and behaviors at all levels of the base's
or unit's chain of command. Over the past two years the center
has compiled sufficient data to conduct an analysis of the
leadership variable. These data have been provided to the
curriculum developers at each PME school to aid them in the
design of their leadership training programs.
2. Personnel Management System
The career pattern, with respect to formal schooling,
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for the Air Force officer is different than that of either
the Army or Navy system reviewed so far. Officers other
than rated officers (pilots and navigators) and certain
technical specialties (missle, communications, computer,
aircraft maintenance, and security police) proceed directly
from their commissioning source to an assignment. Those that
do go to a school after commissioning receive technical
instruction only, no leadership or management training.
The Squadron Officer School provides the first level
of formal Professional Military Education to all officers
between their fourth and eight year of service. The SOS is
a short (11 week, temporary duty) course which focuses on
command and staff capabilities rather than further specialty
development. It is essentially a leadership school for
company grade officers.
The Air Command and Staff College provides the inter-
mediate level of PME to approximately 20 percent of Air Force
officers who attain the rank of major. A 40 week resident
course, its mission is to "provide mid-career officers with
the skills, knowledge, and understanding that will enhance
their value to the Air Force for the balance of their careers
in responsible command and staff positions" [[Review of Educa-
tion and Training for Officers, 1978, p. G-l-6]]. This mission
has been translated into eight specific course goals in the
areas of; common staff goals, specific staff skills, specialist
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skills, broaden knowledge of the Air Force, broaden view
beyond the Air Force, and research.
At the senior level the Air War College provides PME
to approximately eight percent of those officers selected
for the grade of lieutenant colonel. The College's mission
is to prepare selected officers for key command and staff
assignments which it does by placing emphasis on airpower
strategy and employment.
3 . US Air Force Leadership Training
The preponderance of an Air Force officer's leader-
ship training occurs at the Squadron Officer School. It is
therefore appropriate to detail that course's curriculum as
an explanation of their program.
The course is conducted four times annually with a
class ranging in size from 550 to 650 lieutenants and cap-
tains. Each class is further subdivided into sections of
twelve on the basis of a list of thirty variables (e.g.
duty, command, age, sex, etc.) to insure a thoroughly diver-
sified group. Each section is provided with a section
commander who is a member of the faculty.
During the first two weeks the students receive
limited instruction on leadership theories and take part in
many group problem solving exercises (e.g. Project X). The
section commander utilizes this assessment phase to profile
each officer along a series of leadership dimensions. These
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dimensions are; problem solving, organizing skills, inter-
personal skills, forcefulness, willingness to lead, flexi-
bility, motivation, and acceptance of responsibility.
At the begining of the third week the section
commander, and an attached member of the staff who has been
assisting the commander, feedback to the students their
perceptions and recommendations for improvement. A program
is designed with the officer to develop either the areas
discussed as needing work during the feedback or areas ident-
ified by the officer himself/herself . Plans are being made
to include self-assessment techniques for students to aid
them in developing their programs
.
Much of the remaining training is experientially
based. The student continues to work within the group on
structured exercises and in competitive sports, concentrating
on the dimensions specified in the plan. For example, an
individual who needs/wants improvement in organizing skills
would be made the coach of the section baseball team for a
week, responsible for organizing practices, making team assign-
ments, etc.
The assessment of the program's effectiveness has been
primarily limited to internal evaluations . Students complete
questionnaires at course completion and six months and one
year after graduation. Approximately 50 percent of the
replies have been favorable with the most negative comments
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concerning the relevancy of sports to the officer's assign-
ment back at his/her duty station. The individual's superior
also receives a questionnaire about the officer's performance
after attendance as compared to their pre-attendance perform-
ance. In general, their comments are more positive than the
students
.
The concepts behind this program were based on the
assessment center process developed by the Office of Strat-
egic Services (OSS) in the 1940 's to select agents and the
American Telephone and Telegraph Company's Management Pro-
gress Study of the 1950 's. Since that time many organizations
have utilized this methodology to- select or, as the Air Force
has done, to develop its leaders and managers. A closer
look at assessment centers is taken in a later chapter.
At the other two PME schools the subject of leadership
is not addressed in as formal a manner as it is at SOS, nor
is there a service-wide leadership training program at the
unit level such as the Army's L&MDC.
D. UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
1. Organization for Training
The Marine Corps operates the most centralized
agency for leadership instruction of any service. The Leader-
ship Instruction Department (LID) at Marine Corps Development
and Education Command (MCDEC)
,
Quantico, Virginia, is respon-
sible for: (1) Conducting leadership training in the formal
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schools; (2) Conducting special leadership training and brief-
ings; (3) Developing, testing, and revising leadership courses
and manuals, and; (4) Studying prevailing conditions, attitudes
prejudices, and behavior affecting leadership training.
[USMC Order 5390.2B, p. 4]
All formal schools (The Basic School, Amphibious
Warfare School, Communication Officers School, and Command
and Staff College) are located at Quantico. LID, as a
single agency, provides a cadre of instructors who teach
leadership at each level. Currently LID is the only agency
in the Marine Corps which conducts research in the area of
leadership.
Another major aspect of the Marine Corps leadership
program is its unit leadership training (details of which
are addressed in the third section) . The Equal Opportunity
Branch is responsible to the Director, Manpower, Plans, and
Policy Division for the development, implementation, and
monitoring of this program. Unit commanders are responsible
for local implementation of the program to include preparation
of an Annual Leadership Training Master Plan.
2 . Personnel Management System
The influence of the Marine Corps on the proposed
Army education and training system is felt primarily in the
precommissioning accession source. Almost 50 percent of
the Marine officers are commissioned through the Platoon
Leaders Class (PLC) program which requires attendance at
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two six-week summer camps (one after enrollment and one
immediately prior to college graduation) or a ten-week camp
if enrolled in the junior year of college. These camps are
operated by the Officer Candidate School. Other sources of
commissioning include the Naval Reserve Officer Training
Corps, the Naval Academy, and Officer Candidate School.
Initial entry training for Marine officers is unlike
any other service. All new officers attend The Basic School
(TBS) with specialty designations being made as a result of
performance during the course. Functional training follows
The Basic School, if required, according to occupational
specialty assigned. "For a significant number of Marines
(including some who will be advanced to the field grade)
this will be their only extended formal resident schooling"
[Review of Education and Training for Officers, 1978, p. G-2].
At the intermediate level only about 30 percent of
the eligible officers attend resident instruction. The
Amphibious Warfare Course (AWC) is the principal intermediate
level professional school in the Marine Corps. It emphasizes
Marine air-ground task forces in amphibious operations to
prepare captains for command or staff assignments in battalion
and regimental size forces of the Fleet Marine Force. Other
schools available include the Communications Officers School
and a number of Army Officer Advanced Courses. The impact of
the Army decision to phase out its intermediate level courses
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and replace them with temporary duty schools is yet to be
determined.
The Marine Corps Command and Staff College stresses
intellectual processes, oral and written communication, and
the analysis, synthesis, and evaluation of problems to prepare
graduates for high-level assignments. For top level education
the Marine Corps utilizes other services' senior colleges.
3 . US Marine Corps Leadership Training
As promulgated in the Marine Corps Manual the objective
of Marine Corps leadership training is to:
Develop the leadership qualities of all Marines to enable
them to assume progressively greater responsibilities
to the Marine Corps and society. All Marines, officer and
enlisted, will participate in leadership training designed
to achieve this objective.
[Marine Corps Order 5390. 2B,
1979, p. 1J
The leadership training refered to is a composite of
what other services refer to as equal opportunity, human
relations, racial awareness, etc., as well as those
topics which might be considered more traditional leadership
subjects. Leadership is defined in the Marine Corps Manual
[paragraph 5390] as "the sum of those qualities of intellect,
human understanding, and moral character that enables a
person to inspire and to control a group of people success-
fully." A key distinction in this definition vis-a-vis the
other services, is the use of the word "control" as opposed
to influence. The rational behind this is that "control"
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implies a more authoritarian approach than does the term
"influence" which is consistent with Marine Corps philosophy.
In The Basic School the orientation is towards pro-
viding the newly commissioned officer with an understanding
of the concepts of Marine Corps leadership and to prepare
him/her as a discussion group leader for unit level training.
The foundation of the concepts phase lies in the teaching of
the eleven principles of leadership with opportunities pro-
vided throughout the course to practice their application.
These principles are listed in figure 12.
The unit leadership training is designed to provide
the Marine with instruction/ information on topics such as
alcohol and drug abuse, sexism, racial equality, etc. The
characteristics of this program are set forth in Appendix
E. The reason for subsuming these topics under leadership is
that it is ultimately the leader who must deal with issues of
this nature. Each commander is responsible for determining
the goals and objectives for his/her unit based on the sit-
uation and to design an Annual Leadership Master Training Plan
to meet these needs.
In order to prepare the company commander for deter-
mining goals and objectives and in planning, organizing, con-
ducting, and evaluating leadership training the next level of
formal training, the Amphibious Warfare or Advanced Communica-




At the next level of schooling, Command and Staff
College, leadership subcourses are designed to provide officers
with a "command perspective" of leadership training. The
table of contents of the College's handout on leadership
provides the following interpretation of this orientation in
its listing of subcourses:
The Responsibility of Leadership
The Military Profession
Ethics and the Military Profession




[USMC, Command and Staff College,
1979, p. i]
Currently all efforts at assessing the effectiveness
of the resident instruction center on internal evaluations,
e.g. student critiques of the material presented. No formal
external evaluation has been conducted, nor is planned for the
near future
.
E. UNITED STATES COAST GUARD
1
.
Coast Guard Leadership and Management School
As the smallest of the uniformed services, the US Coast
Guard offers a completely different perspective on leadership
training. Unlike the systems studied thusfar, there is no
formal career progression for the USCG officer. There are no
mandatory schools and/or assignments for the individual who
aspires to flag rank. The organization for training which so
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significantly impacted on the leadership training in the other
services does not play as major a role here.
In November 1975 the Coast Guard began development
of a Leadership and Management School (CGLAMS) . Instituted
in 1977 the school now conducts three courses at both its
Yorktown, Virginia and Petaluma, California training sites.
(see Appendix F, CGLAMS Mission, Goals, and Objectives) In
contrast to the other leadership schools, attendance at the
two-week junior officer (03 and below) and the senior petty
officer courses, as well as the one-week senior officer course
is voluntary. District headquarters receive quotas for each
school and select the attendees from among those individuals
whose applications have been received.
The purpose of the school is to develop the leader,
to draw on his/her past experiences to increase their ability
to analyze a situation and thereby select an appropriate
style of leadership. In order to accomplish this the school
requires that only those individuals who have demonstrated
above average leadership competency be selected for attendance
The school is not designed to handle poor leaders sent for
training by the commands. The underlying concepts of the
resident courses are based on three basic principles:
1. Leadership is a relation amoung several variables.
2. Leadership is situational.
3. Leadership requires flexibility on the part of the
leader.
[Marcott, 1978, p. 13]
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The framework upon which the courses are built is an
adaptation of Rensis Likert's concept of the relationship
between three classes of variables: (1) Causal variables or
stimuli such as regulations, policies, and leadership styles;
(2) Intervening variables which act upon the individual or
group, e.g. need orientation, motivation, experience, goal
setting ability, personality, and a sense of responsibility,
and; (3) End results, e.g. short and long term productivity
and impact on human resources. The school contends that
"the only thing we have control over, short of changing policy
directives, is our leadership style [and that] if we can
increase our knowledge of and understanding of the intervening
variables, perhaps we have a better chance of selecting an
effective leadership style" [Marcott, 1978, p. 14].
To develop this understanding the courses involve the
students in the study of groups, individuals, and situational
leadership. In studying the group the students "are exposed
to the difference between 'content' and 'process' and are
invited to note how failure to observe process in a work
group can inhibit task completion. .. they are aided in recog-
nizing group norms and their importance. .. the effect of
cohesiveness within a group is discussed in depth, taking into
account the impact that status has on group decisions"
[Marcott, 1978, p. 14] . Of particular concern is the potential
conflict between junior officers, petty officers, and the work
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group. The leader is given skills and practice in addressing
this issue.
Herzberg's motivation - hygiene theory, transactional
analysis, and interpersonal communications (barriers, active
and passive listening, non-verbal behavior, and feedback)
are all covered in studying the individual. Here, as in all
phases of the school, the principal teaching techniques are
role playing, workshops, team teaching, etc. The lecture is
seldom used as the course attempts to capitalize on the
experiences of the participants.
Hersey and Blanchard's Situational Leadership model,
as presented in the previous chapter, is used to draw to-
gether the knowledge of the individual and group in selecting
a leadership style. "They learn to use their new found
knowledge of the intervening variables to analyze their
followers' maturity level. This knowledge gives them a
better feel for what might be an appropriate or inappropriate
'relationship behavior' in a given circumstance" [Marcott, 1978,
p. 17].
Also covered is a modified version of the critical
path method of modeling the work flow. This is presented to
aid the leader in planning, scheduling, and controlling
projects
.
In the two-week course this material is followed by
a week of case studies drawn from actual Coast Guard experiences
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geared to the individual's rank. The course concludes with
a viewing of the film "12 O'clock High." The movie is
shown in segments with an analysis and group discussion of
the intervening variables, leadership styles, and the possible
consequence of the two at the end of each segment.
To standardize the principles of the courses
within the Coast Guard, members of the school's staff have
taught the leadership instructors at the Coast Guard Academy
and the Officer Candidate School (the only two sources of
commissioning) . The only difference in the courses is in the
orientation of the case studies.
The CGLAMS has been moving into other areas recently,
most notably in the field of organizational development
"after re-discovering that training alone, without the
necessary change in the structure of the people subsystem,
does not impact the organization" [Wehrenburg, 1980, Interview]
In the training area the school is researching the possible
use of behavior modeling as a method of teaching. This
approach consists of the following four major learning
activities:
1. Modeling, in which trainees watch films of model
persons behaving effectively in a problem situation.
2. Role Playing, when the trainees practice and
rehearse the effective behaviors demonstrated by the
models
.
3. Social Reinforcement provided by trainer and trainees




4. Transfer of training is encouraged, to enable the
classroom behavior to be effectively utilized on the
job.
[Kraut, 1976, p. 325]
2 . Evaluation
At Yorktown the Development Staff of the CGLAMS has
been conducting an extensive evaluation of the leadership
courses. A four phase approach, the in-house effort has
attempted to identify: (1) Whether any cognitive learning
has taken place; (2) Long and short term changes in attitude
of the participants; (3) Changes in the behavior of the
trained leader, and; (4) Changes in the performance of the
leader and the organization.
Preliminary results indicate that with respect to
the first three criteria the school has achieved some success
It was found that four months after training there was still
some learning going on as the students were generalizing the
concepts to new situations. [Wehrenberg, 1980, Interview]
Participants showed significant gains in the other criteria
when compared to a control group.
The attitudinal and behavioral criteria were measured
with questionnaires administered to superiors, peers, and
subordinates of the trained leader. Individual performance
was measured with efficiency reports and special reports by
the superior. These results however suffer from their being
subjective opinions of one or two people at most. For
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reasons to be discussed in the next chapter the organizational
performance criterion has been the most difficult to measure.
Frequent mission changes were cited as only one reason for
this difficulty. Future phases of the evaluation process
call for a detailed examination of this area. The longitudinal
study continues as the one-year follow-up is about to be made.
The control group in the above study was (is) comprised
of individuals who have applied to attend the school but for
some reason were, or have as of yet, not been accepted.
Between group comparisons of the control group and individ-
uals who did not volunteer revealed no significant difference
which would otherwise invalidate the selection of the control
group in this manner.
It is apparant that the Coast Guard is far ahead
of the other services in evaluating its leadership training.
While the argument can be advanced that its small size permits
this type of assessment, it is an inadequate justification for
failing to follow suit.
F. SUMMARY
Based on the preceeding discussion of leadership theories '
and training within the military several observations can be
made concerning the service programs. It was shown that the
preponderance of current theoretical research recognizes, in
one form or another, the situational variance in leadership.
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In the military the most obvious variance in leadership
roles is the rank of the individual.
Only two services, the Army and Navy, address this sit-
uational aspect in their leadership doctrine. This doctrine
is reflected in a cradle- to-grave concept of instruction, i.e.
individuals receive a modified version of the base line
doctrine at each ascension point or formal school. The
immediate posttraining assignment reinforces these skills.
The Air Force, while stressing the Hersey and Blanchard
theory at Squadron Officer School (SOS) , fails to fully
appreciate the complexity of situational leadership in that
the subject is not specifically addressed in post-SOS
schooling. The approach taken by the Marine Corps is even
less cognizant of the power of viewing leadership situationally
Relying on the traits and principles which have been used for
many years, the Corps' concern for tradition insures a safe,
non- threatening doctrine which will be supported by its leaders
This philosophy is obviously the reason for subsumming all
human relations training under the banner of leadership, a
policy which may preclude changes from being made even
though research supports such changes.
There is another situational variable which has yet to be
addressed by any service, that is the variation found in
different Military Occupational Specialties (MOS) . Are the
same skills, in the same proportions, identical for the
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infantryman and the military policeman, the commanding officer
of a destroyer and the commander of an aviation squadron, or
even the fighter pilot and the bomber pilot? These distinc-
tions are made primarily on the intuitive appeal of Hersey
and Blanchard's theory that leadership style is dependent
upon the maturity of the follower. Since individuals (enlisted
personnel) are assigned jobs based on a number of criteria
(e.g. scores on aptitude tests, level of civilian schooling,
etc.) it can be assumed that given the same task the maturity
of the subordinate will vary along at least one dimension
used to select his/her specialty.
The Army, with its decentralized approach, is the closest to
recognizing this distinction but has not progressed far
enough in the program implementation phase to determine
whether this distinction will be emphasized. Mixing its
officers to insure a homogeneous group as the Air Force has
done overlooks this aspect. Navy standardization policy
throughout all schools of the same level minimizes the job
variation in the mix of competencies. Varying the situation
of a case study by warfare community does not address this
issue when the emphasis on each dimension is identical.
This same decentralized approach of the Army's has created
a situation which makes program development and implementation
a very lengthy process. With few major distinctions in its
program, the Navy has approached full implementation having
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started two years after the Army on the identification of
leadership competencies. While a longer development phase
may allow for more input from various sources and hence a
wider feeling of ownership, the ultimate determination of
program effectiveness is based on an evaluation after imple-
mentation. With the proper type of assessment, modifications
to the initial design are possible to improve the program.
A program brought on line earlier will obviously reach more
people and stand a greater chance of making a positive impact
on the current problems. The Air Force and Marine Corps
share this benefit of centralization with the Navy..
Another benefit the Air Force and Coast Guard have is the
format of their schools. With individuals returning to their
command after the course the curriculum developers are able
to conduct the best evaluation of any military leadership
program, with the Coast Guard exploiting this advantage to
its full potential. The same approach is possible in the
Army's Leadership and Management Development Course and in
the Navy for the limited number of personnel who attend LMET
courses on temporary duty from their command but neither
service has seized this opportunity.
With the exception of the Coast Guard, all services are
subject to criticism for failing to address the necessity of
conducting comprehensive evaluations. Whether this oversight
is a result of not recognizing its importance or, as in the
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case of the Navy, not addressing the need in the initial
planning the result is the same. Programs which, if called
upon to justify their existence, would be hard pressed to
produce conclusive evidence. Although the Army has included
evaluation as a major objective in its Leader Development
Plan, it has still been remis in not thoroughly studying the
effects of L&MDC. As a consequence of this gap in the
leadership programs, a comparison between services is limited to
subjective observations.
Despite the many differences in the programs there are
some similarities between the services. First, each service
has recognized the need to approach leadership training with
a multitude of instructional techniques, e.g. group discussion,
role playing, group problem solving, as well as the traditional
lecture. This signals a positive step in curriculum develop-
ment in a non-technical area. The Coast Guard's efforts and
experiences with behavior modeling should advance this position
even farther.
Second, and most important, is the recognition of the
benefit of feedback to the participant on his/her style of
leadership. Making the most gain in this area is the Air
Force with their two-week assessment phase. Unfortunately
the specifics of this assessment methodology suffer from the
same format previously ascribed to as being beneficial.
Mixing personnel from various military occupational specialties
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the situations relied upon to point out leadership behavior
is not reflective of the individual's actual job, e.g. sports.
One of the principle features in assessment centers is the
ability to recreate as closely as possible those conditions the
individual will find on the job, this is far from the sit-
uation at SOS and has been criticised by participants for
just this reason.
In summary, it has been shown that there exists a wide
variation in the education and training systems of the
services. Operating the most decentralized system, only the
Army has required attendance for all officers through the
staff officer level (upon implementation of CAS J ) . The Army's
focus in its schooling has always been on the next assignment
while the other services are more concerned with concepts and
principles to prepare the officer for the remainder of his/her
career. Figure 11 depicts the differences between the
services' resident school programs.
Within these training systems the approach taken towards
leadership training is just as diversified. Except for the
Marine Corps and the Coast Guard the services have identified
a set of leadership dimensions or competencies which contri-
bute to effective performance. The Navy, Air Force, and
Coast Guard have sought to increase individual effectiveness
with organizational performance benefiting from a second
order effect. The Army, on the other hand, has recently
127

obtained commitment on a base line doctrine centered
around organizational leadership skills. Figure 12 presents
the skills and competencies identified for the Army, Navy,
and Air Force and the principles of leadership of the Marine
Corps. Figure 13 contrasts the characteristics of each
service's leadership training program.
In the next chapter the problems of evaluation noted in
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In designing a strategy to assess the Army's leadership
training programs it is essential that the purpose of eval-
uation be clearly defined. Simply stated, the purpose is to
provide feedback for decision making about a program. Concom-
itant with this definition is a series of questions which must
be addressed in order to develop a comprehensive plan. Some
of these questions include:
What information is required?
What sources of information are available?
Who is to make the decision?
Who is to conduct the evaluation?
What evaluation techniques are available?
When should the data be gathered?
It is the purpose of this chapter to answer these and
related questions as they pertain to the US Army leadership
training programs. To begin this process a distinction must
be drawn between the two types of evaluation and a determin-
ation made as to the appropriateness of each.
An evaluation may be either summative or formative.
Summative evaluations provide a macro- level assessment of the
program, that is, whether the program's objectives were
achieved or not. In this case the relevant decision would be
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whether or not to continue the program. A summative eval-
uation is appropriate only after full program implementation
has been reached. At this point the characteristics of the
course will have had sufficient time to interact with envir-
onmental influences to determine if the goals were met.
Formative evaluation, on the other hand, takes a micro-
level view of the program's components for the purpose of
providing the decision maker with information on possible
modifications in order to improve the program. A far more
complex process than a summative assessment, a formative
evaluation looks not only at outputs vis-a-vis inputs, it also
considers the change process itself, in this case leadership
training.
Formative evaluation begins with the program's inception,
monitors its progress through implementation, and provides a
resource for continuous feedback throughout the program's
history. Changes in the environment (e.g. societal norms)
are detected, their impact on the organization analyzed
(e.g. greater concern for personal freedom), and what aspects
of the process are being challenged (e.g. Human Relations).
Clearly, the most desirable type of evaluation is form-
ative. Unfortunately, as the complexity of the methodology
increases so does its cost. The following chapter deals
with this critical issue, an issue which hampered evaluation
plans in the other services. The complexity of the evaluation
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also requires that a systematic approach be pursued to analyze
the interrelationship of the components.
The components of the Army organizational leadership
program include the following:
1. Initial State of the Organization
This element is the organizational environment from
which the leaders come prior to receiving training. It is
presently described by such quantitative variables as: Absent
Without Leave (AWOL) rates, nonjudicial punishment rates,
retention rates, percent of Military Occupational Specialty
(MOS) qualified, etc. It also includes qualitative measures
such as motivation, esprite, and bearing. Whether these
indicies are appropriate for studying the effect of leadership
training is discussed later.
2. Pre-training Leaders




These are the properties of the training system which
include its method of instruction, validity of the dimensions
of leadership, applicability of the dimensions to the job,
variation of the emphasis placed on each dimension, etc. In
the "Black Box" analogy from systems analysis it is here that
the results of a formative evaluation are fedback.
4. Posttraining Leaders
These are the leaders who have participated in the
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formal training program; the output of the training process.
A desired result of the program is to produce a positive
change in the leaders ' behavior when compared to their pre-
training measurements
.
5. Future State of the Organization
The final determination of a program's success is
the impact the trained leader has on the organization. This
organization may be the same as the one in the initial state,
as would be the case in the Leadership and Management Develop-
ment Course, or different from the one the leader came from
as in the case of pipeline training (training enroute to a
new duty station) . Any change in the environment of the
organization as a result of the influence of a "trained"
leader will contribute to a redefinition of the initial state
of the organization for the next iteration of the training
cycle. In other words, the output for one cycle changes the
input for the next.
The relationship between these components of the training
system constitute the criteria necessary for a formative
evaluation (figure 14) . These criteria may take the form of
feedback (such as that provided by either the training part-
icipants or an expert's opinion) or the measurement of a
change in some criteria. This latter category includes; the
change _in knowledge about leadership or the learning which















































subordinates, peers, superiors, supervisors, mission, leader-
ship styles, etc., third, a change in the leader's behavior
with respect to the attitudinal change and increased know-
ledge (manifested in the utilization of new leadership skills)
,
and finally, a change in the organization's productivity or
effectiveness as a result of the leader's new behavior.
These five criteria and the elements of the system are
depicted on figure 14 as: (1) Process Evaluation; (2) Learning;
(3) Change in Attitude; (4) Change in Behavior, and; (5)
Change in Organizational Performance.
This classification represents a modification and clari-
fication of Kirkpatrick' s [1959] typology of Reaction, Learning
and Attitudes, Behavior, and Results.
In the discussion of evaluation programs within the mili-
tary, reference was made to internal and external criteria.
This frequently used classification was defined by H. 0. Mann
[1957] as:
Internal criteria are those directly linked to the activities
of the training program, such as attitude scales and the
achievement tests designed to measure what the program is
intended to teach. External criteria, are measures designed
to assess actual changes in job behavior, such as ratings,
economic indicators, grievance rates, or turnover within
a manager's unit.
[Campbell, et al., 1973, p. 274]
Based on this definition the first three criteria (Process
Evaluation, Learning, and Attitude) are all internal, the
latter two external. This distinction is important in that a
comprehensive evaluation must include both internal and external
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measures and a comparison of the two. Ideally, all five
criteria should be utilized, but in reality the resources for
collecting all of the appropriate data rarely exist. When
faced with this constraint the next best alternative con-
sists of a mixture of internal and external criteria obtained
through any of a number of possible data collection techniques.
Several frequently used techniques are; questionnaire,
paper and pencil tests, job sample or performance tests,
interviews, simulations (to include assessment centers), visual
observation (expert opinion), performance ratings, and part-
icipant reports. Throughout this chapter a matrix is developed
which indicates which technique (s) is (are) appropriate for
each criteria.
Bowers and Franklin's [1975] guidelines for acceptable
data are applicable in determining this appropriateness. These
include being: (1) Objective, replicable, free from rater bias;
(2) Reliable, internally consistent, "rather than stable, as
an alternative definition of reliable, since its change we're
evaluating" [Bowers and Franklin, 1975, p. 158]; (3) Valid,
techniques measure what they are supposed to measure; (4)
Practical, obtainable without difficult, expensive, or time
consuming procedures, and; (5) Useful, productive of "under-
standable results within the affectable lifespan of the
program being evaluated" [Bowers and Franklin, 1975, p. 158].
One final word in general about criteria, the data
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obtained by each must be anticipated and planned for in
advance of the measurement. This includes: (1) the minimum
acceptable criterion, and; (2) alternatives or options
based on the results. The first point requires the deline-
ation of standards which will indicate the necessity for
change in the program. The two possible standards are, first,
an absolute standard which fixes a threshold level below which
program modification is required, and secondly, a comparative
standard where the significance in the amount of change or
difference between groups can be determined and must exceed
chance probability.
The advantage of the absolute standard is that the decision
making process requires minimal analysis techniques (i.e.
the threshold level is either met of not met) . Its dis-
advantage is that the particular threshold level selected
may be difficult to justify (why is 90 percent the minimum
acceptable level?). In comparison, the control group used
with the comparative standard is rarely arbitrary or
abstract, but the analysis technique used to reach the
decision requires inferential statistics.
[Alden, 1978, p. 50]
The desirability of either standard is discussed, where
appropriate, for the various techniques.
The second point refers to the need to establish contin-
gency plans before the evaluation results are known. Whether
an absolute or comparative standard is used, this foresight
will aid in determining appropriate modifications to reach the
intended goal. If the decision maker indicates that no action
will be taken regardless of the data, then there is obviously
no need for an evaluation, except perhaps for cosmetic reasons,
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Although the Army's base line doctrine (organizational
leadership) has not been fully integrated into the formal
school system, this chapter approaches the program as
though it has and that a greater degree of standardization
than now exists will characterize the program in the future.
In the following discussion of each of the criteria there




Process evaluation is an assessment of what occurs in the
classroom and is only tangentially concerned with whether any
learning has taken place. It is an important criterion
simply because there must be an atmosphere conducive to
learning in order for the students to assimilate the inform-
ation. The atmosphere can broadly be defined as: (1) the
content of the course, and; (2) the manner of presentation.
Appropriate sources for these two items are the participants
themselves and expert opinion based on visual observation.
In the absence of other criteria Andrews [1966] argues that
the best indicator of a training program's effectiveness is
the opinion of the participant. Both the participant and
expert are currently being used by all of the services as
their primary means of evaluation. In this section they are





There are two forms of feedback from training part-
icipants, the participant report (or survey) and the inter-
view. Although the interview potentially can provide the
most complete data in terms of specific comments and recom-
mendations, its advantage is importantly dependent upon the
skills of the interviewer. An experienced interviewer may
be able to extract more useful information from a fewer
number of participants than the survey. While this would
tend to make interviewing a powerful evaluative technique
there are problems inherent in its use. Principal among these
problems is the presence of two sources of bias, the part-
icipant in his/her replies, and the interviewer in the inter-
pretation of the replies or the manner in which the questions
are posed. Again the trained interviewer may be able to
reduce these biases but unfortunately this level of expertise
is usually not found within the departments responsible for
gathering such information at the service schools.
Other disadvantages are the time and dollar resources
required to conduct interviews. These factors can easily over-
shadow the advantage of fewer respondents.
With respect to the Leadership and Management Develop-
ment Course (L&MDC) conducted at the installation level, the
survey technique is presently utilized. This despite the Organ-




Critical of the use of the survey as a means of
gathering participant feedback, Blumenfeld and Crane [1973]
comment that "one of the most popular and least meaningful
criterion measures is participant questionnaires .. .this
approach to evaluation tends to build 'trainer-ego 1 since it
produces positive results almost without exception" [Blumen-
feld and Crane, 1973, p. 43]. To test this assumption they
conducted a study to document the extent to which perceptions
of effectiveness of training were based upon quality evidence.
Their conclusion: "asking managers (or trainees for that matter)
whether or not training is effective is a meaningless, inappro-
priate, and ineffective way to proceed" [Blumenfeld and Crane,
1973, p. 51].
Despite this deficiency the written feedback remains
the most widely used technique. The rationale behind this
decision is frequently cited as the need for: (1) Data in a
standardized format; (2) Unanimity; (3) Ease of administration;
(4) Data which can be statistically manipulated; and, (5) Qual-
ity of information in terms of mass distribution of the survey.
These considerations contribute to the reluctance to use
interviewing in that it rarely meets these needs.
Kirkpatrick [1979] remains one of the strongest
supporters of written participant reports for process eval-
uation. In discussing the advantages of this technique he
stresses several points which would improve the quality of
information received. These recommendations are applicable to
142

both the organizational leadership training at the service
school and the Leadership and Management Development Course.
First, the report should be distributed prior to the course
completion. This alerts the participants to the kind of
information which will be required of them at the end of the
course. Passing the reports out afterwards may result in
some lost information. In an extended course (over one week)
these reports may be collected prior to completion to allow
for necessary mid-course corrections. The emphasis in the
report should be on the manner of presentation of the material.
Depending on the goals of the training, e.g. prepare the
officer for the next assignment, the participant may not be
qualified to comment on the relevancy of the course material.
Any remark along these lines may merely be speculation. The
L&MDC, involving personnel who will return to the same duty
assignment at the end of the course, could be asked in the
first report about the perceived relevancy of the course.
An important advantage of the survey technique over
interviews is the cost savings in subsequent (follow-up)
participant reports. Several months after training the service
schools should again query the participants, now graduates, as
to their perception of the course's effectiveness. In this
report the emphasis is placed on the relevancy of the mat-
erial presented to their job. For example, what aspects of
the training (leadership dimensions) were extraneous, which
should be emphasized more, and what additions should be made
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to the course. These follow-up reports will serve as
primary input for course modifications based on military
occupational specialty. After several iterations of the
same training at all schools the training developers will
be able to adapt the emphasis placed on the leadership
dimensions so that the infantryman and the military policeman
refered to earlier will no longer be receiving identical
training.
The second recommendation by Kirkpatrick is that the
surveys be designed to permit quantification of the responses
as well as to provide for additional open-ended comments. The
response categories (scales) should be coded with continuous
variables (some multiple value variable in a range from high
to low, e.g. 1 - 5) in order to permit statistical analysis.
The appropriate agency to conduct the initial and
follow-up surveys is the agency responsible for conducting
the training, e.g. the individual service schools for organ-
izational leadership and the OESO for L&MDC training. Gener-
alized data concerning the participants' reaction to the
method of instruction, and later perception of skill rele-
vancy, should be compiled for research purposes by a desig-
nated Army-wide organization. At the school level there
should be a long term trend showing improvement in both content
and presentation with between group comparisons of student





Based on a criteria of complete data the interview
would tend to be the technique of choice for gathering
information. However, the serious resource constraints and
possibility of two sources of bias makes the survey the
most feasible technique for use by the service schools.
This concession need not be made in evaluating the L&MDC.
Follow-up interviews by trained OESO's can be given when
participants return for an additional session as part of the
curriculum. Each class is small enough to permit interviewing
the majority of the attendees, and once the course is completed
they are all on or near the same installation making a
second follow-up by the OESO very easy and inexpensive.
2. Expert Opinion
People who are recognized to be subject matter experts
(either through specialized training or extensive job experience)
should be called upon to give their perceptions of the leader-
ship training. Recall that the initial validation of the
leadership dimensions were made by subject matter experts at
the Infantry School conferences.
This technique, like participant feedback, can address
either the course content (leadership) or the manner of presen-
tation. While many senior service members would consider them-
selves qualified to comment on the former, the selection of
a reviewer should be based on more than rank. It is recog-
nized than many of the leadership trainers are amply qualified
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to perform this task, but their involvement in the training
process would result in a self-evaluation.
In light of the recent delegation of responsibility
to the Organizational Effectiveness Center and School for
the leadership dimensions, and the specialized training
given to the OESO's in the L&MDC portion of their course, it
is appropriate that the OESO at the service school be called
upon to provide input on the process.
Where possible the reviewer should be capable of
providing appropriate input (conclusions and recommendations)
to the Army's leadership research agency (to be determined
in accordance with the milestones of the Army's Leadership
Action Plan) as well as to the trainers. In that the
service schools receive student feedback from which they
modify the course to fit the situational idiosyncrasies of
their specialty, this 'outside' expert's role takes on added
significance. Without this input the course may be modified
beyond the point of base line doctrine.
The OESO's are provided expert assistance on course
content from the Organizational Effectiveness Center and
School in the form of changes to the manual and their own
professional publication the OE Communique .
One of the principle concerns expressed at the Army
Leadership Action Planning conference was the difficulty
of structuring leadership training into the Instructional
Systems Design (ISD) model. Instances in which subject matter
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experts in training methodology might criticize the instruc-
tion for failing to meet ISD requirements (see Chapter 3) were
cited as potential problem areas in future leadership training.
While this difficulty remains to be resolved at TRADOC the
leadership instructor must not overlook the potential benefits
of feedback from experts on methods of instruction, curriculum
development, etc. Prior coordination with the individual
selected to evaluate (or inspect) will contribute significantly
to these benefits.
Coordination with the post's Directorate of Training
(or equivalent) may prove helpful for the OESO at an install-
ation with no service school which can provide this asset.
The use of expert opinion by the decision maker on
possible modifications in the program is critical. It is
not a replacement for, nor is it substitutable by, the
participant report. Both are important techniques within the
process evaluation criterion. The following section discusses
another important internal criterion, learning.
C . LEARNING
Learning may be conceived of as a change, due to exper-
ience, in the students' ways of thinking, feeling, and
acting. The effectiveness of the learning process may
be thought of in terms of (1) the magnitude of the
changes taking place in the individual student or (2)
the proportion of the students who have changed signif-
icantly in one or more characteristics relevant to the
learning process. Thus conceived, education may be
regarded as a system of learning experiences which
bring about certain desirable changes in students.
[Bloom, 1963, p. 386]
147

At the center of the learning process are educational
objectives which are relatively specific characteristics
the student should possess after completing the program.
The learning criterion seeks to determine the participants
level of knowledge on certain cognitive skills, both before
and after training relative to these objectives.
While the curriculum development methodology (figure 8)
has attempted to specify all leadership competencies in
terms of cognitive skills there remain only a few which are
entirely demonstratable on the two learning measurement
techniques. Through the use of paper and pencil or job
performance tests the decision maker is provided feedback
on whether the process (training) is actually teaching those
skills specified in the objective.
Regardless of the technique used, there are a number of
common characteristics. First, a learning test is appropriate
only where there is a definite correct or incorrect response.
For example, under the "Directing" subdimension of "Supervision"
the skill "select appropriate leadership style" is not
suitable for testing, while "prepare budget" and "write mission/
objective statement" are "Management Science" tasks which could
be tested for compliance with established standards.
Second, the tests should be designed in accordance with
accepted doctrine to insure clarity, reliability, validity,
objectivity, etc. In constructing the tests a principle
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objective is to insure a particular level of comprehension
of the material. Therefore, it is appropriate to establish
an absolute standard for this criteria. Failure to meet the
standard on the end of course test would indicate either a
failure of the training process (poor instruction) , a
discontinuity between the material presented and the objec-
tives tested (not testing what was taught) , or an unrealistic-
ally high performance criterion (e.g. 100 percent correct on
the test needed to pass)
.
The third characteristic, the use of pre and posttraining
tests, clarifies possible alternative explanations. With
both tests the after training results can be compared to the
initial test to determine if any change in the participants
knowledge level can be attributed to the training process.
A comparison of the mean scores of the tests which proved
not to be statistically significant would indicate inadequacies
in the training process (given realistic test standards and
a failure to meet those standards)
.
The pretest may also reveal that the knowledge level
prior to training in some skill areas is sufficiently high
so as not to warrant any additional training in that area.
As seen in the proposed Military Qualification Standards
another use of the pretest would be to insure a common base




While the establishment of a control group (individuals
not receiving the leadership training) would_ increase the
meaningfulness of the statistical data the appropriateness
of delaying or exempting personnel from the leadership
training (a true experimental control group) is a matter
for the policy makers to decide. If, however, a situation
is created where the class is subdivided so that two or more
subdivisions receive the same block of instruction but at
different times, there is a possibility of conducting an
institutional cycle " quasi- experiment . " This design must
be considered on a case by case basis to determine what other
training the first control group is receiving and the amount
of interchange between the two groups during training, both
factors which could influence the test results for the group
receiving the training second. The implications of experi-
mental design are discussed in greater detail in the section
on behavioral change.
Finally, the agency responsible for conducting the test
should be the service schools for the organizational leader-
ship and the OESO for L&MDC training. At the service
school level the ISD subject matter expert should be consulted
for guidance in test construction.
Besides the above characteristics, there are some points
which distinguish the two techniques. In the job performance
or job sample test the results of the training are measured
by actual performance (ability) as opposed to strictly cognitive
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knowledge as with the paper and pencil test. These tests are
appropriate when a skill is being taught rather than facts
or principles. For example, if the "Interpersonal Communica-
tions" skill "speak clearly" is selected for instruction it
can easily be evaluated by having the participant give an
oral presentation to the class.
Disadvantages of job performance evaluation are the amount
of time it requires, usually having to be administered on an
individual basis, and/or the need for skilled observers (other
than the instructor) . A numerical scoring system must be
devised to enable statistical analysis of the tests and the
observers trained in its use to insure validity and relia-
bility.
Another form of test, the simulation, is typically more
general in nature than the task specific job performance test
and potentially more powerful in providing feedback to both
the trainee and the decision maker. The assessment center
approach, as discussed in the final chapter, is a
variation of the simulation.
Job performance tests are not easily used to test the
presence of the learning curve. While paper and pencil tests
are more flexible in this regard, their result, when adminis-
tered several months after training may not be a true reflec-
tion of the educational experience. Having been used
primarily for evaluating the participants retention of know-
ledge and facts it can be expected to slope downward from a
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highpoint immediately after training. The shape of this
learning curve may be quite different than one obtained from
a job performance test of the individual's skills. If the
skills are utilized frequently on the job the curve may be
expected to show a rise in the skill level since the post-
training test.
Less frequent utilization of the skills may produce a
"sleeper" experience in which a particular skill declines
(or remains dormant) until some time when a situation arises
requiring this particular skill. At that time the skill
level rises to meet the challenge. This phenomenon is
significant in the measurement of the behavioral criterion.
Relating this to the military experience, the Navy found
that its leadership and management* training programs
,
prior to implementation of LMET, concentrated on theories of
leadership (principles and facts) which proved difficult to
apply in the Fleet. As a consequence the rate of knowledge
retention could be expected to sharply decline over time and
the benefits soon lost. The LMET program is skill based and
therefore should result in an increase in skill level after
the participant returns to the Fleet, providing the opportunity
for reinforcement presents itself. This example serves as
an important guide to the Army's future program. With
its intended emphasis on skills of organizational leader-
ship, vice theory, the technique of choice for determining




A final comment on the learning criterion; testing,
besides its use in rank ordering students and evaluating the
training process, is a powerful tool in determining what is
learned and how it is learned. It is an integral part of the
educational process and must be considered as early as the
development of the program's objectives.
The introductory remarks to this section refer to the
change in the students ' way of feeling besides the cognitive
changes due to learning. This emotional, or affective,
component of learning is measured in the attitudinal criterion.
D . ATTITUDE
The measurement of an individual's attitude as an indicator
of the effectiveness of the training process is more than a
solicitation of his or her feelings toward the program. This
was reflected in the participant report. In the domain of
leadership training the changing of attitudes about the approp-
riateness of certain leadership styles and a feeling about
one's subordinates, peers, and superiors may be an objective
in itself. The review of literature provided several examples
of this goal. For example, in emphasizing that Theory Y and
Theory X are attitudes towards people, McGregor held that a
Theory Y predisposition would allow the leader a greater range
of behaviors
.
Where the objectives of a training program are expressed
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in behavioral terms, it is important to recognize that the
development of a "proper" attitude is an intervening step.
Simonson [1979] stated "while attitudes are latent and
not directly observable in themselves, thev do act toJ * mi
organize, or to provide direction to, actions, and behaviors
that are observable" [p. 35].
In measuring attitudes directly, as opposed to infering
from behaviors, there is an obvious restriction to the
participant himself/herself as a source of information. The
techniques available to extract this information include the
interview and the questionnaire. As with process evaluation,
the former, when conducted by a skilled interviewer, represents
the most complete method for gathering data as well as posing
the greatest problem with respect to the constrained resources
(people, time, and money). The questionnaire therefore is the
most likely technique to be used.
Regardless of the technique used, the first step is to
identify the construct to be measured. This should follow
directly from those attitudes which were identified as being
important during the curriculum development phase and stated
as a course objective. For example, if there is concern
about the leadership dimension "Counseling" and the ability
of the training to impart this concern on the leader, then an
appropriate construct might be "attitude toward subordinate's
personal and performance problems."
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When the constructs have been selected it may be possible
to use an existing instrument rather than constructing a new
one. For example, if there was a need to determine an indi-
viduals concern with human relations in the work situation and
their concern for the task itself, then the Leadership Opinion
Questionnaire (LOQ) may be used. The LOQ is a paper and pencil
measure of leadership attitudes which yields scores on the
two dimensions of leader behavior identified in the Ohio
State Leadership studies, consideration and initiating struc-
ture (see Chapter II) . It is completed by the leaders them-
selves for purposes of self-description. An advantage of
using existing questionnaires, which may influence the
selection of constructs, is the availability of norms and
established measures of validity and reliability.
If the specific constructs to be studied are not part
of an existing instrument, nor can the necessary items be
extracted from several sources, it will be necessary to
develop a new instrument. Such will be the case in the
likely event that a study of the relationship between the
eight organizational leadership dimensions and a change in
the participants' attitude is desired, or that a positive
attitude towards such dimensions as "Ethics," "Human Relations,'
"Communication," etc. are specified as training objectives.
The development of an instrument in this situation is far
more complex than asking the participant how he/she feels
about a list of constructs. Issues surrounding the selection
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of the measurement scale and the test's validity and relia-
bility are key to constructing a new instrument. Stern [1963]
raises four questions concerning the scale: (1) Are all items
relevant to the same measureable continuum; (2) Are the items
in fact ordered as steps along that continuum; (3) Is the
relative distance between the steps constant, and; (4) Are the
responses actually a function of the attitude the items were
intended to sample, rather than of some irrelevant process.
When a test is produced locally, it is critical that val-
idity and reliability be established through repetitive mea-
surements and information gathered on the test itself. If an
existing instrument is being used, or one has been made from
several sources, the validity and reliability must be confirmed,
Both are important methodological issues in assessment and
require a clear understanding to fully appreciate their sig-
nificance.
1. Validity.
Validity depends on a number of factors and is com-
prised of several catagories
:
a. Construct Validity. The extent to which a measure
represents the attitude construct it is supposed to measure.
One can develop confidence in the value of any construct
and in the construct validity of a set of measures only
as the result of a series of experiments in which it is
found that persons who score 'high 1 on a test behave
differently from persons who score 'low' and that this
difference is in accord with theoretical predictions.
[Kelly, 1967, p. 48]
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b. Predictive Validity. How well a measure will
predict some future behavior.
c. Concurrent Validity. How the test correlates
with another instrument which is held to be valid measuring
the same constructs.
d. Consensual Validity. Expert agreement that the
test measures what it purports to measure.
There have developed over the years several other
forms of validity which all too often are mistakenly relied
upon in evaluation research. They are defined here so that
there is no misunderstanding their inappropriateness as sole
sources of validity, especially in assessing a training
program.
a. Face Validity. A test is believed to measure a
given construct because it looks like it should.
b. Validity by Fiat. A test is proclaimed valid
by its author based on his/her position or reputation.
c. Experienced Validity. A test is judged valid to
the extent that it "provides the user with a subjective sense
of the correctness of the inferences that he makes with it"
[Kelly, 1967, p. 81].
d. Faith Validity. A belief by the user that the
test yields accurate and correct information therefore it is




Reliability, or the ability of an instrument to pro-
duce consistent results can be determined by several methods.
The "test-retest" method involves the re-administration
of the instrument to the target group and correlating
the results. The "split-half" method uses an arbitrary
division of the instrument into two halves. Results
from each half are correlated and reported as a relia-
bility coefficient. "Alternate- form" reliability
involves the correlation of the results of the same
attitude construct. Each subject takes each form and
the resulting correlation is reported as a reliability
estimate.
[Simonson, 1979, p. 37]
The preceeding discussion has called attention to the
obvious sophistication required to develop a measure of
attitude test. For this reason the agency which should
be given responsibility for this phase of the attitude
criterion is the Army Research Institute (ARI) . Once ARI
has designed and tested the instrument the administration
phase is the responsibility of the service school (branch
schools for the basic officer course, Command and General
Staff College, or the Army War College).
As with the learning criterion, the schools will be
required to administer a pre- and posttraining test of
attitude. The question of how long before and after the
training is difficult to specify. Since attendance would
necessitate reassignment the change in duty or location might
influence the participants 1 overall attitude (motivation) and
therefore their response. For example, an officer leaving a
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particularly distasteful assignment would probably experience
a more positive attitude which would be reflected on the
instrument. If the instrument were mailed to him prior to
departure the indicator might be more negative. An individual
leaving a good assignment might react in an opposite manner.
With respect to the posttraining measurement the attitude
an individual leaves the school with may be changed or
reinforced as a consequence of the situation. Even though
an individuals attitude toward the assignment or the service
in general is not the same as attitude toward any or all of
the dimensions of leadership its potential influence can not
be denied.
Dressel and Mayhew [1954], in a study of the gains made
by college students in attitudes, found a recurring pattern
of large gains made by students with low pretest scores and
vice versa. While their explanation of this pattern in terms
of ceiling effect, regression toward the mean, differential
motivation, and focus-of- instruction effect as well as the
statistical procedures available to deal with the phenomena
in general go beyond the scope of this thesis, it does serve
to point out the complexity of the issue of when to test.
In a previous chapter the relevance of differential
motivation in the military setting was discussed. Clement
and Zierdt [1973] addressed this issue in the Leadership
Development Model by noting that soldiers generally enter the
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service with a positive attitude. This illustrates a point
of caution with regards to measuring change in attitude. If
it has been hypothesized that attitude toward some construct
will change in a positive direction (i.e. viewed more favor-
ably) as a result of training, and the posttest fails to
confirm any significant change, has the training process
failed? Not necessarily. In this situation an absolute
standard vice the comparative standard must be consulted. If
the pretest mean was sufficiently high there could be little
room for change (the ceiling effect) hence the lack of notice-
able change. At this point the decision maker is confronted
with the problem of whether or not to continue training
directed at improving attitude toward that construct when the
pretest indicates the goal has already been met.
Despite these problems the most advantageous pretest
time is immediately upon arrival at the school. The posttest
should be administered prior to departure from the school
(to measure attitudinal change which can be more directly
attributable to the training process and whether this change
was in the desired direction) as well as some time after
departure. This longitudinal study will indicate the residual
or lasting effect of the attitude change once the individual
has been exposed to the new environment and has had an oppor-
tunity to assimilate its influence. Changes in this third
administration of the test may indicate to the decision
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maker that the original training objectives with respect to
desired attitudinal change may need modification. This
decision, however, can only be made when the effects of the
indivdual's attitude are known. These effects are manifested




What is of interest in this criterion is observed behavior
in the workplace as opposed to classroom behavior. As the
first of two external criteria, the best source of data is the
participant's superiors, peers, and subordinates. Since the
issue of having one's subordinates report on their superior
(the training program participant) has been a delicate one
in the military it must be made absolutely clear to all
involved that the objective of the measurement is to report,
in very neutral terms, what has been observed, and is not a
judgement or evaluation of the leader's effectiveness by
his/her followers. There are many difficult questions to
answer in developing this evaluation methodology, a principal
one being the design of the experiment.
1. Organizational Leadership Training
a. Experimental Design
The purpose of specifying an experimental design
is to "make the results less ambiguous and more amenable to
causal interpretation"[Campbell, et al. , 1973, p. 275]. The
161

authoritative work in this field is Donald T. Campbell
and Julian C. Stanley's Experimental and Quasi-Experimental
Designs for Research on Teaching [1963]. It is from this
publication that much of the design principles for the
evaluation model recommended for the Army Organizational
Leadership and Leadership and Management Development Course
(L&MDC) are derived.
At the high end of the ambiguity continuum
(least meaningful results) is the one-group posttraining
measurement only design. Unfortunately, the ease of
measurement and minimal cost associated with this design
has made it very popular. Among its many flaws is its
failure to provide a base line measurement from which change
can be determined. Any change that is suspected may be the
result of any form of influence, before, during, or after
training.
A step toward reducing ambiguity is taken with
the introduction of a pretraining measurement of the part-
icipants. While a base line is established, it is still
difficult to determine the cause of any change noted.
Obviously neither of these one-group designs is suitable for
formative evaluations. Of the twelve possible sources of
invalidity Campbell and Stanley [1963] indicate the first
design fails to control for any of the invalidities and the
second only for selection and mortality. In 1972 Campbell





1. History. The specific events occuring between the
before and after measurement in addition to the exper-
imental variable [the training program]
.
2. Maturation. The ongoing processes within the in-
dividual, such as growing older or gaining more job
experience, which are a function of the passage of time
and which may change the individual in some fashion.
3. Testing. The effect of the pretest on posttest
performance.
4. Instrumentation. The degree to which the criterion
instruments may measure different attributes of the
individual at two points in time. An example would be
using different raters to rate trainee behavior before
and after training.
5. Instability. Unreliability of measures, fluctua-
tions in sampling persons or components, autonomous
instability of repeated or "equivalent" measures.
6. Statistical Regression. Changes in criterion
scores resulting from selecting extreme groups on the
pretest.
7. Differential Selection. Using different methods
to select individuals for the experimental and control
groups.
8. Experimental Mortality. The differential loss of
respondents from the various groups.
9. Interaction of Differential Selection and Maturation.
The compounding of the disparity between groups as a
result of differential selection, with the interval
changes occurring within the individuals over the course
of the training period. That is, the experimental
and control group may have been different to start
with, and these differences become even greater because
of interval changes occurring during the experimental
period.
10. Interaction of Pretest with the Experimental Variable
The possibility that something in the training experience
reacts with the pretest in such a way that the pretest





11. Interaction of Differential Selection with the
Experimental Variable. A different effect for the
training experience as it is applied to one group versus
another. Because of differential selection the groups
are not comparable at the begining on the criterion
variables, and they may also react differently to the
training
.
12. Reactive Effects of the Research Situation. The
phenomenon that exists when the efforts required by the
research design so change the participant's expecta-
tions and reactions to the training that results
cannot be generalized to future applications of the
training.
13. Multiple Treatment Interference. The differential
residual effects of previous training experiences.
14. Irrelevant Responsiveness of Measures. All
measures are complex, and all include irrelevant
components that may produce apparent effects.
15. Irrelevant Replicability of Treatments. Treat-
ments are complex and replications of them may fail
to include those components actually responsible for
the effects.
[Campbell, et al. , 1970, p. 277
& Campbell, D.T. , 1972, p. 191]
One method of eliminating or controling for some
of these sources of invalidity requires the introduction of a
second group, the control group. This group, given the pre-
and posttraining tests, is not exposed to the training, but
is exposed to the other environmental factors experienced by
the group of training participants. When individuals are
randomly assigned to either group (equal probability of
assignment) this represents a true experimental design;
the "Pretest - Posttest Control Group Design." While MacKinney
[1957] argues that this last procedure is the only one
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worth the effort [Campbell, et al. , 1970, p. 276], there is
still room for error.
As discussed in the section on Fiedler's
experiments the Hawthorne effect (heightening of motivation
as a result of being singled out for training) on the
training group may account for more of the change recorded
than the actual training. To control for this effect a
second control group receiving some training, but not designed
to teach the same thing, may be used. For example, a group
of new officers in the experimental group receives the
organizational leadership instruction, the first control
group is given the same tests, the second control group is
given Fiedler's Leader Match as well as the two tests. If
there is a difference between the organizational leadership
group and the first control group, but not with the second
control group, then the results of the training could most
likely be attributed to the Hawthorne effect.
Solomon £1949] added a third control group to
control for the possible change as a result of the measure-
ment process itself. This additional group received a post-
test only while the second control group was given the
training and the posttest only.
The detailing of the above four designs has
served to call attention to several measures which should be
taken in designing a method to study the effectiveness of a
leadership training program. Principal among these measures
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is the use of a control group. At this point in the
evaluation plan a very critical decision must be made; How
is the control group to be selected?
There are two ways in which a control group
can be designated. The first alternative is the assignment
to either the control group or the training group as the
individual "walks through the door." This selection is
based on some system which makes the probability of going
to either group equally likely. At the completion of the
first iteration of training one group has received the train-
ing which is being studied while the other group (s) have
not. To illustrate the dilema this alternative poses, the
Navy point of view will be reviewed. It is the Navy's
contention that this alternative necessarily denies the
benefits of LMET attendance to those selected for the control
group. For this reason the Navy will not use this alternative.
The Army policy makers must decide whether the benefits derived
from a scientifically sound experimental design with this first
alternative outweighs the inconvenience of delaying leadership
training for one or two hundred leaders during the course of
the study. If the benefits are deemed insufficient then the
Army must settle for the second alternative.
The second alternative method of selecting a
control group, although it is not as reliable, is to identify
a naturally occurring control group within the organization.
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These groups, due to some function of the personnel manage-
ment system or the training system and not the action of the
researcher, did not, or will not. receive the training program
being studied. They will, however, be in the sane environ-
ment as the training group and available for testing and com-
parison.
It is the phenomenon of naturally occurring
control groups which forms another means of measuring the
effectiveness of the Army's future organizational leadership
program. Recognizing that at some point in time the service
schools will be initiating this program it is proposed that
the personnel attending those service schools prior to
the anticipated start date be designated as the control
subjects. Z'r.e training which they receive in leadership and
management skills will act as a placebo to minimize the Haw-
thorne effect.
There is a requirement that before the new program
begins a behavioral measurement test be designed s.nc aominis-
tered (to whom will be discussed later^ prior to the control
group receiving its training. After this group graduates the
new program is implemented with the incoming group having had
the pretest already administered. When this experimental
group graduates it will enter the units and work with peers
(e.g. platoon leaders) who comprise the control group. After
a period of assimilation, the subordinates, peers, and superiors
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of the new platoon leader will be questioned concerning the
training participant's behavior. This same survey will have
been administered at the same point in time from date of
arrival at the unit for the control group.
The objective is to determine is there is any
significant difference between the reported observations of
the control group member's behavior and that behavior report-
edly displayed by the member of the trained group. In this
case the groups are the training class of officers at the
service school, not the platoons or companies they go to.
A disadvantage of this design is the close mon-
itoring of subjects, control and training groups, required of
the research agency. Additionally, this type of experiment
can only last as long as there are peers already in the units
who have not had the new training. In the case of the
platoon leaders the field should be saturated with trained
lieutenants within two years from the date the service school
implemented the training. At this point there would cease
to be a control group and this experiment would terminate.
The measurement of behaviors could continue but based on one
of the less desirable forms of validity defined in the pre-
vious section. This problem does not surface with a true
experimental control group, the experiment could continue
indefinitely.
Having outlined the basic structure of the
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designs necessitated by the type of control group selected,
it is now appropriate to detail specifics such as when the
pretest and posttest should be administered and what tech-
niques are available. Once these issues are addressed the
nature of the experimental design is again discussed
in terms of the recommended course of action,
b. Measurement Timing.
The issue which complicated the development of
an experimental design was the fact that the training program
under consideration is pipeline training, that is, individuals
do not return to the same unit after training. Consequently
the individuals observing the behavior prior to and after
training are not the same.
Faced with this problem the only alternative is a
report by individuals from the unit the participants are coming
from for the pretraining measurement and a posttraining report
by people at the unit the trainee was assigned to. This
resolution is further complicated at the initial entry training
point; the newly commissioned lieutenants are not coming from
any unit.
There are two possible solutions to this: (1) Peer
measurement before commissioning at the ROTC unit, Military
Academy, or Officer Candidate School, or; (2) Peer measure-
ment after commissioning at the officer's basic school. The
first alternative is selected as the most appropriate for
169

several reasons. First, the peers at the pre- commissioning
source have had a longer period of time in which to observe
each other. As noted previously the sleeper effect may-
require a specific situation to trigger a behavior and
the longer the people know each other the more likely it is
they would have observed a greater range of behavior. At the
basic course there is less of an opportunity to make these
observations prior to the block of instruction on leadership.
Secondly, a new lieutenant may supress what would
constitute his/her normal behavior after having been placed in
a foriegn environment, this of course depending on the indi-
vidual and/or the commissioning source.
Finally, the future officer is less anxious
about completing peer ratings than the newly commissioned
one. Peer evaluations are a normal requirement at West Point,
ROTC and OCS and they are less likely to suffer from any
adverse effects, e.g. distrust, skepticism, etc.
The use of peer evaluations in leadership studies
is favorably supported in research. Gordon and Medland [1965]
found that peer ratings showed higher stability over time
and over different situations than did the superior's.
Hollander (1954, 1956, 1957, 1965) and Wherry and Fryer
(1949) have demonstrated conclusively that peer ratings
of leadership potential obtained during training in
military settings have higher reliabilities and are
more highly related to later ratings of leadership
competence than other measures or estimates .. .obtained
during training.
[Campbell et al., 1970, p. 113]
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Barrett [1966] commented that peer ratings are
potentially the most accurate judgements of employee job
behavior. The rationale for these findings is that "a person's
behavior in the presence of his peers constitutes a more
valid portrayal of his 'real self than his behavior in the
presence of his superiors" [Campbell et al
.
, 1970, p. 114].
Kelly's [1967, p. 64] comments support the position
that after the experiment's termination (no more control group
in the naturally occurring alternative) the peer ratings are
still desirable, "for many personality variables, the average
of several peer ratings constitute the best currently avail-
able measures, and, as such, are frequently used as criterion
measures against which the scores of newly developed assess-
ment devices are validated." This also is significant for
the development of assessment centers in the Army.
Unfortunately the availability of peer ratings is
very limited for the posttraining measurement. These data
must be gathered at some point sufficiently long after the
leader's arrival to permit assimilation of the environment and
reaction with the learned skills. It is gathered, as previously
mentioned, from peer, subordinate, and superior. Obtaining
information from several levels of the chain of command on an
individual would, when averaged out, tend to eliminate the
common biases of observers.
These biases are: (1) The leniency error, a
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tendency to rate people favorably; (2) Closure error, using
knowledge about one behavior to report on one upon which the
observer has no information, this is both favorably and unfav-
orably; (3) Similarity error, allowing common characteristics
between observer and observed to favorably influence the
rating, and; (4) Contrast error, observers who consider
themselves good at some skills tend to underrate others on
that same skill. The degree to which these biases are present
in the measurement is a function of the technique used to
gather the information and the training of the rater.
Before considering the techniques it is now pos-
sible to return to the experimental design and address the
third major point as illustrated by Solomon's four group
design, pretest sensitization. When a group has been exposed
to a set of relevant factors on a pretest it may learn what
behaviors to look for on the part of its leader. Solomon's
solution called for a third control group to receive only the
posttest and the second group to receive only the training and
posttest, any difference between groups after the posttest
could be attributed to this pretest sensitization. The
experimental design which uses two different groups of raters
obviates the need for such a control group design. With the
pre- and posttraining reports coming from different groups




Similar in nature to the attitudinal criterion,
the best method for obtaining complete data (in depth and
detailed) is the interview. As a practical matter, however,
this is the least feasible method. With respondents scattered
thoughout the nation's campuses (ROTC) , the Military Academy,
and Army installations world-wide, the cost of travel alone
would be prohibitive. This problem is only compounded by
the presence (or possible presence) of both rater and inter-
viewer biases
.
Consequently the method of choice is the survey
or questionnaire. While this technique is subject to the
respondent's biases discussed, Kelly [1967] reports that
these biases are normally distributed throughout the respon-
dent sample and therefore extreme scores tend to cancel each
other out. Another factor which reduces these errors is the
validity and reliability of the instrument. One possible
alternative is the use of existing instruments which have
already been tested for validity and reliability.
The Leadership Opinion Questionnaire (LOQ)
discussed as a measure of an individual's attitude on the
dimensions of consideration and initiating structure, has a
companion instrument for behavior. The Leadership Behavior
Description Questionnaire (LBDQ) is used by superiors, peers,
and subordinates to describe the leader's behavior along these
same two lines. Other tests, such as Hersey and Blanchard's
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LEAD - Others, have not been sufficiently validated to
allow consideration be given to their use.
Another area which deserves exploration is the
use of an existing organizational survey within the Army
such as the General Organizational Questionnaire (GOQ) . The
GOQ is an eighty- four item survey which calls for a measure
of agreement to behavioral and attitudinal statements, e.g.
"My supervisor emphasizes mission accomplishment," and
"My supervisor lets me know when I have done my job well."
The general catagories of questions concern the unit, super-
visor, work group, co-workers, and personal satisfaction.
With only eighteen questions relating to leader behavior
this survey can not be considered appropriate for providing
the necessary feedback relative to the new training program.
Modifying this survey is not a viable alternative since it
would conflict with the norms and data base being developed.
A second survey, Command Climate, has twenty
domains and includes more of the dimensions of organizational
leadership but is yet only an experimental effort by the Army
Research Institute (ARI) . The use of this instrument, with
only minor changes, remains a possible alternative. ARI's
involvement in this field raises an important question;





Up to this point in the evaluation plan, the
service schools have been given responsibility, with the
assistance of ARI, for conducting the internal evaluation.
There are two principal reasons why this is no longer possible
for the external evaluations. First, the task of developing
a survey, selection and testing of the officers prior to
training, and monitoring their posttraining assignments is
too extensive for the service school. It is, however, an
undertaking which ARI is fully capable of handling. The
Army Research Institue meets each criterion discussed by
Eoyang [1977] which must be possessed by the capable research
agency; competence, objectivity, resources, motivation, and
credibility.
The second reason is more politically oriented.
If the service school were to begin gathering data on officers
it would be viewed more as an attempt to evaluate the officer
rather than the program. Cooperation would be difficult, at
best, to obtain.
ARI's primary responsibility would be to gather,
analyze, and feedback the data to the appropriate service
school. The decision maker (at the school) will then compare





In order to outline the elements of the evaluation
strategy for the organizational leadership training program the
notations used by Campbell and Stanley and introduced in
Chapter II are used. The treatment group is that class
(e.g. Officer Basic Course) which receives the new training,
the control group is the class graduating from the school
prior to implementation of the program (the second alternative







Control Group : 0-, 2
Again, X represents the training received and the O's indicate
observation reports received from the respondents.
Observations at time one (0, ) are the peer ratings
gathered at the precommissioning source, while the observations
at time two (0~) are from the units (after training) . A stat-
istical analysis would first compare the two initial obser-
vations to determine if any pretraining differences exist.
In their discussion of the Nonequivalent Control Group Design
(the one most like this) Campbell and Stanley p.963, p. 217]
state, "The groups constitute naturally assembled collectives
such as classrooms, as similar as availability permits but
yet not so similar that one can dispense with the pretest...
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the more similar the experimental and the control groups are
in their recruitment, and the more this similarity is confirmed
by the scores on the pretest, the more effective this control
becomes ."
The important test comes in determining whether
the change from 0-. to CU is significantly larger (and in the
desired direction) for the treatment group than for the control
group. If it is, and the likelihood that this is due to chance
is small enough (a relative judgement by the decision maker)
then it can be assumed (within a certain probability) that
the new training program was responsible for the change.
The experimental design does contain some defic-
iencies. Foremost is the possible historical source of
invalidity. Since the time of observations of the two groups
do not coincide there may be different environmental effects
on the two groups. To control for this possibility ARI must
coordinate the survey administration through the local OESO.
A brief inquiry should determine if the results of the ques-
tionnaire are likely to be contaminated by this historical
invalidity. In any case, since the individuals within each
group are assigned to separate locations after training there
is little likelihood that a single event (short of war)
will affect all of one group. Calculation of mean scores
for all respondents will help moderate the affect of the
difference in posttest experiences.
177

A second source of invalidity is the interpret-
ation of questions asked. With different respondents (college
peers versus unit personnel) on the pre- and posttraining
surveys there may be two different interpretations of the
questions. Control for this effect is best achieved by
ensuring clear, concise wording on the survey so that there
is little possibility of misunderstanding what behavior is
being asked about. A pilot trial of the test instrument can
help clear up ambiguities and possible misinterpretations of
the questions asked. Here again, calculation of the mean
scores will reduce any gross misunderstandings not detected
in the pilot trial.
Until such time as a standardized program is in
use at each precommissioning source the possibility of the
invalidity of multiple treatment interference exists. At
the officer basic course level this presents a not so easily
solved problem. The majority of Military Academy graduates
attend their branch (occupational specialty) school within
three months after commissioning. By winter of that school
year the courses are comprised mostly of ROTC with some OCS
graduates. This most likely will result in a pretraining
difference in leadership experience between groups. As was
discussed in the introduction, one constraint on the eval-
uation process is the requirement to interface with the
systems already in place. This aspect of the personnel
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management system represents one such constraint which the
decision maker must consider in analyzing the data.
The discussion thus far has centered on the second
alternative method of selecting a control group, the naturally
occurring group. This is for two reasons: (1) It is more
difficult to design an experiment around this type of group,
and; (2) The implications of not training people in leadership
along with their peers might erroneously lead a decision maker
to conclude that it is the method of choice. In the last few
pages the resulting complexity of the design necessary to
support this decision has clearly demonstrated its disadvan-
tages .
If there is doubt about the capability of this
design to reduce the ambiguity of the results, and delaying
training for some leaders is acceptable, then the first
alternative for selecting a control group is appropriate.
This group, selected at random from the class scheduled to
receive the new program, would not receive any leadership
training at all; a true control group. It should be noted
that precedence does exist within some service schools for
exemption from training.
Should such a procedure be used to select the
control group the design would be as shown:
Treatment Group: R C^ X 2
Control Group : R 0-^ 0„
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This design is weak in only two respects: (1) Interaction of
the pretest with the experimental variable, and; (2) The
Hawthorne effect. If the two groups above can each be sub-
divided then the Solomon four group design discussed pre-
viously will address these weaknesses. Subdividing only the
control group and administering a placebo would indicate the
presence of the Hawthorne effect. Use of a program such as
Fiedler's Leader Match as the placebo would minimize the
impact on existing resources. The additional information
concerning pretest sensitization provided by the Solomon
design would not be necessary with the difference in the
pre- and posttraining respondents. The simplicity of these
designs as well as their ability to account for most sources
of invalidity obviously makes the true control group the
preferred alternative.
The detail with which the organizational leader-
ship program's evaluation strategy was covered will aid in the
development of a plan for measuring the behavioral changes
attributable to the Leadership and Management Development
Course.
2. Leadership and Management Development Course
The procedure necessary to assess behavioral change
as a result of the L&MDC is considerably easier to present
than it was for organizational leadership. Recall that for
this program the participants attend a one-week course and
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this design is able to control for such factors as testing,
selection, and maturation by noting any significant changes
in the pretraining observations. Plotting the measurements
taken at each observation can contribute substantially to
understanding what effect the training may have had. Patterns
which indicate an unbroken trend throughout all reports will
give less credence to even a statistically significant change
between the observations taken at times three and four. For
a detailed discussion of this measurement technique see D.T.
Campbell's "Reforms as Experiments."
Campbell and Stanley £1963] note the lack of
control which this design has for the interaction of testing
and training. Obviously the respondent will be learning
more about behavior and what to watch for the more he/she is
asked about it prior to the training of their leader, peer,
or subordinate. Also noted is the lack of control over the
interaction of selection and training due to the lack of
random assignment. While modifications to this design can be
made to improve control in these areas they would also tend




Timing for this design is critical. With the
need to conduct several observations before training the
lead time becomes considerably longer than people may be
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accustomed to. The interspacing of the observations is also
very important. If the time is too short people will consider
the measurement a test of their memory and attempt to replicate
their previous report. Too long a time increases the possibil-
ity of the maturation effect. While Campbell and Stanley say
that the observational series should hold known cycles
constant (e.g. paydays, weekly inspections, unit work cycles,
etc.), observations which are recorded to coincide with one
of these cycles may suffer from situational peculiarities.
For example, monthly observations on payday may elicit
responses more favorable to the leader than at some other
time. Regardless of the time interval chosen it should be
constant throughout the experiment, varying time may vary the
respondents to an extent that instrumentation error is
introduced. Weighing the above factors, a monthly observational
cycle would be the most appropriate.
c. Measurement Techniques.
At this level of leadership training the previously
described benefits of both survey and interview data gathering
are attainable. Beginning the series of observations with a
survey the researcher can interview respondents the following
month to clarify inconsistencies, verify information, etc.
The interview must provide quantifiable data as well as qual-
itative in order to make statistical comparisons of the obser-
vations. The same issues which were raised for the organizational
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leadership program are applicable to L&MDC, e.g. the use of
existing instruments and respondent and interviewer biases,
d. Research Agency.
The principal beneficiaries of a formative eval-
uation of L&MDC are the OESO's who conduct the training and
the Organizational Effectiveness Center and School which
develops the curriculum. The training which these individuals
receive (or can receive) qualifies them to carry out the steps
included in the behavioral criterion. The efforts by other
agencies involved in evaluation, such as ARI, must be made
available to the OESO's to aid them in carrying out this
phase of the assessment.
3. Campbell, Dunnette, Lawler, and Weick ["1970] caution
about the over reliance evaluators place on experimental
design and the notion of statistical significance. They
argue that "demonstrating that a difference between the
before and after measures is statistically significant is
only a minimal step. The crucial consideration is whether
or not the training changes managerial behavior enough to
make a difference to the organization" [p. 283]. This
notion of practical significance as opposed to theoretical
significance is discussed in the final criterion, organ-
izational performance.
F. ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCE
Ascribing changes in organizational performance to leadership
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or management training is perhaps the most controversial of
the evaluation criteria. Kirkpatrick [1978, p. 8] states
"in training areas like leadership and communication there is
no way that tangible benefits can be directly related to the
program." In those studies which have used performance results
Campbell et al. , criticize their methodology by implying that
behavioral measures are better indicators of training effec-
tiveness :
Behaviorally based measures can account for far more
job complexity and can be related more directly to what
the manager actually does than the global "organizational"
measures that have been used in so many training research
studies done thus far.
[Campbell, et al., 1970, p. 481]
Despite this pessimism there are techniques which can
contribute to the understanding of the relationship between
training and results and provide the decision maker with
information necessary to modify the curriculum. Two tech-
niques will be reviewed and their interdependence examined,
the use of performance ratings and the application of cost-
effectiveness analysis.
1. Performance Ratings
The objective of this technique is to identify a set
of indicators of unit performance which have a high degree of
correlation with leader behavior. Once identified, comparisons
between trained leader groups (either program) and untrained
leader (or old training program) groups along those indicators
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will tend to show the relative effectiveness of the training
program.
For many years, and in many studies, people have
relied on the traditional indicators of unit effectiveness.
Motowidlo and Borman ([19783 typify the reliance on these
measures with their use of the following scales to study morale
vis-a-vis unit effectiveness; narcotics and drug abuse, total
serious incidents, absent without leave rates, non-judicial
punishment rates, congressional inquiries, sick call rates,
reenlistments, and company inspections.
Peter Vaill, in answering the question:
When a group of men using some collection of technologies
is performing in relation to some predefined goals or
standards, in a way that may be described as "excellent"
or "outstanding" or "high performing," what events may
be observed in such systems?
[Vaill, 1978, p. 109]
has hypothesized 47 indicators of organizational performance.
Based on this work, Lieutenant Colonel William W. Witt [1979]
developed a list of 40 descriptors of the High Performing
System (HPS) which could be used by military commanders to
measure and improve unit performance. Examples of these
nontraditional descriptors are:
There will always be discrepancies between "what the book
says" and what the HPS actually does. Circumvention of
the rules tends to be overt and nonapologetic.
Soldiers in a HPS exhibit reflex behavior to the degree
that they later cannot account for how or why they acted




Regardless of whether the observer uses the traditional
indicators or the HPS descriptors, the concept of using unit
performance to distinguish between trained and untrained
leader groups is considerably more complex than transfering
existing data or checking off HPS behavioral characteristics.
The primary difficulty in that these measures are dependent
on a great number of factors, leadership being only one.
In order for any of them to be indicative of the leader's
behavior the leader must be able to exert a significant degree
of influence over their outcome.
For example, motor pool A takes two days to complete
repairs to a vehicle, motor pool B requires only one-half
of a day to successfully accomplish the same task. Does the
performance of A indicate that the supervisor is lacking in
ability and needs training in the organizational leadership
dimensions of "Supervision," "Planning," and "Decision
Making?" Not necessarily. The difference may be due to the
leader, or it may be that the mechanics did not have the
requisite skills, tools, or parts to do the job. Parallel
examples can be drawn for those indicies used by Motowidlo
and Borman.
In statistics this problem is one of identifying the
percent of variance in the performance measure which can be
explained by leadership. While methods of determining this
variance exist (e.g. canonical discriminate functions), their
explanation goes beyond the scope of this thesis. Suffice it
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to say that, if research indicates that only a small proportion
of the difference between units on a particular measurement
(e.g. AWOL rate) can be attributed to the leader's behavior,
then that indicator in not an appropriate criteria for eval-
uating the effectiveness of a particular training program.
Even though this procedure may seem thorough it may
not yield the specificity required by the decision maker to
modify the leadership training program. The need to target
a certain dimension of organizational leadership, vice only
the discovery that a difference between units exists, further
complicates the effort.
Once, however, the basic research has been accomplished
and the best indicators of unit performance have been ident-
ified (best in that they show a high degree of leader influ-
ence) the evaluation of training may begin.
a. Experimental Design.
Similar to those designs previously discussed,
there is a need to establish a base line measurement, a
control group, and controls for the various sources of
invalidity. There is also a need to redefine the treatment.
Previously the treatment (X) was the training, now, since the
unit effectiveness is the criteria, the treatment is the inter-
action of the trained leader and the unit. In this situation
the appropriate base line measurement at time one (0,) must
be taken prior to the new leader's arrival in the case of
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organizational leadership training at the service school, or
prior to attendance at L6MDC. The second measurement is taken
after the leader has time to assimilate the new environment
and or exercise his her influence. A control grout vill be
measured during this same time period. This design is depicted
as :
Treatment Group : 1. X Z-
Control Group : 0, Z-
If other identical units exist then this basic design may be
expar.cec in aotordance vich the prinoiples outlined under the
behavioral criterion.
those betveen group measurements at time one 'C, , :: determine
if any initial differ en oe exists, at time :v: 'Z~, t: test the
the results ;f toe first observations tc the leaders.
This factor depends to a great extent or. vhat
indicators vara found a', abecuate measures t f effectiveness.

If certain measures require a specific situation (e.g. field
training) then obviously observations at time one and two
must wait for the unit to be placed in that environment.
Restrictions such as this point out the need to develop a
comprehensive list of indicators. It is envisioned that
modifications may be made to the basic design if the units
do not perform the same tasks at the same time (e.g. platoon
level training in which the units go to the field at different
times) . In this situation the researcher must evaluate the
possibility that other sources of invalidity have been
introduced.
c. Research Agency.
Given the complexity of the tasks outlined it is
obvious that the only agency with the resources available
to conduct the basic research is the Army Research Institute
(ARI) . Once the initial research is completed the Organ-
izational Effectiveness Staff Officer is the appropriate
staff agency to conduct the field research phase. The inform-
ation gathered at this level is channeled through Training and
Doctrine Command to the service schools.
With the degree to which leadership influences the
criteria determined, it is possible to use this information
in other areas. One such area is the study of the cost-




It is appropriate that cost-effectiveness is the
final evaluative technique, for only after the results of
each of the other criteria are weighed can this measure be
considered. While some authors suggest that if training can
not be shown to contribute to the economic goals of the
organization it should not be conducted [Odiorne, 1970],
others feel "it is probably not possible to demonstrate the
worth of training in cost accounting terms" [Campbell, et al.
,
1970, p. 272]. In the military such arguments are purely
academic. Every program should be shown to be cost-effective.
The objective of this criterion is to compare the
costs and benefits of the new program to those of the old
(service school training) or to any other proposed alternative
A task made more difficult by the identification of costs
and the assignment of dollar amounts to benefits received,
it is, none the less a feasible task. There are two possible
approaches to evaluating alternative programs, cost-benefit
analysis and cost-effectiveness analysis. Levin defines the
distinction as:
A crucial assumption for performing benefit-cost analysis
of alternatives is that the benefits or outcomes can be
valued by their market prices or those of similar altern-
atives. Yet, the objectives of many, if not most social
programs often have no market counterpart ... In such sit-
uations the effectiveness of a strategy is expressed
in terms of its actual physical or psychological out-
come rather than its monetary value. That is, the
monetary measures of resource costs are related to the
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effectiveness of a program in producing a part-
icular impact. When the effectiveness of programs
in achieving a particular goal (rather than their
monetary values) is linked to costs, the approach
is considered to be cost-effectiveness rather than
cost-benefit analysis.
[Levin, 1975, p. 92]
The Army, recognizing the need to rate the effective-
ness of training programs, has developed a model to structure
this need. Cost and Training Effectiveness Analysis (CETA)
is the model designed to assist the decision maker. Developed
by the US Army Training and Doctrine Command Systems Analysis
Activity (USA TRASANA) , CETA is formally defined as
:
A methodology which involves documented investigation
of the comparative effectiveness and costs of altern-
ative training systems for attaining defined perform-
ance objectives.
[Neal, 1978, p. 15]
The approach outlined in the model enables programs
to be ranked according to their effectiveness relative to
their costs. It can not directly be used to ascertain whether
a particular program is worth it in terms of the dollar
benefits exceeding costs. The reason for this is that costs
are expressed in monetary terms while benefits under this
model are expressed in terms of effectiveness in reaching a
particular objective.
The CETA seven phase model is comprised of:
a. Performance Objective Specification.
This initial step identifies and defines the
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performance objectives of the training system. This phase
is in accord with the evaluation plan's initial step of
establishing program objectives for each criterion in either
absolute or comparative standards.
b. Study Conceptualization and Planning.
This step addresses specific questions to be
answered by the model in contributing to the overall program
objectives. Essential Elements of Analysis (EEA) are derived
and the various alternatives (present training and organ-
izational leadership training) are compared in detail.
Responsibility for the remaining phases of the study are
identifed.
c. Training Effectiveness Analysis (TEA).
This third phase identifies Measures of Training
Effectiveness (MOTE) for comparing alternatives. In this
plan the MOTE are derived from the discriminate analysis
results obtained for the performance rating criteria. For
resource related EEA, Measures of Training Resource Require-
ments (MTRR) are also identified. The gathering of data
proceeds along the previously discussed lines and any
special methodology needed for the study (computers, stat-
istics, etc.) are identified. In the final steps of this
phase the information is analyzed to determine if the MOTE




For this phase those costs attributable to each
program are calculated. Thomas E. Mirrabel [1978] presents
a comprehensive model which has been used by the US Civil
Service Commission to identify training costs. With only
minor modifications this systematic approach is applicable
to this phase of CETA.
e. Cost and Training Effectiveness Analysis.
This phase integrates the results of analysis
conducted in phase three and four. Possible comparisons
include total cost for obtaining a given level of effective-
ness and the average cost per unit of effectiveness. The
former is appropriate when the criteria reviewed indicates
approximately equal level of effectiveness, i.e. organizational
leadership has not produced any significant change in either
attitude, behavior, or unit performance. In this case
the program with the lowest total cost should be retained.
The latter comparison requires the combination
of the criteria according to some formula. This formula can
weigh the criteria in terms of importance to the overall
objective. For example, all results (for both treatment and
control groups) are assigned points relative to some scale,
these points are then multiplied by a criterion weighting
factor and summed for a total measure of program effective-
ness. The criterion multiples would range from the highest
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for unit performance to a lower rating for process evaluation
(opposite the order presented in this chapter)
.
Average cost per unit of effectiveness is obtained
by dividing the total cost by the total points of measure of
effectiveness. The method "has the desirable quality of per-
mitting cost-effectiveness comparisons among divergent pro-
grams with very different characteristics as long as the
total cost of programs are available and the outcomes of
the programs are measured in the same effectiveness units




Phase six involves documenting the CETA results
for the decision maker.
g. CETA Updating.
As new alternatives or major changes to existing
programs are introduced this procedure can be replicated to
maintain current cost-effectiveness measures, [figure 15]
It is obvious that cost-effectiveness analysis is
a feasible method of evaluating the possible alternative
leadership training programs, but is this what is needed?
Given the difficulty in quantifying the benefits of leader-
ship training it is a necessary first step.
To the degree that the effects can also be translated later
into monetary values, a cost-benefit framework can be
applied at a second stage. Thus, the use of the cost-
effectiveness approach does permit one to do a cost-
benefit analysis as well, whenever the physical or
psychological outcomes can be converted into monetary
measures
.
[Levin, 1975, p. 93]
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SOURCE- "COST a TRAINING EFFECTIVENESS
ANALYSIS" EDUCATIONAL TECHNOLOGY . Gilbert L. Ned,




The purpose of this chapter has been to develop a frame-
work for evaluating the effectiveness of the Army's two leader-
ship training programs . Towards this end five criteria
were identified, defined, and their interface with the
programs examined. These five criteria can be arranged along
several characteristic scales as shown in figure 16.
In the next chapter the details of these criteria are































































V. LEADERSHIP TRAINING EVALUATION ACTION PLAN
A. INTRODUCTION
Having detailed the concepts of the evaluation strategy
in the previous chapter it remains to structure those ideas
into an action plan format. The purpose of this blueprint
is to: (1) Identify specific objectives for each criterion;
(2) List the action steps necessary to reach those objectives;
(3) Outline responsibilities, and; (4) Align those action
steps with other ongoing initiatives, specifically the Leader
Development Plan and the Review of Education and Training
for Officers Implementation Plan. It is from these two plans
that this format is derived.
Two separate plans are detailed, the organizational leader-
ship training evaluation plan and the Leadership and Management
Development Course evaluation plan. For both, the criteria
for selecting a specific technique, apart from those values
listed in the introduction, were:
1. Practicality of Data Collection.
In cases where the prohibiting cost or time required
to gather the information reduced the likelihood of using a
specific technique, the method is not considered appropriate.
2. Meaningfulness of Data.
Methods which offer the best information in terms
of freedom from respondent bias and greatest contribution to
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the reduction of ambiguity are selected as the method of
choice. The proposed steps are valid regardless of the manner
in which the control group is selected.
Proponency for specific actions is assigned within the
plan at the major command or Army agency level. Further
assignment is not practical without an exhaustive study of
the subordinate element's missions. The only exception to
this policy is the direct tasking of the Army service
schools where the action is clearly to be implemented at
their level.
B. ORGANIZATIONAL LEADERSHIP TRAINING
1. Process Evaluation
Objective: To solicit feedback from the trainees
and subject matter experts on the relevancy of course content
and the adequacy of presentation. The steps to achieve this
objective are:
a Identify goals of the program
with respect to information
of students and subject matter
experts towards training.
Identify characteristics of
the program and the trainers
e.g. methods of instruction.
Identify and train interviewers
Structure questions concerning
student reaction to training
after presentation of material.
Design student feedback form.










Coordinate ISD methodology for
leadership training. Modify
ISD where necessary.
Designate subject matter expert
for both leadership content and
instructional technology.
Decision maker may make changes
in the course of instruction or
in trainers based on feedback
from steps c through e above.
Schools provide generalized







Objective: To determine the change in knowledge as
a result of training. The steps are:
a. Identify skills to be taught at
the schools and specify required
task or knowledge (facts and
principles) . Establish compar-
ative standard required to in-
dicate that learning has taken
place.
b. Design a paper and pencil
instrument for testing of facts
and principles taught. Specify
criteria for passing.
c. Design job performance test for
demonstratable types of tasks.
Specify criteria for passing.
d. Validate instruments.
e. Test student's knowledge or
skill prior to training.
f. Administer posttraining test to
students
.
g. Compare pre- and posttraining












Based on criteria set at step a
and the results of step g,
decision maker modifies course
as necessary.
Service school provides general-






Objective: To determine if the attitude of the
training participants has changed as a result of training
and whether this change is significantly different, and in
the desired direction, from that change experienced by part-
icipants in the pre-organizational leadership training pro-
gram (or control group). The steps are:
a Identify constructs (attitudes)
which are desired in the leader
as a result of the training.
Designate a comparative standard
which will indicate that a
change has taken place. Indicate
the required difference between
programs which will demonstrate
the superiority of one program
over the other (inter & intra
group comparative standards)
.
Identify and train interviewers
.
Structure attitude questions for






Design attitudinal questionnaire ARI
to be administered to participants.
d. Interview participants prior to
start of classes in accordance
with format developed in step b.
Distribute questionnaires to the






e. Mail questionnaires to partici- Service Schools
pants six to twelve months after
graduation.
f. Compare results of pretraining
interviews and questionnaire
responses (e.g. mean score per
construct) to results of post-
training questionnaires.
Calculate the difference between
means and their statistical
significance.
g. Compare intra-group results to
other groups (control versus
treatment groups) . Based on
criteria in step a, determine if
the attitude change as a result
of the new program is in the
direction and to the extent desired
h. The decision maker makes appro-
priate modifications to the
program based on information
gathered in g above.
i. Service schools forward recom-
mendation to TRADOC.
j . TRADOC evaluates recommendations
and modifies the program service
wide or authorizes the school to
make necessary changes.
4. Behavior
Objective: To determine the extent of behavioral
change as perceived by superiors, peers, and subordinates
and ascertain whether this change was a result of the training




a. Identify behaviors desired in
leader as a result of training.
Establish a comparative standard
which will indicate that one of






b. Develop questionnaire to measure ARI
the extent to which the partici-
pant displays the behaviors ident-
ified in step a.
c. Validate questionnaire. Conduct ARI
pilot test.
d. Solicit responses from peers ARI
prior to graduation based upon
stratified random sample from
ROTC, Military Academy, and
Officer Candidate Schools
.
Stratification should be based
on the branch assignments in
order to compare leadership
skills by occupational duty.
e. Monitor assignment of personnel ARI
selected for study through
service school training to their
next duty station.
f. Administer survey to training ARI
participant's superiors, peers,
and subordinates. This should
be conducted six to twelve
months after arrival at the
new duty station.
g. Compare results of pretraining ARI
surveys with posttraining surveys.
Calculate difference between mean
scores for each leadership




h. Compare results of the group which ARI
received organizational leader-
ship to the group which didn't.
Calculate difference between
groups on both pre- and post-
training surveys
.
i. Determine if the difference ARI
between programs is statistically
significant and in the desired




j. Report each service school's
results to TRADOC.






1. Implement course modifications. Service Schools
5. Organizational Performance
Objective: To determine if the leadership training
program is reflected in changes in the operational performance
of the units to which the newly trained leaders are assigned.
The steps in this criterion are:
a. Identify indicators of organiza- TRADOC
tional performance which may be
attributable to the behavior of
its leader. Identify Measures
of Training Effectiveness,
Essential Elements of Analysis,
Measures of Training Resource
Requirements, and the standard
for program success in this
criterion.
b. Conduct a study to analyze the ARI
indicators selected in step a
(e.g. discriminate analysis).
Determine what percent of the
variance between units on those
indicators can be attributable
to the factor leadership. This
task must be accomplished for
each ascension level.
c. To insure valid measures design ARI
a rating form for use by OESO's
utilizing the results of step b.
d. Prior to arrival of the newly OESO
trained leader record the organ-
izational performance of the con-
trol and treatment groups.
205

e. Record performance measures of
both groups six to twelve months
after new leader arrival (prior
to control group leader departure)
f. Compare within and between group
measures to determine if there is
a difference between the groups
and whether it was in the desired
direction.
g. Review the results of the study
to determine if performance
difference criteria is met and/
or what modifications may be
necessary to the programs.
h. Determine leadership training
costs for all programs.
i. Compute average cost per unit
of effectiveness.
j . Determine degree to which
effectiveness indicators can
be translated into monetary
terms
.
k. If feasible, compute cost-
benefit ratio of new and old
programs
.
1. Determine if minimum acceptable
ratio has been achieved and/or











C. LEADERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT DEVELOPMENT COURSE
Since this program is conducted at the installation level
the first step the OESO must take is to secure permission
from the superior unit commander to establish a control
(comparison) group within his/her command. As can be seen below,
many of the steps are identical to those taken in the evaluation
of the organizational leadership training program. For each
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Same as Organizational Leadership
2. Learning
Same as Organizational Leadership
3. Attitude
a. Same as Organizational Leadership
b. Same as Organizational Leadership
c. Interview participants and members OESO
of the control group three to six
months prior to the start of the
course.
d. Interview participants and control OESO
group three to six months after
course completion.
e. Compare results of pre- and post- OESO
training attitudes for both inter-
views . Calculate difference
within treatment group and between
treatment and control group.
f
.
Based on the minimum acceptable OESO
standards, determine if the
attitudinal change is in the
direction and to the extent
required to support the program.
g. Determine if results of step f OESO
warrant modification of the course.
If so, forward recommendations
to OECS.
Evaluate recommendations and








a. Same as Organizational Leadership
b. Same as Organizational Leadership
c. Develop strategy to interview OEC&S
superiors, peers, and subordinates
along measures identified in
step a.
d. Same as Organizational Leadership
e. Select random sample of respondents OESO
for both control and treatment
group. Begining three to six
months prior to the course, conduct
a series of three interviews and/
or surveys of respondents with
the instrument/ strategy developed
in steps b and c. Allow a minimum




Between the third and sixth month OESO
after course completion conduct
a series of interviews and/or
surveys of the respondents in step
e above. Allow a minimum of one
month between observations.
g. Compare pretraining and posttrain- OESO
ing measures . Plot the results
and examine for trends throughout
the study. Determine probable
causes of differences.
h. Same as Organizational Leadership OESO
step g.





All steps remain the same as those for Organizational
Leadership, except that the control group leader and the previous




Not addressed thus far has been the subject of milestones
for the implementation of these steps. The Leader Develop-
ment Plan calls for the integration and implementation of
the Leadership Conference ' 79 tasks derived from Monograph
8 of the Leadership Monograph Series into program of instruc-
tion development by November 1980. Obviously, if this
target date is realistic, it is mandatory that the initial
steps for each criterion be undertaken immediately. Failure
to do so will result in the lost opportunity to establish
control measures for the organizational leadership program.
The majority of the latter steps in each criterion are
ongoing actions.
Even if the strategy outlined here is begun in time it
must be recognized that assessment is a dynamic process.
Changes in the environment as well as results of the exper-
iments themselves will force modifications in the evaluation
plan. The distinction between this situation and the one
described above is that the decision maker has greater control
over the course of the study and will be able to weigh the
consequences of his/her actions.
In the concluding chapter the implications for future




A. AREAS OF FUTURE STUDY
1 . Assessment Centers
Throughout the thesis the subject of assessment
centers has been alluded to. An assessment center, as illus-
trated by the US Air Force, is simply a process in which an
individual's behavior in a number of job related situations
is observed and evaluated. The results of this evaluation
may be useful to the decision maker in selecting a person for
a particular job, acceptance into a program such as Army pre-
commissioning training, or as Douglas Bray [1976] , a developer
of AT&T's assessment center, suggests:
Since many of the goals of management training parallel
the dimensions utilized for evaluation in assessment
centers, it seems logical that assessment may provide a
criterion for the effectiveness of training. [Leaders]!
could be assessed before and after training, or, in a
more experimental design, they could be assigned randomly
to training or no training conditions, or to different
types of training, and assessed some time after training.
It may be that the assessment center approach can finally
throw some light on the overall effectiveness of [leadership]
training and assist in pinpointing its strengths and
weaknesses
. ["underscoring added)
[Bray, 1976, p. 16-14]
This potential use of assessment centers warrants a
closer look at the methodology. It is first necessary to
point out that assessment is not new to the Army.
In 1973 - 1974 the US Army Infantry School (USAIS)
Assessment Center (ACTR) assessed students from the
Infantry Officer Advanced Course (IOAC) , the Infantry
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Officer Basic Course (IOBC) , and the Advanced NCO Educa-
tional System (ANCOES) to determine the feasibility of the
assessment center as techniques for leadership develop-
ment and leadership prediction.
[Dyer and Hilligoss, 1979, p. 1]
The assessment process took three-and-one-half days
for each participant. During that time paper and pencil
tests, simulated leadership tasks, and interviews were used
by the assessors. Unfortunately the results of the study
did not support the use of an assessment center.
Field leadership ratings by superiors, peers, and subor-
dinates were substantially the same at o and 18 months;
that is, the ratings were reliable. The most assessor
intensive formal ACTR exercises actually did the poorest
job of predicting field leadership. Self-description
provided the most 'leadership predictors and required the
least assessor and assessee time.
[Dyer and Hilligoss, 1979, p. 2]
Since this study considerable research has been
done in the civilian community and favorable results recorded
by such corporations as Sears, AT&T, IBM, Standard Oil (Ohio),
etc. The reasons for the increasing interest in this method-
ology are: (1) Accuracy of the technique; (2) Powerful
learning experience for leaders/assessors; (3) High accept-
ance of the results, and; (4) Fairness of the method. This
increased interest by civilians was noted in the Review of
Education and Training for Officers (RETO) study which
recommended the technique be used to select individuals for
officer training and that it be studied at the Command and
General Staff College and the Army War College for career
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development process. Currently the War College is actively
developing an assessment center for its students. Colonel
Anthony Nadal, Director of Curriculum Evaluation and Organ-
izational Effectiveness, Army War College, has argued that
the War College is the only school currently capable of
conducting assessments. The ratio of assessors to partici-
pants at each of the other service schools he maintains is
too low to warrant its consideration as a tool to aid in the
development of the leader. [Nadal, 1980, Interview]
William Byham of Development Dimensions, Inc. lends
support to this contention:
The one-to-two [assessor - participant] ratio has been
found to be the most efficient ratio for most assessment
centers. While assessors can physically observe more than
two participants in a group exercise, the one-to-two
ratio produces almost the maximum amount of paper work
than an assessor can be expected to accomplish in an
assessment program.
[Byham, 1978, p. 96]
While the assessor - participant ratio at the Officer
Basic courses and the Command and General Staff College appears
to rule out assessment at these levels it must be remembered
what the objective is. When used to evaluate the effective-
ness of leadership training the number of participants need
not overwhelm the resources available. Random selection of
a portion of the trained and control groups is sufficient for
the information required. The Army should investigate the




This variation of the assessment center is no dif-
ferent from the model Colonel Nadal is working on at the War
College. Both consist of three components: (1) The dimensions
to be assessed; (2) Assessment techniques, and; (3) The
assessment staff. [Moses, 1978, p. 5-7]
The first component has already been identified as
the eight organizational leadership dimension. To specify
the particular behaviors of each dimension a front end task
analysis of the officer positions is required. The Organ-
izational Effectiveness Center and School has already
completed this in accordance with the RETO Implementation
Plan.
Assessment techniques commonly include; in-basket
exercises, management games, leaderless group discussions,
interviews, paper and pencil tests, and role playing. Each
technique is designed to draw forth certain dimensions or
behaviors. For a discussion of the techniques and the
dimensions applicable to each see Lois A. Crooks' "The
Selection and Development of Assessment Center Techniques"
[1978]. It is the techniques of the Air Force's assessment
methodology which have been criticized by the participants.
They are not convinced that the sports programs accurately
reflect the dimensions of leadership they are evaluated on.
The final component, the assessment staff, is the
biggest investment required in this methodology. Already
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mentioned was the ratio of staff to participants, other
issues are; selection, rotating or semi-permanent assessors,
acquaintance of the staff with the participants, and most
importantly, assessor training. An interesting aspect of this
component is the increased leadership skills of those people
selected and trained as assessors. The process is as much
a training vehicle for the staff as the participants.
Moses and Byham's [1978} Applying the Assessment
Center Method provides an excellent source of articles con-
cerning the implementation of assessment centers. Of part-
icular interest is the report of a task force on developing
assessment center standards. The report (contained as appendix
G to this thesis) defines assessment centers, outlines the
support and training necessary to operate one, and discusses
the ethics involved in the operations
.
2 . Evaluation Design
As with all dynamic systems the only certainty about
the Army's proposed leadership training program is that it
will change. The first step in evaluation is monitoring the
program to detect unanticipated or undesired changes. When
these changes occur, as they inevitably will, the plan will
require modifications to maintain its feasibility. This form
of research is most appropriately left to the policy maker.
Another area greatly in need of further research is
the identification of measures of organizational performance
which can be linked directly to the behavior of the leader.
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While the steps outlined in the action plan are clear, the
time and effort necessary is considerable. Success in this
area will not only benefit the evaluation of leadership
training effectiveness but provide the unit commanders with
badly needed guidance.
B. SUMMARY
Leadership training in the Army has come a long way from
the rote memorization of principles and traits of leadership.
With contributions from such scientific and academic researchers
as those reviewed, the service now stands ready to meet the
challenges of the 1980' s and 1990' s.
Unfortunately the question of whether or not this course
of action is providing the better trained leaders has been
neglected. It was shown that this oversight is not unique
within the Army, both civilian and military programs suffer
from the same inadequacies in evaluation (Fiedler and the
Coast Guard notwithstanding) . The consequence of this
ambivalence towards assessment is potentially made more severe
in the face of increasingly limited resources without a
concomitant reduction in the mission. It will never be known
if the training is the best possible or if this best effort
is good enough without an aggressive, scientifically proven,
evaluation of the program.
The purpose of this thesis has been to raise the question
of evaluation and to offer a plan whereby the issue of training
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effectiveness can be studied. As in any proposal there
remain issues which must be addressed at the highest levels
of the organization. Specifically, the matter of control
groups must be resolved. Does the need for everyone to
receive leadership training at the same point in their
careers outweigh the benefits provided by a true experimental
control? It has been the contention here that such a need
does not overshadow the requirement to establish a true
control group.
The specific evaluation plan proposed here has met the
six conditions which Campbell, et al., [1970] express as
being necessary in any attempt to assess training. These
are:
1. Utilization of multiple criteria. . .for the purpose
of more adequately reflecting the multiple contributions
of [leaders] to the organization's goals.
2. Some attempts to study the criteria themselves, that is
their interrelationships and their relationships with other
relevant organizational variables. The relationship between
internal and external criteria is especially important.
If the development program affects the internal criteria
but not the external criteria, then even though learning
may be taking place, it apparently does not have any
relevance for the organization's goals. If the converse
is true, then the training program apparently has an
effect on job performance, but not for the reasons intended
by the trainers.
3. Enough experimental control to enable the causal arrow
to be pointed at the training program.
4. Provisions for saying something about the practical and
theoretical significance of the results.
5. A thorough, logical analysis of the process and content
of the training itself.
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6. Some effort to deal with the "systems" aspects of
training impact, that is, how the training effects are
altered by interaction with other organizational subsystems.
[Campbell, et al. , 1970, p. 284]
Bunker and Cohen £19 78, p. 11} best summarize the
contention of this thesis: "'going the extra mile' and
conducting a comprehensive and well controlled investigation
may be more mandatory than optional, more investment than









a. Interpersonal Techniques and Focus
Effective commanders are able to deliver interper-
sonal feedback, to "read" nonverbal as well as verbal cues,
and to utilize informal information networks.
b. Organizational Techniques and Focus
Call upon the individual to listen carefully in
order to assimilate as much factual data as possible; and to




The ability to deal effectively with individuals
within a work group (keeps subordinates informed, applies
rewards equitably, shows interest in subordinates welfare,
and diagnose subordinate motivation)
.
b. Intragroup Relations
The ability to work with several groups.
3 COUNSELING
a. Personal Counseling
Assists individual in developing and implementing
an action plan enabling them to better handle problem areas.
b. Performance Counseling
To convey to the individual the nature of his func-





Organizing, directing, inspecting, advising, explaining,
maintaining, troubleshooting, and motivating.
b. Techniques
5. TECHNICAL
a. Specific Content Area
b. Procedures, Techniques, Principles




Controlling, organizing, development, evaluation,






c. Process and Procedures
8. PLANNING
a. Procedures
Establishing policies, allocating resources, budgeting
programming , s chedul ing
.
b. Processes











OBJECTIVES of the UNITED STATES ARMY'S




a. Greater ability to learn from experience.
b. Interest, involvement and investment in course.
c. Behavior which contributes to group learning.
d. Willingness to share relevant personal information.
e. Accurately diagnose and correct communications
blockages
.
" f . Give and receive effective feedback.




a. Communicate directly and accurately with others.
b. Accurately defines the central issue which the group
is working either overtly or covertly and behaves in a way
which facilitates resolution of the issues.
c. Effectively uses active listening to encourage others
to talk and to better understand one another.
d. Avoids or deals effectively with win/lose situations.
e. Behaves as an effective member of a team.
f
.
Behaves in ways which will reduce dysfunctional





a. Successfully influences others' behavior in terms of
both short and long-term goals, while building his relation-
ship with those others.
b. Recognizes the need for functional roles in a group
and demonstrates ability to take several roles as required.
c. Uses FIRO theory to explain group behavior and pre-
dict successful leadership behavior.
4. THURSDAY
a. Successfully constructs measureable performance
objectives
.
b. Uses "I" messages and active listening effectively in
performing counseling.
c. Uses active listening to successfully help another
solve a personal problem.
d. Uses non-directive leadership behaviors effectively
in appropriate situations
.
e. Recognizes the value and uses effective confrontation
with others.
5 FRIDAY
a. Actively and productively uses Outcomes -- Methods --
Resources model.
b. Indicates interest in the application of Organizational
Effectiveness techniques in his/her work.
c. Takes responsibility to reach "closure" with the course
6. POST- COURSE




ADVANTAGES and DISADVANTAGES of the UNITED STATES ARMY'S




a. Soft data are highly favorable.
b. L&MDC has a dramatic initial effect.
c. An environment highly conducive to attitudinal and
behavioral change is fostered.
d. Only five days are required to conduct L&MDC.
e. A wide range of learning catagories are covered (and
makes use of current. unit problems).
f. The content of L&MDC is flexible and can be designed
to meet the needs of the attendees.
g. L&MDC can be used with stranger groups or "family"
groups, but the latter requires more facilitator expertise
and cognizance of restructuring and redesign considerations.
h. Provides opportunity for personal as well as pro-
fessional growth.
2 DISADVANTAGES
a. Hard data are inconclusive.
b. Facilitators must be well-trained to deal with what-
ever intrapersonal or interpersonal conflicts occur.
c. There is little specific skill practice.
d. Some threat is experienced by participants. The degree
depends on the individual participant and the experience of
the facilitator.




f. Demand on facilitators is high.
g. Unit personnel cannot easily be trained to conduct
in-house training.
h. Five days of uninterrupted training is required to




COMPETENCIES of the UNITED STATES NAVY'S PROGRAM for
LEADERSHIP and MANAGEMENT EDUCATION and TRAINING
1. CONCERN FOR EFFICIENCY AND EFFECTIVENESS
a. Sets Goals and Performance Standards
Identification of a problem or concern in terms of
specific goals. This may include the following:
(1) Mention of specific goal or definition of a
revised outcome in terms of an action plan.
(2) Expression of concern for a unit's standards of
task performance.
(3) Mention of an effort to reconsider goals in
order to make them more realistic.
(4) Setting of deadlines for task accomplishment.
The person must personally set goals or clearly
promote on his or her own the goals set by the organization.
b. Takes Initiative
Accepting responsibility of one's own volition or
taking intiative in accomplishing a task. This includes:
(1) Being the causal agent in a situation.
(2) Being proactive rather than reactive or passive
(3) Initiating new actions, communications, pro-
posals, meetings, or directives to accomplish a task.
(4) Exhibiting resourcefulness and persistence
(defined as taking two or more actions to circumvent an
obstacle) rather than giving up or accepting failure.
The initiative must not be externally motivated
(e.g. occasioned by a direct order or emergency situations.
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2. SKILLFUL USE OF INFLUENCE
a. Influences
Successful action to influence others. Pursuit of an
effective strategy. Specific influence methods and skills
include:
(1) Persuasive speaking, briefing, or selling ideas
by putting them in terms of other's self-interest.
(2) Building political coalitions or potential
influence networks
.
(3) Influencing by personal example, i.e. molding
desirable motivation or behavior (personal charisma)
.
(4) Explaining why, sharing information, or communi-
cating intent of actions to influence others.
(5) Gaining commitment to organizational goals,
traditions, and values by appealing to a higher purpose.
(6) Making others feel strong.




Takes action to instruct, coach, help, train, or
develop co-workers or subordinates to do their jobs better,
to be more skillful and responsible in getting the job done,
or to meet the qualification standards. This may be accom-
plished in any of the following ways:
(1) Transferring expertise by setting an example.
(2) Providing the information necessary to get the
job done.
(3) Developing subordinates or supporting their
self-development efforts by making available to them
training opportunities, expert help, and resources. The
expertse must be transferred to the subordinate.





Acting to promote a spirit of teamwork and cooperation
within a work group or with another work group or organization;
or rewarding contribution to a team effort. This may be
accomplished in any of the following ways:
(1) Communicating to others the need for cooperation
or teamwork.
(2) Producing teamwork in nonroutine situations
which require cooperation between and among people and
work groups in order to accomplish an important task.
(3) Acting to create symbols of group identity,
pride, or team effort.
d. Self-Control
Control of impulses, suppression of rage, control
of emotional involvement, remaining calm in potentially
explosive situations. The emotions most often controlled
are anger (exploding at people) and affiliation (getting
too close to one's subordinates). Some examples include:
(1) Holding back on an impulse to say or do something
and replacing impulsive behavior with a more appropriate
response.
(2) Not showing anger when under attack.
(3) Making decisions only after identifying and
weighing all the facts in the situation.
(4) Controlling the urge to "do it yourself" and
instead managing others to take personal responsibility
which has been assigned to them.
3. MANAGEMENT CONTROL
a. Plans and Organizes
Planning or organizing activities, people, or
materials in a hierarchial (priority) , temporal (sequential)
,
spatial, chain of command, administrative, or other order
that proceeds from a problem to a goal state. The following
conditions may be present:
(1) Identification of action steps, resources, or
constraints involved in reaching an objective.
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(2) Preparation of a schedule of activities.
(3) Analysis and prioritizing of alternative courses
of action.
(4) Anticipation of specific obstacles before the
plan is executed.
(5) Organization of people, materials, or activities
in a new way to accomplish the task.
b. Optimizes Use of Resources
Realistically assessing and weighing the assets and
limitations of people and tasks before organizing a work
group for the purpose of maximizing task accomplishment.
This may occur in the following ways:
(1) Analyzing the capabilities of individuals and
characteristics or requirements of jobs and matching people
and jobs to optimize task performance.
(2) Fully using available human resources to accom-
plish meaningful tasks (not "make work").
(3) Considering trade-offs between task requirements
and individual's needs to optimize both performance and
morale.
c. Delegates
Uses the chain of command to get subordinates to take
responsibility by any of the following means:
(1) Clearly assigning responsibility for task
accomplishment to others.
(2) Using or supporting the use of the chain of
command to get subordinates to share in task management.
(3) Encouraging others to seek task management
responsibility by methods other than direct orders to perform
a task.
d. Monitors Results
(1) Monitoring a work process by seeking information
regarding task progress or by direct observation.




(3) Evaluating the outcome of a task against a
standard of performance.
e. Rewards
(1) Providing positive feedback to others for their
performance on a specific task.
(2) Officially citing or recognizing others for their
meritorious accomplishments, and withholding rewards when tasks




Disciplining, and holding accountable, a subordinate,
or giving someone negative feedback on inappropriate appear-
ance, behavior, or performance.
4. ADVISING AND COUNSELING
a. Positive Expectations
Expressions of belief or trust in people's basic
worth or ability to perform, as typified by statements
involving the following:
(1) A strong conviction that others are fully
capable of doing good work when given the chance.
(2) Generalized positive feelings toward other
people (e.g. "He was a super Seaman" or I've got the best
group of PO's you ever saw").
(3) Believing that subordinates are valuable
resources
.
b. Realistic Expectations (Negative Expectations)
Expression of any of the following as a concern for
the impact of other's limitations:
(1) Doubts and concerns about others' ability to
perform.
(2) Sensitivity and a realistic concern that orders
will not be followed or carried out effectively by others.
(3) Open acknowledgement of these negative expecta-




(4) Openly stating one's displeasure, disappointment,
and concern about the shortcomings of individual and group
performance.
c. Understands
Accurately identifying and helping others to under-
stand what created a problem and what is the real agenda,
and responding appropriately to get the job done. This type
of empathy or insight is being able to uncover and accurately
summarize the feelings which underlie a person's initial
statements and reports. It is "knowing what other people
feel" (the ability to accurately assess others' motives,
thoughts, and behavior or patterns), not "feeling what they
feel" (personally sympathizing with people, which may be
dysfunctional in getting the job done). Examples are:
(1) Citing the feelings of another person in an
accepting fashion (e.g., "I knew he was feeling resentful"
or "He was disgusted").
(2) Mention of understanding the motives of




Identification, through an inductive process, of a
concept (problem, condition, conclusion, or other state)
which is greater than merely the sum of the specific examples
from which the concept is derived. The following elements
must be present:
(1) Evidence that the person has rigorously searched
and identified the available facts
.
(2) Evidence that the person has organized the facts
so as to draw realistic, plausible inferences about the
problem.
(3) Use of two or more alternative concepts which
taken together, make up an overarching concept ("X versus
not-X," or X versus Y," where X and Y are parallel concepts).
(4) An implied comparison of (a) what now exists,
and (b) what ideally should exist.
(5) Evidence that conclusions and final judgements are




CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MARINE CORPS LEADERSHIP PROGRAM
The Marine Corps Leadership Program, with heavy emphasis
on human relations, is a values oriented program designed to
improve relationships among Marines, between Marines and in-
dividuals outside the Corps, and to deal with contemporary
problems in leadership, discipline, and military profession-
alism. It is conceived as a training tool that is designed
to cover all aspects of human understanding and moral character
as opposed to only race relations. The ultimate objective
is combat effectiveness.
The Marine Corps Leadership Program has four basic charac -
teristics :
a. The program is guided by research and experimentation .
The educational materials used in the program, the methods
of instruction, and the implementation procedures are all
results of extensive research. Scientific studies, surveys
and experiments, conducted by the Institute for International
Research, are provided to Headquarters Marine Corps to update
and enhance the program.
b. The program is based on objective values , rather than
being based on "relativistic" or "self" theories. The Leader-
ship Program attempts to rejuvenate a concern for some of
the basic values we hold as Americans; values such as freedom,
democracy, equality, and the need for order. The dominant
theme, the dual- life value, is defined operationally as the
belief that: we have a duty to others and we have a duty to
ourselves. This values concept holds that all complex human
problems, e.g. the women's movement, drug abuse, and family
breakdown, derive from the same source -- a confusion of
values. Hence, the starting point for a long-term solution to
any of our human problems must be the identification of common
values by all of the conflicting sectors of society, especially
inside the Corps.
c. The third characteristic is the guided inter-group
discussion . The learning discussion group serves as a forum
for the rational exchange of ideas. It is also an opportunity
for leaders to provide their Marines with factual information





d. The fourth characteristic is that the program is
action oriented . The discussion groups are designed to
motivate Marines to adjust their behavior in positive ways,
through interpersonal relations with others. To adjust
behavior, Marines must develop skills which will facilitate
positive behavioral adjustments. This is the self-develop-
ment part of the individual action.
Contemporary problems of concern to Marines are discussed
within the framework of the dual- life value philosophy. In
its simplest terms, the dual- life concept holds that all
persons have two very strong internal drives, not the only
drives, but certainly those that every person possesses.
These drives are the desire for the survival of oneself, to
include the survival of one's close circle of friends and
family, and secondly, the desire for the unit or society
in general to survive. This philosophy provides the leadership
program with a backdrop against which Marines can discuss
contemporary problems and begin to formulate solutions.
[USMC, Leadership




UNITED STATES COAST GUARD
LEADERSHIP and MANAGEMENT DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM
MISSION:
To provide the necessary direction, assistance, and
support to Coast Guard personnel-- line and staff--
in supervisory positions ensuring that the most
effective use is made of the resources--human and other--
at their disposal.
PROGRAM GOAL:
To make the most effective use of our training and
resource development dollars by:
1. Ensuring the availability and use of appropriate,
professional and consistent leadership and management
principles and skills throughout the Coast Guard; and
2. providing methodologies that can be used to develop
leadership and management skills at servicewide, district,
and unit levels.
SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES:
1. To determine the leadership and management related
functions and training needs of the service.
2. To provide a development program which helps
supervidory personnel deal with their most significant
leadership and management problems.
3. To provide appropriate methodologies for leadership
and management development programs
.
4. To provide an institutionalized program which ensures
that consistent and relevant leadership and management





5. To create, throughout the hierarcial structure of
the service, an atmosphere (attitude and culture) which
fosters the continued growth of effective leadership
and management skills.
6. To provide a means to continually assess the
changes to organizational climate and performance
levels which results from leadership and management
development efforts.
7. To provide assistance, as requested, in the
diagnosis, implementation, and assessment phases of
organizational change efforts within the Coast Guard.
At the time of this writing the above listed objectives
were being modified. The following goals have been ident-
ified but not yet sanctioned.
To determine the functions and training needs of
Coast Guard supervisors and managers
To provide guidance for and coordination of the
training programs by which supervisory and manage-
ment knowledge and skills are developed.
To assess the impact of supervisory and management
training on the knowledge, attitude, behavior, and
performance within the service.
To continually assess the organizational climate
within the Coast Guard.
To provide expert advisors to be available to assist
in the planning, implementing, and assessing of the
impact of organizational changes on Coast Guard
personnel.
To assess the need for and make recommendations about
the process by which managers and supervisors are
developed.
To continually develop personnel with the expertise




STANDARDS FOR ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
for ASSESSMENT CENTER OPERATIONS
1. Rationale for Assessment Center Standards
The rapid growth in the use of the assessment center
method in recent years has resulted in a proliferation of
applications in a variety of organizational, educational,
and governmental settings. Serious concerns have been raised
by many interested parties which reflect a need for a set
of minimal professional standards for users of this tech-
nique. The standards should:
Define what is meant by assessment center
Describe minimal acceptable practices concerning:
Organizational support for assessment operations
Assessor training
Informed consent on the part of the participants
Use of assessment center data
Validation of issues
These standards are not designed to prescribe specific
practices. Neither do these standards in any way endorse a
specific assessment center format or specific assessment
techniques. Rather we have attempted to provide general
principles which can be adapted to meet existing and future
applications. The reader should keep in mind the spirit
by which these standards were written: as an aid to the
assessment center user, rather than a set of restrictive pro-
hibitions
.
2. Assessment Center Defined
To be considered as an assessment center, the following
minimal requirements must be met:
Multiple assessment techniques must be used. At least one
of these techniques must be a simulation.
A simulation is an exercise or technique designed to
elicit behaviors related to dimensions of performance on the
job by requiring the participant to respond behaviorally to
situational stimuli. The stimuli present in a simulation
parallel or resemble stimuli in the work situation. Examples
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of simulations include group exercises, in-basket exercises,
and fact-finding exercises.
Multiple assessors must be used. These assessors must
receive training prior to participating in a center.
Judgements resulting in an outcome (i.e. recommendation
for promotion, specific training or development) must be based
on pooling information from assessors and techniques.
An overall evaluation must be made by the assessors at
a separate time from observation of behavior.
Simulation exercises are used. These exercises are devel-
oped to tap a variety of predetermined behaviors and have
been pre- tested prior to use to insure that the techniques
provide reliable, objective, and relevant behavioral inform-
ation for the organization in question.
The dimensions, attributes, characteristics, or qualities
evaluated by the assessment center are determined by an analysis
of relevant job behaviors.
The techniques used in the assessment center are
designed to provide information which is used in evaluating
the dimensions, attributes, or qualities previously determined.
In summary, an assessment center consists of a standard-
ized evaluation of behavior based on multiple inputs. Multiple
trained observers and techniques are used. Judgements about
behavior are made, in part, from specially developed assess-
ment simulations.
These judgements are pooled by the assessors at an eval-
uation meeting during which all relevant assessment data are
reported and discussed, and the assessors agree on the eval-
uation of the dimensions and any overall evaluation that is
made.
The following kinds of activities do not constitute an
assessment center:
Panel interviews or a series of sequential interviews
as the sole technique.
Reliance on a specific technique (regardless of
whether a simulation or not) as the sole basis for evaluation.
Using only a test battery composed of a number of
pencil and paper measures, regardless of whether the judgements
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are made by a statistical or judgemental pooling of scores.
Single assessor assessment (often refered to as
individual assessment) - measurement by one individual using
a variety of techniques such as paper and pencil tests, inter-
views, personality measures, or simulations.
The use of several simulations with more than one
assessor where there is no pooling of data - i.e. each assessor
prepares a report on performance in an exercise, and the
individual reports (unintegrated) are used as the final
product of the center.
A physical location labeled as a "assessment center"
which does not conform to the requirements noted above.
3. Organizational Support for Assessment Center Operations
The assessment center should be administered in a pro-
fessional manner with concern for the treatment of individuals,
accuracy of results, and overall quality of the operation.
Assessment centers should be incorporated as part of a total
system rather than as a process that operates in a vacuum.
Considerable care and planning should precede the introduction
of an assessment center. Policy statements concerning assess-
ment operations should be formally developed and agreed upon
by the organization. Minimal considerations in developing
this policy should include:
The population to be assessed.
The purpose of assessment.
The kinds of people who will serve as assessors.
The type of training they receive and who is to provide
it.
The responsibility for administration of the center
Specific restrictions concerning who is to see the
assessment data, and how they are to be used.
Procedures for collection of data for research and
program evaluation.
Feedback procedure to participants and management.
Expected "life" of assessment center - i.e. the length
of time assessment center data will be kept in the files and
used for decision-making purposes.
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The professional qualifications (including relevant
training) of the individual or individuals initially respon-
sible for developing the center.
4. Assessor Training
Assessors should receive sufficient training to enable them
to evaluate intelligently the behaviors measured in the
center. "Sufficient training" will vary from organization
to organization and is a function of many factors including:
The length of time an individual serves as an assessor.
The frequency of individual participation as an assessor
The amount of time devoted to assessor training.
The qualification and expertise of the assessment
center trainer.
The assessment experience of other members of the
assessment staff.
The use of professionals (i.e. licensed or certified
psychologists) as assessors.
The above list is illustrative of the many issues related
to assessor training. There is more variability in this area
than in any other section of the standards.
While we do not wish to establish minimal standards
concerning the number of hours of assessor training needed,
it is difficult to imagine assessors functioning effectively
with only a one- or two-hour orientation prior to serving as
an assessor. However, whatever the approach to assessor
training the essential goal is attaining accurate assessor
judgements. A variety of training approaches can be used, as
long as it can be demonstrated that accurate assessor judge-
ments are obtained. The following minimum training is
required:
Knowledge of the assessment techniques used. This
could include, for example, the kinds of behaviors elicited
by each technique, relevant dimensions to be observed,
expected, or typical behaviors, examples or samples of actual
behaviors, etc.
Knowledge of the assessment dimensions. This could
include, for example, definitions of dimensions, relationship
to other dimensions, relationship to job performance, examples
of effective and ineffective performance, etc.
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Knowledge of behavior observation and recording
including the forms used by the center.
Knowledge of evaluation and rating procedures
including how data are integrated by the assessment center
staff.
Knowledge of assessment policies and practices of the
organization, including restrictions on how assessment data
are to be used.
Knowledge of feedback procedures where appropriate.
In addition, some measurement is needed indicating that
the individual being trained has the capability of functioning
as an assessor. The actual measurement of assessor performance
may vary and could, for example, include data in terms of
rating performance, critiques of assessor reports, observation
as an evaluator, etc. What is important is that assessor
performance is evaluated to insure that individuals are
sufficiently trained to function as assessors, prior to their
actual duties, and that such performance is periodically
monitored to insure that skills learned in training are
applied.
5. Informed Consent on the Part of the Participants
Informed consent is a fundamental concern in conducting an
assessment center program. This means that the participant is
given sufficient information prior to assessment to evaluate
intelligently the nature of the program and the consequences
of attending or not attending a center. While organizations
have the right to require participation in an assessment
program as a condition of employment or advancement, indi-
viduals should not simply be "sent" to a center with little
awareness of why they are going. Rather, they should be
provided with sufficient information to decide whether or
not they should attend.
While the actual information provided will vary from
organization to organization, the following basic information
should be given to all prospective participants:
The purpose of the center and the objectives of
the program.
How individuals are selected to participate in the
center.
General information about the assessors - the composition
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of the staff and their training.
General information concerning the assessment
process itself. This should include a description of the
techniques and how the results will be used, the kind of
feedback given.
Reassessment policy.
It is recognized that many assessment center programs
have descriptive names or titles which are often neutral or
purposefully general. This is an acceptable practice. How-
ever, it would be inappropriate to suggest to participants
that the assessment center is for personal development or
training when the clear intent is for selection or management
staffing.
6. Use of Assessment Center Data
One characteristic of an assessment center is the volume
of data produced. There are many different forms of assess-
ment data, ranging for example, from observer notes, to
reports on performance in the assessment techniques, to
assessor ratings, and reports prepared for management. The
preceding is not exhaustive and could also include participant
and peer reports and observations, biographical and test
data, etc.
The specific purpose of the reports and data obtained by
the assessment center should be clearly established. This
will include a statement concerning individuals who will have
access to assessment data, the kind of information they will
receive, and the format that will be provided.
The recipient of assessment data will be given sufficient
information or training so that the data provided can be
clearly interpreted. This will include an estimate of the
relevance of current assessment data for the use in the
future
.
The individual assessed should be informed of how the
assessment data are to be used. This will include:
Who has access to assessment reports.
Whether participants will normally receive feedback
concerning assessment performance. If not, provisions must
be made to provide such information upon specific request.
How long assessment data will be retained for operational






A major factor in the widespread acceptance and use
of assessment centers is directly related to an emphasis
on sound validation research. Numerous studies have been
conducted and reported in the professional literature demon-
strating the validity of the assessment center process in a
variety of organizational settings.
The historical record of the validity of this process,
however, cannot be taken as a guarantee that a given assess-
ment program will or will not be valid in a given setting.
Because of this, each user must ascertain the validity of
the program as applied to one's organization. The technical
standards and principles for validation are well documented
and appear in "Principles for the Validation and Use of
Personnel Selection Procedures" prepared by the Division of
Industrial and Organizational Psychology, American Psycho-
logical Association, 1975, and Standards for Educational
and Psychological Tests and Manuals" prepared by the American
Psychological Association, 1974.
In addition to the above standards which include Dro-
visions related to demonstrating fairness and validity, some
specific guidelines are provided for assessment center pro-
grams. These include:
The ability to document the selection of dimensions,
attitudes, or qualities evaluated in the center.
The ability to document the relationship of assess-
ment center techniques to specific dimensions, attributes,
or qualities evaluated.
The ability to document the demographic composition
of the assessment staff as representative of the group of
individuals assessed.
8. Concluding Statement
It became obvious in developing these standards that the
standards should serve as guidelines rather than doctrine.
Rather than create a set of standards that become ends in them-
selves, the authors attempted to provide a series of general
principles which can apply to both managers and professionals
using this technique. These standards should enable the
assessment center professional to create, implement, and main-
tain assessment center programs that protect the rights of the
individuals while meeting organizational needs at the same
time.
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CHAPTER III
2. An indicator variable is a variable from the test
battery which is either: (1) Significantly correlated
with competency elements mentioned in a critical
incident interview; or, (2) Correlated with the
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